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THE INTERNATIONAL
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APRIL, 1917.

THE INTERNATIONAL IDEA.

MAJOR E. CRAWSHAY-WILLIAMS.

Preface.

I AM writing this on service, in the intervals of military duty, and amid difficulties regarding materials, references, and so on. It may never be finished. One never knows. But despite all disadvantages of time and position the impulse is irresistible to put down even in a crude and general form certain ideas to the peaceful growth of which war has put the ripening touch. The result will be, I know, not any profound or exhaustive study of a great subject; but, at the best, an attempt at suggestion and inspiration. Nevertheless I shall write. One cannot live through this war—at least I cannot—without being filled with a fierce longing for humanity to redeem itself in the future from a state of international barbarism, and with an aching desire to help, if only in the smallest way, in the work of redemption. One cannot stay idle, or without expression;—I cannot. And one is consoled for the presumption of daring publicity by the reflection that the more thoughts—even trite and inadequate thoughts, indifferently expressed—that are put forward tending in the right direction, the more assurance will be given that the right path will be taken.

The time is short and precious. I will waste no more words in preface but get to my task.

Why then, and for what are we waiting? There are three words to speak:
We will it, and what is the foeman but the dream-strong wakened and weak.

(William Morris: "Pilgrims of Hope.")

I.

Nationality and Internationality.

Be certain about your goal before you set out for it.

This sounds like, and is, a platitude. But many splendid platitudes live lives that are in the main obscure, neglected, and without effect. This is one of them. With only too many people (as with Stevenson's youth) the great thing is to go. The direction is not so important.

Let us be certain about our goal.

Is internationalism a good thing? If so, absolutely? or with qualifications?

There are, roughly, three aspects of mind towards internationalism. There is the aspect of mind which envisages the nations of the world as individuals—each self-contained and un-blending; each an entity in itself, *teres atque rotundus*. There is the aspect of mind which sees in the collected nationalities only an assemblage of human beings,—of variegated and divers human beings, but of beings essentially the same in nature and potentiality, and making one tremendous whole. The first mind will call the second mind visionary and futile; the second mind will call the first mind narrow and wrong. There is a third aspect of mind, which is an intermediate one. It recognizes nations as individuals, with the first mind; and humanity as a collection of substantially similar mortals, with the second mind; and it can see the intrinsic good in each conception. The result is that it comes to regard the world as an assemblage of individual nations, differing (as is proper and beneficial) in characteristics, but so bound together by mutual needs and inspirations as to necessitate the formation and recognition of a sort of comradeship or association towards common ends.

This type of mind will reason thus about the specific virtues of nationalism and internationalism respectively:

"I see that a common and unrelieved monotony of bowler-hatted uniformity would be an abomination of desolation. (Not that I believe nature would ever permit of such!) I am quite convinced that variety of manner, custom, tradition, sentiment, and ways of living is as essential and excellent among nations as among individuals. I should deplore that the hard-headed commonsense of the North and the sunny buoyancy of the South should be blent into a colourless (if theoretically perfect) average. I know that the nations should jealously preserve their national traits; their distinctive dress, their peculiar speech, their individual habits of thought. But I am absolutely sure that some co-operation among the nations is desirable, indeed necessary, in the common interests of humanity. And I believe that the advantages of such co-operation can be attained without losing the advantages of independent nationality."

That is how such a type of mind will reason.

It is a question whether one can think too broadly in this matter. It is a question whether nature would not have her way and produce variety however much man tried to produce uniformity. It is a question whether, even though fashion decreed felt hats for all; though law prescribed similar rules for every nation; though coinage, measures, stamps, tariffs, and the materials of life were as far as possible standardized, the seeds of nationality would not still flourish in the new soil. Climate and heredity, the great influencing factors in nationality, would still hold their sway. The sun and story of Spain would still ensure a race of hot-blooded men and amorous women; the hills and history of Wales would still send forth their strange, melancholy dreamers; the soft skies and hard persecutions of Ireland would still make the Irish a race of poets and rebels. Even travel and inter-marriage, even cars that covered a hundred miles an hour, trains that took men five thousand miles a day, or flying machines that circled the world in a week, would not be potent to undo nature's forces.

But it is no question at all that it is possible to think too narrowly in this matter. Shortness of vision, insularity, international ignorance, call it what you will, lies at the root of international evil. Nor does nature help here. Nature can keep a man a Scotchman wherever he goes, but nature cannot make him travel. Nature can salt an English family with the Irish flavour by three generations' residence in Ireland; but nature will not take the family to Ireland. Nature, in a word, can take care of nationality; but it cannot take care of internationality. That is man's work. And a work he can pursue, at all events for the present, and probably for all time, with no qualms lest he go too far. For he can accomplish the good, that is certain; but it is doubtful whether nature will let him accomplish any ill. Be that as it eventually may, there is a vast area of undebatable ground ahead in the work of promoting internationalism. So far as we can see into the future our goal is purely good; the international idea can be freely and vigourously pursued.

How? How far? Those are matters of practicability; and it is from theory to practice that we can, and must, now proceed.

Let it be granted, then, that the conception of nationality and internationality which we have endorsed is, so to speak, a system of humanity in which the simple figure representing each nation is resolved into a numerator of nationality standing over a common denominator of internationality. Our task is to determine that common denominator, and to decide how it is to be attained.

Now the scope of this common denominator of internationality, the matter in which the nations shall have a common understanding, will be the subject of what I have to write after this. Suffice it to say that there is undoubtedly a number of matters in which it would pay the nations to come to some common agreement.

As to methods, there we come to a wide and difficult subject. Matters of machinery will be gone into later, and the way of treating various problems will be best dealt with

as those problems arise. But on the general subject of how to get mankind to go forward at all, there is a word to be said. Briefly, we must get men to conceive of the international idea; to think more internationally. There are two great civilizing influences in this direction; travel and education. By travel a man loses (unless he be exceptionally stupid) much of his narrow insularity. By education he can be drawn towards broader and more generous ideals of human life. If we are to succeed in our task of attaining a larger internationalization of the world, we must use these tools that lie to our hand. Travel must be promoted and facilitated. Even the poor man must be able to appreciate the life of foreign nations. (In this direction the war will have done much.) And we must educate. That is at once easier and more difficult. Easier, because we can educate at once, and at home, and without new machinery. We have the apparatus, we have only to use it well. More difficult, because we have to convert and inspire the directors of our educational policy (and other nations have to convert and inspire theirs) before we can do anything. Moreover, more is implicated by "education" than the grounding of the young in general principles or in such particular practical details of international subjects as can form the material for international instruction to-day, or may be recommended in later articles. Much can be done that way. The young mind may be given an international bent; it may be equipped linguistically, socially, and materially to avail itself of the advantages of internationalism. But we must also proselytize among the men and women of to-day. Their minds must also turn in the direction of internationalism. Therefore the great need is that there should be earnest and energetic apostles of internationalism. Let us cry the truth, and it shall then prevail.

There are great practical problems ahead of constructive minds in this matter of internationalism. Let us by all means discuss and elucidate them. Let us prepare the way. But the first great thing is to get mankind to think more internationally.

II.

War and Law.

I suppose nobody save a fanatic would deny that it would be a good thing if the nations settled their differences by some sort of peaceful arbitration instead of by war. The manifest futility of the argument of brute force as opposed to that of reason and justice; the patent horrors of carnage and mutilation; the crushing financial burdens and the appalling material waste, entailed by an appeal to arms, —in a word the calamitous folly of the whole business,— must outweigh anything that could be advanced in favour of militarism as a training school of courage and health, and so on. No; the serious man's misgivings as to schemes of international arbitration are not of a theoretic but of a practical nature. "It's all right," he says, "but it can't be done."

Well, it can be done. It could be done to-morrow.

Of this subject above all others it is true that:

> ". . . There are three words to speak:
> *We will it*, and what is the foeman but the dream-strong wakened and weak."

Two things indeed, both immediately attainable, are needed in order to substitute law for war among the nations: faith and work. Faith to inspire clear-sighted confidence in the practicability of the task; work to carry it out.

This is not all a dream; it is hard fact. To believe in it one need not be a visionary indulging in hopes of a human nature free from sin and malice and filled with brotherly love; one need not preach the abandonment of force and the substitution of a gentle reasonableness. One can be, and must be, a hard-headed and intelligent human being, basing his schemes and theories simply on the facts of life. But one must have faith. And one must work.

Faith does not mean blind faith. The true faith sees very clearly. In fact it is itself a kind of clearness of vision, induced by throwing off prejudice, timidity, and distrust. And our first task must be to strip our subject of all false,

visionary, and immaterial encumbrances. First as to force. One must have no dreams or illusions about force. Force is the ultimate argument of humanity. It is—at present at all events—the sanction of law. Behind the law must be force; where would laws be without the police? But force must be properly applied. It must be, not individual and capricious force, but co-operative and reasonable force. When the world is truly civilized it will still employ force; but it will be force behind the law, not obscuring it.

Here is the kernel and crux of the whole matter. How are we to, not do away with force, but ensure its application in its proper capacity? In the old days individual barons and chieftains, collecting armed men, were able to impose their arbitrary will on their neighbours. With the broadening of civilization these exhibitions of individual and capricious force were rendered impossible and useless, and the common will, supported by centralized and co-operative force reigned supreme. More than this, directly the new régime superseded the old, it became unprofitable and useless, as well as lawless, for individuals to sustain their private armaments. These armaments therefore disappeared. How can this process be made to take place internationally, as it has taken place nationally?

There is no impossibility about it. It is possible to have a community of nations "keeping the peace"; punishing and preventing infractions of the peace; having at their disposal for these purposes sufficient force to take the matter in time and suppress attempts to supplant an appeal to the tribunals by individual violence;—in fact, it is possible to put an end to international rowdyism. Make no mistake; it is possible; and it will be done sooner or later. Why not sooner? Most important perhaps of all, the substitution of law *plus* co-operative force for anarchy *plus* individual force will mean the passing away of the need or use of great national armaments. It will be as foolish to have a huge standing army in any state as it would be to carry a revolver in Piccadilly.

Now all this can be done, and can be done just as soon as a sufficient number of persons realize that it can be done.

Three things are necessary:

(1) Laws.

(2) A tribunal.

(3) The sanction, or force, behind.

The laws are not the chief difficulty. The difficulty is to prevent their being disobeyed. Even if they are not perfect laws, it is better to have indifferent laws than anarchy. The law is notoriously a "hass," but he is better than a raging lion.

Most of this also applies to the tribunal. Granted that we cannot obtain an assembly of supermen, we can yet obtain a body of well-meaning persons who will say something. The great thing is to see that what they say "goes." County court judges are not Solomons, but their judgments are carried out—without rioting.

Moreover, it is very important to remember that such an international tribunal need not be a Parliament of Man or Federation of the World; it need have scarcely any deliberative or executive functions. It need have only two essentially simple duties; first, to register the agreements made between nations, and secondly to see that in case of discord, recourse is had to arbitration, and the world's peace is kept. A third duty might, and would naturally in the end, fall to the share of this tribunal—to decide on the particular cases of dispute which might arise. But at first it might be best to reserve this duty for *ad hoc* courts, composed of members who should be (as in cases of trade disputes) agreed upon by both sides. The great thing is, to keep the peace; to see that arbitration and not war is appealed to;—even, to gain time. Most wars would never occur if nations had to wait a week or two before they plunged into them.

There should be no question not referable to arbitration. "Honour" has been found to be an insufficient reason for individuals killing one another irrationally; it should be an insufficient reason for nations killing one another irrationally.

And, as in the case of national law, "breaking the peace" should be enough to bring in the police. "No rowdyism! Come and settle it in court." Whether "carrying arms" (internationally) should be prevented, or whether, as in civilized places, it would fall into disuse through the growth of a sense of lawfulness, and a recognition of the futility of doing so, is a point which need not now concern us. But, as to "breaking the peace"; mobilization of any kind could be held to constitute this. War should be nipped in the bud.

How?

Now we come to the crux and kernel of the whole;—the sanction of the international will;—the force behind the tribunal. This is where the risk of a collapse of our scheme occurs; this is where the schemes of many well-intentioned persons do collapse. But schemes need not collapse here.

What is our problem? It is to place behind the will-of-nations-to-prevent-war a sufficient force to carry that will into operation. It is this force that is the chief point, the laws and the tribunal are much less material—shadowy things, merely representing in some sort of concrete form that will-of-nations-to-have-the-peace-kept—organizing and distributing machinery for the force. The force is the thing.

In order to get at the nature and form of this force let us presume a world agreed to prevent war; agreed that if treaties are to be kept and the peace maintained some kind of force must be present behind "scraps of paper" and pious resolutions; agreed that to organize and dispose that force some centralized machinery is necessary—no, we will not yet presume that last point; let us presume they jib at any kind of centralized executive and see how we get on. Because a very common and influentially-supported scheme to employ force in the interests of international peace, is through a league of peace whereby certain nations—or all nations—agree to take steps, without any centralized management, acting simply in concert, to stop war breaking out.

Now heaven forbid that one should do or say anything to check the nations in even the smallest advance down the road to a truer civilization! And a league of peace would be a step forward, a large step forward; perhaps, even, a decisive step forward. But I, at least, do not think it will ultimately be found to meet the case completely, and I think there will be found two inherent defects in the scheme. These two defects are liability to intrigue and lack of plans.

Suppose in order to stop the probability of rioting in the case of trade disputes you were to say: "We will not have any actual police; but the masters shall train one body of men, the men another, who shall prevent rioting if feeling runs high over a dispute." Supposing, even, you said (let us say in the coal industry): "There will also be trained bodies of men belonging to the railways, the cotton industry, the engineering trade, and so on, to all of whom will fall the duty of helping to insure peace." Would you rely on it that there would be peace? Would you not expect that, when the emergency arose, each of these bodies would have private sympathies, and that it would, in practice, be found impossible to quell the one trouble without starting a greater?

Would it not be so among the nations? You cannot expect national prejudice, national antipathy, national hate or love, to disappear at the blast of a trumpet.

Then as to lack of plans. If there be no centralized machinery, how are eventualities to be prepared for? Is the League of Peace to have one plan to deal with Germany, another with England, another with Italy, and so on? Then it virtually does become a central body—a hampered and clumsy one, it is true, but a central body with deliberative and executive functions. If no such plans are to be made, you will find the nations falling into the old cliques and associations to protect their own interests —to prevent war against *themselves*, and things will be much as they were.

No; we want a centralized body, however shadowy and limited in scope, to organize and dispose the force which is

to keep the world-peace. And, instead of a league of individual nations, as it were red and green and blue and white in their national temper and proclivities, we want a truly international force, homogeneous, impartial—an even and sober grey; like the police. A policeman may have been a collier or a shopkeeper or a landlord (of a public-house, not of an estate) or anything else; but once he has put on his uniform he is a policeman. And at any rate there are so many more policemen around him who have been something else than he has been that it is little use his showing his personal prejudice, if he has any.

What is possible in national life in this matter is possible in international life. It is only a matter of seeing it is possible. I will give a practical illustration—very briefly.

Say I command a battery. To-day my officers and men are all English. I am in France—or India—or Egypt. I am there on England's behalf. Why should my officers and men not be of mixed nationality? Why should not I have a Russian captain; one French, one Austrian, one American lieutenant? The men, similarly. (Language you will say?—we will come to that later, in the next section. Suffice it to say; that difficulty can be removed.) Why should not we be here in an international, not a national, interest; to see the peace is kept?—to police the place. Why should not there be, scattered throughout the world—on land, on sea—other units, like my own, sent there to see order is kept? Why should there not be plans made to cope with any situation of violence; to take it in time and suppress it? Why should there not be a great international force, manned and officered by all nations? It would be a splendid and fascinating force to which to belong. Naturally one would not be called upon to police (or to serve against) one's own land. One would travel. One would mix with diverse men of many nations. One would be taking part in the greatest work of mankind. It would be the Premier Service of the world.

And it would abolish war. It would render armaments (except, perhaps, for domestic police purposes) useless and

unnecessary. The world would be ruled by law—*and* force; by law with force behind it;—not by a utopian spirit of law abidingness; but by law and the police.

There is no impossibility in all this. It could be brought about to-morrow, if the world (or even a large part of it) were only to speak those three magic words: *We will it.*

III.

An International Language.

I remember when I was in Moscow about twelve years ago meeting some delightful young Russian students of my own age. We foregathered in the garden of the *pension* in which I was staying; we came together at dances; we even went mild excursions together. They knew a little German and somewhat less French; I knew a little French and somewhat less German. And once one of them voiced what we all felt.

"If only we could get over this clumsy difficulty of speech," he said, "how good it would be. Our thoughts are all there, in our heads; but I cannot give you my thoughts properly; nor can you give yours to me. O! that we could! We should be even better friends. We should understand one another better."

That young Russian was dealing with one of the prime obstacles to internationalism,—or at all events to that international thinking and frame of mind which is so essential to any international progress. To most men the language, literature, expression, and thought, of any other nation but their own is either a sealed book, or a book in which they can catch only a hazy and imperfect understanding—often only a misunderstanding—of the general sense. How can the nations be full friends, true friends, with this gulf of uncomprehension between them? How could even a man and his wife be full and true friends if they had to communicate by broken sentences—nods and signs—gestures? Translations and interpreters do something, it is true; but not very much. Imagine the man and wife—and an interpreter! No; the only solution for the

nations (as for the man and wife) must be a tolerable and working knowledge of some one tongue. With this, international amity, understanding, and peace, would be a vast stride nearer full realization. The nations would be able to get directly in touch, instead of relying on second-hand means of inter-communication. There would be one common method of expression, into which anyone could slip when he wished to make himself universally intelligible —if there were an international language.

There could be an international language, universally understood, in a generation. Universally understood;—sporadically it would be understood much sooner. At once, from the day it was initiated, it would begin to spread its filaments in amongst the dense mass of international ignorance. But in a generation it would be competently understood by a majority of all nations, and would be currently used for a multitude of subjects. A generation is a long time, it may be said. Not to ensure international understanding for ever afterwards.

The international language of which I am thinking would not be any *ad hoc* language. I should like to be very careful not to tread on the corns of Esperantists and other special-linguists; but I confess I see grave disadvantages and difficulties in trying to make universal any *ad hoc* language. In the first place, everyone has to learn such a language. Even the teachers have to learn it. Next, such languages have no history, tradition or literature. Lastly, they have something of the air of patent medicines; they are a specific—a fad. Or at least, so they inevitably seem to a large majority.

What then?

Well, if we are not to have some *ad hoc* universal language, one of the existing languages must be made the universal language. And obviously it cannot become the only, the world, language. It must stand in every country side by side with that country's language. It must be taught compulsorily in the schools; it must be made the medium for all international dealings, and even national

proclamations, laws, and so on, should be published parallel in the native and the international language. Newspapers would all of them have columns or pages in the international language. And wherever any foreigner was present, the international language would be talked.

This is no dream, no impossibility, this vision of a world of bi-lingual nations. Go to Wales, you will find how simple it is to teach a child to be bi-lingual. And it is no hindrance, but a help, to the general intelligence of the child to have a bi-lingual education. Think, too, of the increased pleasure and interest in life that is opened out to the bi-lingual child. Two literatures, the newspapers and gossip and friendships of two nations; nay, of all nations. It is little exaggeration to say that a thorough bi-lingual education could add fifty per cent to the possibilities of happiness for an intelligent child.

Which would be the international language? and how would it be instituted?

To take the first question by itself; after it had been decided in principle by a congress of nations to adopt a secondary, or international, language in all those nations, a council of linguistic and educational experts could be assembled and charged with the task of deciding which (after their own tongue, of course!) was the most suitable language to be adopted. Facility of pronunciation, simplicity of grammar, and other such points would decide the question in the main. One language would be chosen as the world-wide means of communication.

Then would come the business of making the chosen language universal. It would be a long and at first a laborious task. Many grown people would, no doubt, at once gladly start, and soon accomplish, a thorough study of the selected tongue. But the main work, the decisive work, would have to be done by the states. Teachers would have to be obtained, as far as possible, from the native country of the universal language. The state schools would not only teach the language, but they would soon teach (for part of the time) *in* the language. During

certain hours conversation would be in only the universal tongue. As far as possible all education and school life would be bi-lingual. Quite a different matter from the "French hour" or "German hour" of to-day. And none of this time would be wasted. Nor would the task be so difficult as would appear. Remember, it is the child we are taking. A baby can learn two languages almost as easily as one.

And when these babies grew up, the world would be of one tongue. There would be no bar to business, to friendship, to communion of ideas. We should be all able to speak together. Man would have defeated nature. We should be back beyond Babel!

IV.

Standardization.

Wherever a traveller goes to a fresh country he meets with, roughly, the same materials of life, but a different method of dealing with them. He finds money—gold, silver, copper, nickel; but coins of different values from those in his own land. He finds rice and corn and sugar; but a different scale of weighing them. He finds a postage system; but different stamps; crimes; but different laws; in a word, the working parts of life are to a different measure from those he has known.

Now, here, as elsewhere in this question of nationality and internationality, a dead level of similarity would be an evil. Over-standardization in nations would be as cramping and blighting as it would be, say, in the motor trade, where scope for individual taste and initiative must be duly blended with a certain useful amount of interchangeability. It would be a crime, even if it were a possibility, to condemn all nations, say, to our own coinage or stamps. Even did we get the best (to the general mind), it would be wrong to compel a minority to adopt it. The whims of man must be respected—where they are not actually harmful.

But between this nightmare of universality and the present utter absence of any standardization or reciprocity,

there is a mean. Much could be done towards facilitating the intercourse of nations by a judicious *rapprochement*, a politic surrender of prejudice on the part of those the basis of whose system was clearly inferior to that of their neighbours. Reciprocity or harmonization, where standardization was impracticable, would smooth many difficulties away. If one nation cannot have, say, the same laws as another, it can at all events avoid such a clash as must inflict injustice (as is the case at present in divorce law). Even if different coins are used, they can be divided in similar proportions, and, subject to fluctuation of credit, possess a clear relative value.

And here we come to perhaps the chief point where reform is possible, and where we are the ones to bring it about. Almost all other nations have adopted the decimal system in coinage, weights, measures, etc. It is clearly the best and simplest system, and were we in possession of such a system and another nation had ours, no objurgation would be too great for us to pour upon the offender's head. No doubt there are technical difficulties in the way of the change. There are always technical difficulties in the way of any change. There were insurmountable technical difficulties in the way of the Daylight Saving Bill. Yet, as in that case, when it comes to the point, technical difficulties need not stand in the way of a real reform. And were we to adopt the decimal system so far as it can be applied, we might, doubtless, suffer some temporary inconvenience; but we should confer a lasting benefit on, not only foreign nations, but on our future generations.

Into details as to the standardizing, or harmonizing, of coinage, weights, measures, postage and so on it is not possible here to go. But, generally, there might be, if not identity, some simple ratio in these between the nations of the world. A universal postage stamp might take its place beside the national stamps. Coins might be internationally valid without the present difficulties of changing—instances are plentiful already of various currencies being valid at the same time in the same place, and this could be

extended. Briefly, the citizen of one state could pay a visit to another without having, in many matters at all events, to learn a new system and assume a new equipment. All this would make considerably for international convenience, prosperity, and amity.

These questions, and deeper ones, such as similarity or reciprocity in laws and even perhaps in commercial matters, might be worked out by international committees for submission to their respective parliaments. What is certain is that any effort towards standardization would have a large field to work on and, in the end, a fruitful result.

V.

An International Party.

Some objects suitable for international treatment have now been suggested. It remains to discuss what better means than those at present existing can be devised to hasten and facilitate action. International committees, *ad hoc* conferences, excellent-minded Hague tribunals, are all very well; but what we want is practical results. To ensure these an increased internationality of thinking is a powerful factor; it will demand to see something done. But there must also be the machinery, the material means. And any sublime ideas of a Parliament of Man are, at present at all events, too altruistic and visionary. We must proceed by smaller and more practicable steps.

Now, one most desirable element in the campaign for the international idea is a great leader. He is a matter for fate and for opportunity. It is to be hoped that he will show himself. He will find much of the world ready to acclaim him.

But, given the leader, or a number of earnest and vigorous leaders, more is wanted. The leader, or leaders, must not waste their energies on a vague mass of thought; on unco-ordinated and impotent humanity. There must be a machine for them to direct. There are, of course, the existing national machines, and through them in the end

definite action must come. But still more is necessary. A complementary means to the leader and the national assembly is the establishment of international politics as a live and potent force. This would be the tool with which the new leader could effect his purposes. For just as we must labour under no illusions as to international peace being attainable by treaties or understandings or pledges, without force behind to see them kept, so we must labour under no illusions that effect can be produced in the sphere of international affairs by any less material means than in that of national affairs. Academic aspirations and conferences will produce little; the brute force of the vote can produce much.

Now, statesmen may discard the idea of any present form of international control; the average man may call him who believes it is bound to come a vain dreamer; but no one can prevent those in every country who desire a step forward towards internationality organizing themselves into a body, with all adequate machinery to make their ideas known and their force felt. The period immediately following the war would obviously be the most propitious for starting such a party of Internationalists; and it is possible—nay, probable—that such a movement, then initiated, would have powerful and lasting effects.

The Internationalists need not be, and must not be, an assemblage of academic idealists. They must have a reasonable and practical programme, and all the proper means of pushing it. They must make their pressure felt in the orthodox manner, through the polling booth. They must be a super-party; covering and permeating all parties everywhere.

The objection will at once be raised that the Internationalists would be doomed to failure because their success would never be more than partial, *i.e.*, they would succeed in one country and fail in another, and so their international ideal would automatically be destroyed. For instance, say some scheme of international limitation of armaments, promoted by the Internationalists, were

endorsed by a majority of the members of the House of Commons, but not by a majority of the members of the Reichstag—where would internationalism be then? And who would care to pledge himself to support disarmament, without first knowing whether the rest of the world would do likewise?

The answer to this is that a condition qualifying the international programme should be its international acceptance—either absolutely, or over a certain minimum and effective number of states. This might postpone success—or it might accelerate it.

Suppose a candidate for the Reichstag were to be asked: "Are you in favour of such and such a scheme of limitation of armaments *provided that the rest of the world agrees to the same?*"—would he not be more likely to subscribe to it, than to an unqualified declaration in favour of the same scheme? Similarly, in all countries. And the result might be—if such schemes were kept sane and practical—that one fine day we should look round and find that a majority in the requisite number of states had been obtained in favour of a definite scheme. The "*We will it*" of William Morris would have been spoken, and "the foeman" would verily be "the dream-strong, wakened and weak."

This illustration serves to show that the Internationalists would be a party working behind, or rather, perhaps, independently of all other parties and party organizations. They would appeal direct to the people, and their results would indeed be the voice of the people unqualified by the trammels of national party interests, titles, rewards and so on.

The Internationalists though working independently of, and so to speak across, ordinary party interests and programmes, would probably have in the main to speak and act through the ordinary party candidates and members in every state. In some places where internationalism was strong, and particularly where some system of proportional representation was in force, they could get directly-elected members (though the advisability or need of these may be

questioned, except for the purpose of initiating legislation, and alertly guarding the international interest). But there could be, and would need to be, no international Government or executive; not even a large number of Internationalist members in Parliament—only an organization and a programme. For the rest, there would be the national assemblies; the old parties. There need be no waiting.

What would be wanted would be:

(1) Organization.

(2) Men of ability.

(3) Money.

These, joined to inspiration and hard work could soon produce an international body of opinion whose weight would be felt in all the council chambers of the world.

This is no place to go into details, which could fill pages;—details as to programmes; places and times and methods of meetings; modes of propaganda; enterprises, such as a paper (*The Internationalist*), International clubs, tours, and so on. These can be worked out, if only the principle be conceded, and the project entered upon.

The real point is; there is a need, there is an opportunity, and there is a field of practical work. Not only do guarantees against war, sanctions to compel arbitration and obedience to its decrees, limitation of armaments, and such vital human matters cry for truly international treatment; but there is a host of other and minor matters, such as language, weights and measures, and harmonizing of laws, about which the heads of our international party could usefully busy themselves. There is plenty of work crying to be done.

ELIOT CRAWSHAY-WILLIAMS.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

IS MANKIND WORTHY OF PEACE?

WILBUR M. URBAN.

I.

ON A hundred battlefields—out of unnumbered skulls, monuments were raised to Genghis Khan. Of what consist the monuments of Cæsar, of Attila, of Napoleon? In the last analysis, though indirectly of the same stuff. War is war. Whether it be waged in the name of barbarism or civilization, through blind lust of power, for honor or for still nobler motives, war is war. Must it always be, must it through all the long ages remain the same? Is this worthy of humanity? More than ever at the present moment must man ask himself this question—at this moment when even the poets, those eulogists of war, draw back with cries of horror: this is no longer merely war, but some nameless diabolical thing—undreamed of by very Mars himself.

The idea of a perpetual, universal peace has always stood on the human horizon as a self-evident, self-illuminating ideal. One must indeed be blind of heart and mind not to see it. The laying down of weapons, universal disarmament, war against war, the brotherhood of nations, universal arbitration, the union of civilized peoples into a world state, the establishment of a high court of the nations before which all the disputes of the nations can be brought, and which would treat any nation which threatened the peace precisely as the single nation treats the disturber of the peace, the murderer, the criminal—is not this eirenic ideal the hope of every right-feeling man, the goal toward which all the moral and political development of mankind points and which will earlier or later be attained? And if our heart is convinced, is not our reason also? For, so the usual analogies run, as it has been possible to bring the many egoistic individuals into the peace-

ful and peace-conserving unity of the state, so is it possible, at least in principle, to bring the many egoistic nations into the more inclusive unity of a world state or federation. The idea is self-evident, the induction seems at the first glance indisputable. And so, for more than a century and a half, a long series of minds of the first order—from the Abbé de St. Pierre and Rousseau to Kant, from Kant to Cobden, and Elihu Burritt, and from these to Tolstoi and the innumerable peace advocates of the present day, this idea of a perpetual peace has been worked out more and more completely and pressed home to the hearts and minds of men. If then—despite all this, the idea is still greeted by many with an ironical shaking of the head, by others declared in deepest sorrow to be still a phantom from Utopia, must it not be because in all our discussion there is an element in the problem not yet adequately taken account of—some unknown factor that disturbs the entire reckoning?

II.

It is the belief of many that the peace propaganda has been gradually passing from the utopian to the scientific stage. Despite widespread theoretical acceptance it is now generally realized that the earlier proposals are without results. A universal tribunal would have practical value only when there stood behind it a supreme power, a highest neutral world power as greatly superior to single peoples and nations as the single state is to its citizens and subjects. Failing this, and so far as human calculation goes, the future contains no promise of such a world state; the only practical constructions have been treaties and balances of power, the limitations of which are obvious. On the other hand, the hopes of Kant and others, placed upon the gradual growth of commerce, have been put to shame by the unexpected developments of commerce itself —the quite unforeseen treason by which trade has taken to itself all the principles if not the accoutrements of war. The proposals of the World Peace Foundation with its League to Enforce Peace, are held to be more scientific

in that they build upon existent practical constructions of treaties and balances. Yet, in so far as nations know no law but necessity, manifest destiny and sacred egoism, such a league is powerless. When President Lowell candidly recognizes that a "nation can hardly bind one to wage war on another with which it has no quarrel, to enforce a decision or a recommendation of whose wisdom or justice it may not itself be heartily convinced," he has admitted all the utopian "water" with which the stock of the Foundation is so generously filled. All honor to those who do any thinking at all upon this question. But no candid or thoughtful man will overvalue such thoughts. Under the surface of the League, the volcano will still glow and rumble, ready to break forth, now here, now there, in ever new craters.

Of a totally different sort are the proposals of that chief apostle of the peace propaganda in modern times, Leo Tolstoi, with his doctrine of non-resistance. This, at the first sight the most visionary and impracticable of all peace proposals, really goes most deeply to the heart of the matter. In the hands of International Socialism it has undergone a development which has tended to lift it from the sphere of the utopian into the world of the actual. The "break-down" of Socialism at this point has created much sadness, and more secret satisfaction. But if it be true, as there is every reason to believe, that the plans of mobilization of several of the great European states included orders for the arrest and imprisonment of Socialist leaders, it is proof that the propaganda, though it had not gone far enough, had at least reached the point where it was taken seriously as "war against war." Since the great war itself, Mr. Bertrand Russell has worked manfully to raise the principle of non-resistance from the realm of emotion to that of reason, to extend its application from individuals and classes to peoples and states. An amused toleration of the "fatuous philospher" has been followed by conviction under "the defense of the realm" act. But one such determined and consequent thinker as Mr. Russell is worth

more to the peace propaganda, if it is to be taken seriously at all, than all the Hague Tribunals. One French Socialist, deserting the colors because the promise that he should not be compelled actually to fight was not honored; returning to his little school house, there to remain quietly until he was found and taken out to be shot; one such school master is worth all the Leagues to Enforce Peace. Mr. F. B. Vrooman finds something infinitely amusing in our American peace talk—that we should "count on stamping willy-nilly, a Chatauqua civilization upon the rest of the world." Of such stuff is much of pacifism made. But not Tolstoi's, not that of International Socialism. Neither attempts that combination of contradictories so disastrous to the moral health of babes and sucklings,—a milk and water Christianity with the corrosive acid of modern competitive industry.

III.

That which makes this latter sort of propaganda powerful is an absolute belief in the absolute value of peace. This conviction underlies all consequent pacifism. It is the possession of this faith that makes the utopian forms strong; the lack of it which makes the practical forms ultimately and essentially weak. This leads us to a second deeper and really fundamental question: whether then, lasting peace among the nations is unconditionally desirable, whether it is an absolute postulate and ideal.

There are those, of course, who praise war just as there are those who praise egoism. They are, for the most part, honorable, honest, and deep-thinking men, thoroughly convinced and far from frivolous. With their arguments we are thoroughly familiar and, at the present moment, have little patience. Nor is there any need to point out the equivocations and sophistries of these arguments, historical and biological. They have been made entirely familiar by a long line of criticisms of which Viscount Bryces' Atlantic Article is but the splendid culmination. Enough! If we played with these ideas before the war, we

are in no mood for them now. Yet at this very moment let us remember that we not only played with them, but that they were, and still are, the secret *credo* of a large part of us. Between the Treitschkes and Bernhardis and many of us quiet citizens, the only difference is one of courage and logic. With what dismay must many an Englishman have seen his own real convictions expressed openly in the opinions of Earl Kitchener, made public by Mr. Richard Barry after his death. "We shall always need and always have soldiers. Without the military spirit nations decay. The basis of all sound government is the military spirit. As for industrial, commercial, and economic life, I would say that nothing in it can endure without the military spirit." Now it is one thing to praise war. It is another thing, of course, to hold that it is necessarily implicit in the forms and values of our civilization. But war is not made by its eulogists, but by those who consider it inevitable. Not by those who accord it unstinted praise, but by those who call it, even grudgingly, a conditional good. Nietzsche's dictum, that "there has never been a bad war," may rouse our fiercest indignation, and we may feel very virtuous over our feeling. But until we cry, "there has never been a good war"—and until our conception of humanity and civilization makes that cry inevitable, perpetual peace is a phantom from Utopia. Is peace then an absolute good? Whether we will or not, we are forced to ask this question.

We hear much of the ignobility of "peace at any price." Ordinarily it refers to peace at the expense of national honor or supreme interest. But the same principle may be extended even to the ideal of universal peace itself. Let us assume that the longed-for goal were reached; that war were definitely abolished, that all the nations on this terrestrial ball formed a world state, etc., etc. There would still be the question whether mankind would be worthy of all this glory. Suppose this pacified human race consisted wholly of men given up to material interests and pleasures, little souls without any sense for the great and the noble—to what end were such a race of pitiful

souls in existence at all? Suppose international peace were assured for all time, but only because mankind had become a race of weaklings and cowards, whose need of peace arose only from fear of pain and death—what would this everlasting peace be worth? Suppose finally, such a peace, brought about only by egoistic and material interests, were used only for the peaceful exploitation of the lives and energies of men? Would this laughing, golden age (!) be better than an age of iron, of successive wars of noble virile nations pursuing their ideals, and after the work of war is done, turning all their energies to science and the arts and crafts? Enough! Peace in itself is not unconditionally desirable. It is not a categorical but only an hypothetical imperative. Quite apart from the question whether such a peace could be lasting, it would be wholly lacking in worth. This is the eternal truth in all the exaggerated and dithyrambic cries of "Human, all too human," in the "Everlasting Nay" against all civilization and morality that make prosperity and peace an unconditional good. *Only then is perpetual peace worthy when mankind is worthy of that peace.*

Here then is the crux of the whole matter. From this fundamental axiom all serious discussion of peace, ideal or practical, must proceed. I fancy most men know this in their hearts. It is this interior knowledge,—of some inescapable, some *a priori* relation if you will, between the value of peace and the worthiness of our humanity and civilization, that makes us so impatient of much of pacifism. It is the belief also in an equally necessary relation between the present ideals of civilization, and the values of war, so honestly expressed by Earl Kitchener, that makes us skeptical of most practical proposals. When a man feels himself unworthy of the object of his desire and love, it is no mere abstract sense of unworthiness, but a very concrete and genuine doubt as to whether he is the sort of man that could keep that love. When men beat their breasts and cry out that they are unworthy of heaven, it is partly at least because, like Mark Twain's Captain Storm-

field, they do not know what in heaven's name they would do with it when they got there.

IV.

Here then we stand at the point where these two questions may be seen to merge into one. Is the pacifist ideal possible? Is it unconditionally desirable? They are inextricably bound up together and the nature of their subtle connection can now be brought to light. Peace is desirable only when mankind deserves it. But it is possible also only when he deserves and earns it. At the beginning we asked, is war worthy of humanity? Had we not better ask, is humanity at present worthy of anything but war?

There are two kinds of skeptics that must always be carefully distinguished. There is the cynic, skeptical because he holds mankind in such low esteem, and the ironic, skeptical because he holds him so high. To the latter we should always listen, in the matter of peace, as in all other fundamental questions. Is man's inhumanity to man a defect mostly of morals or of intelligence? Is stupidity or malignity the chief source of war and all its horrors? To the ironical critic this has always been a disputed question. However it be answered, there can be little doubt that in all that concerns his thoughts and labors for peace man's unworthiness is shown as much in defects of intellect as of will. Consider the whole long story of our peace projects from those of St. Pierre and Rousseau to that of the League to Enforce Peace. One is at a loss to know whether the persistent fallacy that dogs their steps proceeds mostly from the heart or from the head.

Everywhere, even within the most civilized societies and states, endless strife rules—strife between classes and parties, between labor and capital; and often enough, despite the entrance of the police and even the military arm of the state itself, it ends in bloody war, with its quota of dead and wounded. How can one expect that, when even within the single state or nation strife and war have no end, they can be ended between individual nations which

recognize no common end, no *summa potestas?* "If a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how shall he love God whom he hath not seen?" This is not merely religion—it is good psychology and common sense. Surely its quotation here is neither irreverent nor beside the mark. Or again, is it not usually the very minds who minimize the value of law in the individual state, because forsooth "law cannot make men good," who expect wonders from it in precisely that sphere where it lacks the very power that gives it force; who when the most sacred rights of the individual in national and civic life are violated in the interest of business and property, still expect that the more intangible and uncertain customs misnamed international law, will hold against the strain of nations and cultures fighting for their existence; and who, when their own civic and national life is shot through with "official lies," are shocked when the "scrap of paper" appears in international relations?

One may well ask whether this is the kind of intellect likely to be able to grapple with the problems of world peace. No less lacking in the power of irony are all those arguments which infer the possibility of peace from the working of the rational self-interest of the nations. To all these a diabolical instinct replies "they reckon ill that leave me out." Rational egoism is still will and may throw off reason at any time. "Sacred egoism" is still egoism, and when sanctity enters the mouth, reason may at any time fly the head. One of our college presidents has naïvely wondered why men can continue to gamble when all calculations show that in the long run the laws of chance work against them; are those who cannot understand why nations will go to war when the interests of commerce and industry are against it, in any different case?

After all, it is the same kind of intellect that thinks in terms of vigilance committees, that still talks of violations of neutrality and invasions of nations in terms of robbery and murder. Is such intellect capable of thinking out the problems of peace? Is the kind of intellect that dismisses

the one hopeful principle, the one that goes to the root of the matter, because it has broken down (when no one should have expected it to do anything else but break down at this juncture) and grasps at methods that have done nothing but break down through all the centuries—is such intellect worthy? It is an old saying that men are known by the ends they seek. Even more surely are they known by the means they choose to reach their ends. It is precisely in the discussion of means that the total lack of a sense of the irony of our thought is revealed.

But this indwelling irony is merely symptomatic of something deeper. The condition of a valuable peace is that mankind shall be worthy of it. We are still morally unworthy of peace because we do not yet value it highly enough. We do not yet realize what it is for; it is a good that we do not yet know rightly how to use. Something of this feeling is undoubtedly at the back of the heads of those who praise war. They still have the uneasy feeling that peace may mean degeneration if we do not know how to use it aright—that there must be some "moral equivalent" for war, and that mankind has not yet found it. We may scoff at them, but can any one deny that this is part of our moral unpreparedness for perpetual peace? If this is true, it is important, but what I have in mind goes much deeper. Briefly and bluntly, it is this: *we are morally unworthy of peace, because when we have it we know how to use it only for the purposes of war.* Is this paradox? If so, it is only because on this point the human heart is itself paradoxical. But let us see.

We speak of the profound peace that preceded the present war. With Pecksniffian airs we bewail the splendid civilization that naughty men would destroy. This is how that profound peace, that splendid civilization appeared to one of us at least. "Greetings from the nineteenth century to the twentieth, in shorthand, by Mark Twain: 'I bring you the noble matron, called Civilization, on the return journey from piratical expeditions to Kiautschau, Manchuria, South Africa, and the Philippines, soiled and dis-

honored, with her pockets full of booty, with her soul full of deceit, and her mouth full of hypocrisy. Give her soap and a towel, but hide the mirror.' " The essence of all war is the use of the lives and deaths of men as means to ends—whether the ends be the personal egoism of despots, as Rousseau thought and some simple people to-day think, or whether they be the over-individual ends of expansion of commerce, civilization or what not. All war implies a certain calculus of the lives and deaths of men. But this valuation also underlies all our activities of peace. We use peace for the same ends. I do not say that there has been no growth in the sense of the incommensurability of the value of a human life and personality. From the days of Wehr-geld—when a life had its definite money value, when you could purchase the life or honor of a female slave for a bit of gold—history proves the contrary. I do say, however, that the development is by no means sufficient to make peace either possible or desirable. So long as the ideals and values of peace are what they are, they will inevitably and rightly, when the crisis comes, lead to the decision of war.

The truth of the matter is that the problem of peace involves certain principles and practices which no country, not even our own, has ever acted upon—or indeed fully acknowledged to itself. "The struggle for trade need not, it is true, necessarily lead to war. But, conducted as it has been in the past, war is the logical result. The diplomacy and the armies and navies of the various governments have all been, in one form or another, the partners of commerce. When commerce is hard pressed, it calls upon its partner, and with that call comes the possibility of war." Not only has this been so in the past. Witness the French and German crises in Morocco, and the whole history of the opening of China! At this very moment in England the Anti-German League proposes to maintain British prosperity by keeping Germany and Austria in a permanent state of impoverishment—by preferential rates among the allies, by placing prohibitive duties upon Central European

trade, by refusing German vessels access to their ports. The Central powers, on their side, discuss making a similar offensive and defensive union against their enemies. The vicious circle is complete. Mankind seems bent on proving that we know how to use peace only for the purposes of war. Who that is conscious of the silent but certain growth of "over-seas finance" among ourselves, can doubt that we are like to prove the same thing?

If intellectually unworthy, still more then is mankind morally unworthy of peace. It has often been maintained that every fallacy of thought really goes back ultimately to some moral obliquity of feeling and will. In all that concerns our practical judgments at least, certainly it is not without a strong dash of truth. At least to talk of the principles of humanity and liberty in politics, and not to see that they apply equally to commerce, is to talk either as a knave or a fool—probably a little of both. The first condition of the enforcement of peace is to stand against those principles and methods *in peace* that directly lead to war. I am not saying that savage commercialism is not necessary and inevitable. Perhaps it is. My sole contention is that the civilization in which it is inevitable is incapable of peace. Still more, that the civilization incapable of seeing its own irony is both intellectually and morally unworthy of it.

V.

To some this may seem to be but a belated *a priori* argument against the peace ideal itself. To some it may even suggest that rather famous dilemma against Socialism which not only has a place in the logic books, but still lurks unchallenged in some incorrigible minds. Why advocate Socialism? it is asked. Until men are perfect, it is impossible. When they are perfect, it will be unnecessary. So here. Why advocate peace? Until men are worthy of it, it is impossible. When they are worthy of it, it will come of itself. Of course the answer is that in neither case is there a dilemma. Men are neither wholly perfect or imperfect, neither wholly worthy or unworthy. They are

in a transition stage and the very advocacy will help to bring about the worthiness that will make the desired goal possible. In insisting upon this necessary relation between the moral development of man and the possibility of those things that make for his peace, I have, therefore, not the least desire to assent to the stupid fallacy which underlies so much of our prate of "necessary progress" and lends itself so easily to the gospel of things as they are. The problem of perpetual peace, like the problem of social good, can be solved only *in ambulando*.

With the peace ideal itself I have no quarrel. The whole question is as to the nature of its advocacy. Am I wrong in thinking that what we need here above all is irony? Of sentiment and moral indignation we have had plenty. Of specious argument more than enough. What we need is irony—and again irony. In time of peace prepare for war; should we not rather say, in time of war prepare for peace? If so, is not a large part of that preparation precisely the discipline of intellect and will that shall enable us to know the things inherent in peace that lead to war? What shall it profit us if in the emotional ideology of the present we shall have forgotten that which we had almost learned before the war broke out? Mr. Bernard Shaw rightly doubts the capacity of an English Secretary of State to negotiate peace "on the assumption that he is engaged in a crusade against certain sentences of Treitschke," and who, as is evidenced in Sir Edward Grey's recent interview, "after two years of reflection talks the same moral humbug as under the first shock of war." Is it with any less right that we doubt the capacity of many of the self-appointed secretaries of state to humanity, who set out so valiantly to negotiate perpetual peace?

On a hundred battlefields, and out of unnumbered skulls, monuments were raised to Genghis Khan. Must it always be? Must it through the long ages remain the same? Somewhere or other Carlyle describes how Tamerlane, in glistening armor, his battle ax over his shoulder, stood before the gate of Damascus and watched with satisfaction

as his soldiers built a pyramid of the seventy thousand skulls of his conquered enemies. "But," he adds, as a consolation in the face of this monstrous fact, "perhaps at the same moment there was playing on the streets of Mainz with his comrades, a boy who should later discover the art of printing, namely Gutenberg." Consequently printing with all its consequences, even if they are all good, *compensates* for a Tamerlane! This way of valuing expressed by Carlyle even more brutally in a hundred places, is still the type of valuation that underlies our civilization in peace as well as war. I do not say that it is not the true way. That is a question for itself—and by no means easy of answer. It is possible that, as many are contending at the present time, western civilization, even in the short distance it has gone, has been guilty of a morbid evaluation of the individual and the individual life. Into this question I do not go. I simply contend that so long as this way of valuing remains fundamental—and modern evolutional thinking but confirms it—perpetual peace is a dream as indeed it should be. Must it be so? Is war with all its horrors, worthy of mankind? I do not know. All I know is this. War is worthy of mankind, just so long as man is no more worthy of himself. The horror of war is with us. But, as history and present experience alike teach us, that horror, like everything else emotional, becomes blunted by time and use. There is only one thing ultimately intolerable, and that is a contradiction at the heart of life. Here only irony avails.

WILBUR M. URBAN.

TRINITY COLLEGE, HARTFORD, CONN.

ROYCE AS AN INTERPRETER OF AMERICAN IDEALS.

FROM the inception of the JOURNAL OF ETHICS to the day of his death, Professor Royce was a member of of its editorial board. And the many articles and reviews that he contributed to its pages attest his interest in its field of activity. We are apt to think of Royce as primarily a metaphysician, only incidentally interested in ethical problems. This is a great mistake. The two dominant interests throughout his career were logic and ethics, and his metaphysical interests grew out of the latter. For he held that for morality to become effective through religion, it was necessary to "find one's ideal among the realities." It is in the critical discussion of the problem thus suggested that he is led to his earliest formulation of his metaphysical idealism in *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*.

In the preface to that work he tells us that religious interests first drove him to philosophy. But what is unique in his case is that it was not the interest of the believer in finding support for his faith, but rather the interest of the rebel in winning through to a higher vision of values because of his very rebellion. Royce was by nature a nonconformist. He was proud of the tradition current in his family that one of his ancestors had stood by the scaffold of Charles I. Moreover, he was born and spent his early years in a small mining town in California, when the independent spirit of the early pioneers was still in evidence, and frontier lawlessness and vigilante committees still fresh in memory. Now the problem of freedom which lies back of our efforts in democracy stands out in bolder relief in the life of the frontier community than anywhere else. What is the price one must pay for freedom? How can the interests of the community be maintained and the independence of its individual members be preserved? Royce's two books and his many articles dealing with Cali-

fornia life show not only a deep interest in his native state, but especially his interest in the great practical problems that confront the American nation. His *History of California* bears as a sub-title "A Study of American Character." And it is clear that his interest in California was mainly due to the fact that there he found a fresh and vigorous expression of American character freed from the artificialities of convention, all its passions, its ambitions, its ideals,—both its virtues and its failings, its pettiness and its grandeur, writ large. And his ethical idealism is best understood as an interpretation of the spirit of modern civilization as it had found expression in his native land. Not that there was anything of the Chauvinist in Royce. If there were aught of value in our social and political ideals it was due to the fact that they rested on principles that cross the boundaries between nations, and might equally serve as the basis of that community of nations to which he hopefully looked forward.

Professor Royce's confidence in the so-called dialectic method of proof is well known. The only irrefragable truths, he held, are those that are implied in the very effort to deny them. This was not, however, a method borrowed from Hegel. The truth is, Royce was a born dialectician. It was a method suggested rather by the practical problems that he used to ponder over in the days of his youth: How one must surrender independence in order to gain freedom; what the dissenter must affirm in order to make good his dissent. It is only a step from this to the conviction that the road to certainty lies through doubt; to the discovery, in any serious defence of ethical skepticism the affirmation of a positive ideal, in the assertion of rights the implication of duties, in the existence of error the proof of the reality of God. It was his clear consciousness of the paradoxical aspect of all significant human experience that determined the method. Living near the concrete and vital facts of experience, he found that things were much more complex than abstract reason, or human wilfulness, would have them, and rediscovered the old truth that things

are not cut off from one another "as with a hatchet," and that "opposites unite."

We are concerned in this paper, however, not with the method itself, but rather with the use Royce made of it in dealing with the problem of ethics, with the ethical ideal to which he was led, and with the application of that ideal to certain vital problems of the hour.

The subjectivism latent in the Protestant reformation came out into the open in the doctrine of the rights of man in the period of the enlightenment, and reached its extreme expression in the latter part of the eighteenth, and the beginning of the nineteenth, century in the work of the Romantic philosophers, who, cut loose from all authority, would follow unhindered the dictates of the enlightened heart. But their work is mainly negative, its aim being to set the human subject free from the bondage of authority and tradition. For us, however, this aim is, in theory at least, already accomplished, and the intelligent man of to-day is earnestly seeking new ties that will bind him once more to his fellows and to the social order,—some method of reconciling the individual's heart and interest with the authority of the community.[1] If the moral law is not a finished code, delivered on Sinai, nor yet engraved on the tablets of the mind, neither is it to be found in any form of self-will.

> What we nowadays want, in that loneliness of the inner life which, during our worse moments, we often feel so bitterly, is precisely this,—to learn to love authority, and to that end to find the authority that is worth loving. Hence our ethical inquirers, indeed, ask the old question of subjectivism, "Why should *I* obey the moral law?" But they ask not as the old romantic rebels asked, for the sake of escaping from any but the inner law. They ask longingly, just because the subject has learned, in his keen modern sensitiveness, to despise the merely inner law of his caprice, and because he wants to find the way back to an ethical order that can be verified in and through the world of hard facts,—an order that shall be external and still spiritual; an object of scientific experience, and still a kingdom of the ideal.[2]

[1] I am here summarising the position taken by Professor Royce in an article entitled "The Outlook in Ethics," published in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Vol. II, 1891–2.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 109.

Moreover, this is just the form that the perennial problem of freedom takes in modern civilization, and it is especially conspicuous in our own experiment in democracy. We want independence; we must have the unity that authority alone can insure. How are we to realize both? It is because Professor Royce saw this so clearly, and saw also what its solution implies, that we are justified in viewing his work as an interpretation of the spirit of American civilization. The law of freedom that we seek is "determined by the fact that there are many of us living together, and that, if we are rational beings, we are deeply concerned for one another,—concerned to comprehend one another, to respect one another, to organize our wills into some sort of universality, to live in spiritual union, to give our common life the most complete wholeness that is possible."[3] In this way we may combine "the fullest regard for the 'independent' conscience of each man, with the sternest insistence that without dependence on the life of man, as embodied in the organism of society, the individual's ideals are worthless."[4] So far, however, this may seem to be merely a clear statement of the *desideratum*. What is the nature of the moral ideal that is to accomplish this result, and what the source of its validity? This question Royce discusses at length in his *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*. He shows the impossibility of getting any moral ideal by simply observing the facts of nature, finding the drift of things, and calling that good. To attempt to found morality on evolution is to confuse the notion of evolution with the notion of progress; of growth in complexity and definiteness with growth in moral worth.[5] One can only give moral approval to a natural tendency on the basis of a moral code found independently of that tendency. On the other hand, if one seek the moral ideal through an appeal to conscience, viewed as a sort of inner light or higher instinct, one finds, alas, so many different

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 111.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 110.
[5] *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, 1885, p. 27.

and conflicting ideals seeking support in this way. And who is to judge between them? The appeal to sympathy fares no better, for it is confused, often capricious, and not infrequently a disguised form of selfishness. And, in any case, a code thus founded is unable to defend its claims when confronted with the ideal of the unsympathetic individual.

The result would seem to be purely skeptical. No adequate reason can be given for the choice of any ideal. One asks for reasons and gets enthusiasm, rhetoric,—and abuse. But serious ethical skepticism is no mere indolent acquiescence in human ignorance. If one is really in doubt as to which of conflicting ends should be adopted, it is because each makes its own appeal, and one is provisionally accepting both. Make such skepticism as complete as you please, it would still presuppose one end, namely, the "effort to harmonize in one moment all the conflicting aims in the world of life."[6]

This result is neither barren nor self-contradictory. Such perfect harmony is indeed unattainable. But one can nevertheless walk in the light of this ideal. If he does, he will act as one would act who expected to realize in his own person all the consequences of his act, as it affects all his conflicting aims. In other words, the ideal does not bring us forthwith to the desired harmony, nor does it represent that harmony as in some mystical sense now realized. The disease is still there; the conflict of aims is real; but recognizing these aims as my own, I can deal with them, and work for that organization of life in which the harmony is to be found. The ideal sets a limitless task, but at least it defines my aim.

But at this point Professor Royce, of a sudden, makes an extension of this principle which at first sight seems highly questionable. The highest good, he tells us, would be realizable only in case all the conflicting wills in the world realized fully one another, and were brought into con-

[6] *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, 1885, p. 138.

formity to this insight. "For, then, not abandoning each its own aim, each would have added thereto, through insight, the aims of the others. And all the world of individuals would act as one Being, having a single Universal Will."[1]

But what is the warrant for this extension? Have we not, in making it, simply become involved in the difficulty which Professor Royce has noted in other efforts to set up an absolute end, namely, that one can meet the recalcitrant individual, who refuses to accept it, only with anathemas, not with compelling argument? I do not find that in this earlier work Professor Royce has met this difficulty. The idealism there expounded does, indeed, represent the individual as a partial and fragmentary embodiment of the universal will and reason. And so, one might argue, if he ever finds himself in his wholeness he will discover at the same time his unity with that universal will. But even if one were to accept this as sound metaphysical doctrine, one might well be left cold, and unconvinced as to its ethical pertinence, and even rebellious. The more red-blooded he were the more likely he would be to retort: "After all, God's business is God's business. My ideals, as mine, are inevitably bound up with my own individual life in all its uniqueness and finitude."

There is here clearly, I think, a gap in the argument, and the whole of Royce's subsequent work might, in one aspect, be viewed as an attempt to bridge this gap. In metaphysics, this appears in his interest in the problem of the individual, and his concern in his later works to find in the world of the absolute elbow-room for the individual; and also in his investigations of the nature of the social consciousness. The results to which years of reflection on these problems brought him are most clearly formulated in the *Problem of Christianity*. Here he shows that the isolated individual is a pure abstraction; that it is not true that one takes one's start, as it were, in the prison of the inner

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 145.

life, and then argues oneself into the belief in other minds on the basis of analogy, finding the behavior of their bodies like that of one's own, and inferring the presence of a corresponding consciousness. The notion of a self-contained mind, coming to believe in the existence of other minds in such fashion, is a pure fiction. We cannot even state the argument from analogy without presupposing as its own terms a consciousness that takes us beyond the limits of our private personality. Our consciousness is in truth from the first social. And one "rounds to a separate mind" only by defining his own interests and purposes within the unity of the mind of the community. Consequently truth-seeking itself, and every form of purposeful activity, is from the first a social enterprise.

It is this insight that bridges the gap noted in the earlier work, and justifies the interpretation there given of the moral ideal. For it makes it plain that the realization of that harmony of my own individual aims which I seek is only possible in so far as I am a member of a community in which is realized the more comprehensive harmony of the conflicting wills of men through the organization of the larger life of mankind; and that I can do my part in the service of this cause only in so far as the spirit of the community dwells within me. From one point of view, this ideal describes an infinitely distant goal,—"the hope of the great community,"—but from another it appears, in moments of moral insight, as precisely the light that is the life of my present endeavors, and gives them form and direction.[8]

The moral insight, then, involves the will to harmonize all the conflicting wills there are in the world, and to this end demands that one act as if one's neighbor and oneself were "one being that possessed at once the aims of both,"[9]

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[8] This is, I take it, the meaning of the interpretation which Royce gives of the essential message of Christianity in the *Problem of Christianity*, that one is saved, made morally whole, through the "indwelling of the spirit of the beloved community."

[9] *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 169.

and that one further extend this principle to include the life of all whose aims one realizes; and it involves the will to work for that organization of life in a future and happier humanity where each shall be able to perform his daily task in the service and under the inspiration of this over-individual cause. Although we can not now foresee what such a complete organization of life would be, we do, even now, enjoy certain activities, such as the work of the artist, the scientist, the public-spirited citizen, which illustrate such whole-hearted devotion to an over-individual good, and give more concrete meaning to the formula.

Moreover, our ideal does not simply state generalities. It very definitely determines what our attitude should be in all our social intercourse. For it demands that one realize, as far as may be possible, the true inner life of one's fellow men. Most of the persons with whom we come in contact in our daily lives we meet in a purely external fashion,—our grocer, our tailor, the conductor on the car, and even our more familiar associates. They behave in certain ways, agreeable or disagreeable, and we like or dislike them accordingly. But for the most part we have no true realization of their inner lives at all. It is only in the case of those nearest and dearest to us that we succeed, and then only imperfectly, in taking such an over-personal view as to realize their aims, even as we do our own, and consciously seek to bring them into harmony. Yet bitternesses, jealousies, and hatreds will persist until this spirit can prevail in all our human relations. Work then for the extension of the moral insight in yourself, and among your fellow men. This ideal is absolute. But if one now is confronted with any specific practical problem, individual or social,—shall I do this thing, or advocate that cause?—one may and must, if a moral issue is involved, ask, will it further or hinder the growth of this moral insight? But in most cases there is room for an honest difference of opinion. One may be mistaken. And the test, the only test, is the appeal to experience. The ideal furnishes a standard, but in the use of this standard in concrete sit-

uations the personal equation cannot be escaped, and the limitations of knowledge make mistakes inevitable. Our absolute idealist is modest, if he understands the meaning of his idealism.

The moral ideal that we are here describing might be called the spirit of fair play as between the conflicting wills of men. This does not mean that he who upholds it is an advocate of compromise. Right is right; wrong, wrong. And he has in his vision of the ideal, in his moral insight, a sure criterion. But concrete cases are complex and baffling. The issue is rarely clear cut. So, while he will strenuously work for the triumph of what seems to him best, he will scorn a victory won by compulsion, or by any unfair advantage.

There is only one thing which he absolutely knows is always and everywhere wrong, and which he will therefore oppose, if need be, with all the force at his command; and that is, the action or policy of anyone, individual or nation, which by ruthless egotism seeks to enforce its private will on others, and thereby strikes a blow at the very root of morality itself.

In the *Philosophy of Loyalty* Professor Royce has given a fuller exposition of this moral ideal, and has shown the way in which it underlies and determines reason as well as conduct. It is a "cause" which unites the lives of various human beings in one life. And loyalty, which is the "willing and practical and thorough-going devotion of a person to a cause" is the essence of virtue. And it is such just because it lifts one out of one's private and egotistical self into the unity of the larger life of the community.

Royce has, in his various writings, made many applications of his moral ideal to the practical problems of the day. I shall confine myself to the consideration of two of these. The first is the question of the relation of superior to inferior races, which he discusses in his essay on "Race Questions and Prejudices."[10] The difficulties we have in

[10] In *Race Questions and Other American Problems*, 1908.

dealing with our negro problem will never be solved, he holds, so long as the "superior" white man parades his superiority, thus humiliating the "inferior," and tries to coerce him into decent behavior. Make real to yourself his own inner life as it is to him, give him his share of work to do in the service of law and order, and thus awaken his self-respect, and enable him to become a loyal servant of the community, and then the problem will be solved. That this is no visionary ideal Royce was convinced by the fact that this was just what had taken place in the English West Indian colonies, notably in Jamaica, and that, in consequence, the race problem never had arisen there. The genius that dominated England's policy with respect to her colonies was just that spirit of fair play that rules in her sports. And, one may add, she is now reaping her reward, in the way in which her colonies have rallied to her defence in the present crisis, showing that the empire had become in truth a community of nations.[11]

Professor Royce was in California when the war broke out, preparing to give a series of lectures on some of the problems raised in his then just published work on *The Problem of Christianity*. He at once changed his plan, and decided to lecture instead on the application of his ethical principle to the great problems brought to the front by the world crisis. His little book, *War and Insurance*, was the result. More important than the simple remedy there suggested,—the extension of the principle of insurance to international relations,—is the clear vision it contains of the community of nations, and of what its realization implies; which is simply, the extension of the moral insight, the spirit of fair play, which should govern our relations as human beings, to the relations between nations.

As the months went by, and the awful tragedy of the war grew ever more appalling, it seemed to Royce increasingly evident that Germany was playing the rôle of the enemy of

[11] For example, the small island of Jamaica at the outbreak of the war at once contributed $2,000,000, and 10,000 soldiers, and then set about it to raise another 10,000.

mankind. The sinking of the *Lusitania* was the crowning proof. After that it was "as impossible for any reasonable man to be in his heart and mind neutral as it was for the good cherubs in Heaven to remain neutral when they first looked out from their rosy, glowing clouds and saw the angels fall. Neutral in heart or mind the dutiful American . . . will not and cannot be. He must take sides."[12] "Our duty is to be and to remain the outspoken moral opponents of the present German policy, and of the German state so long as it holds to this policy and carries on its present war. In the service of mankind we owe an unswerving sympathy, not to one or another, but to all the allied enemies of Germany."[13]

Throughout the last two years of his life Professor Royce lived constantly under the shadow of this world tragedy. It was, as he viewed it, the supreme test of modern civilization. The moral ideal which Western civilization had, after long centuries of travail, brought to birth was fighting for its existence. Militant Germany of to-day, egotistic and ruthless, as her deeds and the utterances of her spokesmen alike proclaimed, had shown herself the enemy "of all that makes the common life of humanity a possible ideal."[14] The call to Americans was plain. As we value that moral ideal which underlies the cause of freedom, so must we be ready to hazard all, not for the sake of America solely, or of any nation, but for the sake of that "trurer union of mankind, and for the future of human brotherhood."[15]

CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

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[12] From the *Lusitania* address, delivered at Tremont Temple, Boston, on January 30, 1916, and since published in *The Hope of the Great Community*.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] From a second *Lusitania* address delivered on the anniversary of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and since published in *The Hope of the Great Community*.

[15] *Ibid.*

THE INDIVIDUAL CONSCIENCE AND THE LAW.[1]

EMILE BOUTROUX.

THE question before us seems to many minds to have been clearly and definitely answered long since. Conscience and law! were not their respective positions marked in indelible characters when the words were uttered: Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and unto God the things that are God's? Conscience has its own domain, the wholly interior world of beliefs and thoughts, feelings and wills. In that domain it is sole mistress; it is amenable only to the powers that it accepts. Around this domain rises a wall of brass which no external power has the right to break down, and which, indeed, no force can really undermine. In theory, even in reality, as a final resort, conscience is inviolable. Outside the sanctuary of conscience, however, stretches the region of the outer life, of manifestations and actions. Here, law is sovereign, quite as independent of conscience as this latter, in its own realm, is independent of law. There are two worlds and there are two empires; nothing could be clearer or more logical than this economy of the universe.

In practice, however, we encounter difficulties. The system is based on the radical distinction between thought and action: the latter wholly material and exterior, the former wholly interior and spiritual. What, then, is to be said of the written and the spoken word? What is to be said of instruction? Are these simply thoughts, or are they, even now, acts, and, as such, subject to law? The difficulty is solved by endeavouring to find out, in each given case, whether the fact resembles more closely a pure thought or an external manifestation. Nature indeed always offers

[1] A lecture given at the École des Hautes Études Sociales, November 7, 1905. Authorized translation by Fred Rothwell.

intermediate forms between two genera, however distinct from each other these may be. Yet the difficulty of classifying these forms does not prevent the naturalist from maintaining the distinction between the genera.

Such, unless I am mistaken, is what may be called the classic doctrine as regards conscience and law. It is principally shown in the peculiar importance attributed to tolerance, which is regarded as the first of duties, the essential virtue of modern societies.

Is it quite certain that this famous doctrine is at the present time as firmly established as it seemed to be? Certain formulæ, now in considerable vogue, might make us suspect that such is not the case. For some time past, the question of the necessity of insuring the moral unity of the nation, and of the task, incumbent on the state, of establishing this unity, has frequently been raised. We are told that democracy has both the right and the duty to institute a system of moral beliefs and to impose this by any means calculated to create in men's souls something equivalent to religious beliefs. We read that only free consciences, *i.e.*, consciences freed from religious beliefs, have the right to claim freedom of conscience; for we cannot expect to retain what we have not got, and it is precisely in the formation of such consciences that the task of democracy consists. This doctrine comprises, strictly speaking,—so we are assured,—rational liberalism, which must not be confounded with empirical liberalism. The conclusion reached is that, in the matter of tolerance, to maintain that all sincere beliefs are deserving of respect, is either cowardice or foolishness.

True, on the other hand, we frequently hear such aphorisms as: Be thyself, there is no other law. The object of life for every man is and can be nothing less than the entire realisation and emancipation of his individuality (*freie Individualität, Entwickelung und Ausleben seiner Individualität*). All constraint is humiliating, all pledging of one's word a falsehood. What right has society, which is composed of men like myself, to impose on me its conven-

tions, prejudices and routine, in which I, for my part, see nothing but documents dealing with the past?

It would seem that, either in one direction or in the other, we are moving away from the dualistic doctrine which attributed a distinct function to each of the two principles; and that, in both cases, there is a tendency to absorb the one of the two principles in the other. If such doctrines really find credit nowadays, it would be advisable to enquire what are the claims of the classic doctrine of dualism, in order to see if it is capable of overcoming the attacks to which it is exposed.

I.

This doctrine was based on a certain number of postulates, which, in these days, seem to be greatly compromised.

In the first place, the self was regarded as a real and distinct entity. It was because it was thought to exist separately that it was declared to be inviolable.

At the present time, its separate existence is disputed. Our thoughts, says contemporary psychology, are not those barren virgins imagined by classic dualism, bringing to birth only when united to some extraneous agent. They differ from acts in degree, simply, and, of themselves, are already big with action. They *are* the very act, which begins, assumes form, and tends to display itself in all its amplitude. Alone amidst surrounding obstacles, other thoughts, stronger, keener, and of a more encroaching nature, inhibit and keep in a state of tension the thoughts that appear inert. There is no reason, then, once we allow that the state has a right over actions, to withdraw thoughts from its province. We might as well say that the doctor has the right to combat disease only when the patient is beyond hope of recovery, and that he is departing from his rôle if he attacks the evil at its origin. In the same way, no thought has the right to proclaim itself innocent. When, shut up in my room and apparently thinking all alone, I allow my imagination to dwell on certain conceptions, ideas or dreams, I am really working to create within

myself certain habits, tendencies, laws of judgment and action which, sooner or later, will be represented in effects. One cannot do evil in thought only.

Thus, thought, conscience, the self is not a separate and wholly spiritual reality. Is it even a reality at all? Those psychologists who set up the philosophical foundations of classic dualism did not consider the relation between the conscious and the unconscious, they neglected the enormous share of the latter in the content and the conditions of existence of the former. The self was brought before the mind as a well defined and circumscribed subject, which possesses and knows itself, which is complete, potentially at least, in its entire scope, and which in all its acquisitions or modifications, remains itself throughout its entire existence. The study of the unconscious, however, has upset this psychology. The conscious self is no longer anything more than the contingent explosion of some of those forces, the whole of which constitute the subconscious, the true self; an extreme degree of tension has transformed these potential energies into living forces. What we call our convictions, conscience, personality, is but the mechanical result of a work that has been brought about apart from this personality itself, in the depths of the unconscious.

There, unknown to us, the organic influences, imitation, suggestion, auto-suggestion, are at work. Instinct or passion, acquired habits, the influence of a certain person, the spell exercised by some particular formula, all these decide us; we passively suggest to ourselves a certain belief or conviction to which we afterwards point as the sincere and spontaneous expression of our individual conscience; we imagine this belief to be our own work because of our tenacious hold upon it. Now, how can we regard as inviolable and sacred a conscience that is but a psychical illusion, a reflection, an epiphenomenon, devoid of substance and efficaciousness alike? The classic doctrine owed its semblance of consequence only to the realisation of an empty abstraction.

A second postulate underlying it in men's minds was the principle of the *contrat social*, that there belongs to the individual as such "an absolute and naturally independent existence." Conscience, whatever it was in essence, was connected with the individual as with a distinct reality. Society was regarded as consisting of such individuals, aggregated from without, somewhat like the atoms of Epicurus in the worlds pictured by this philosopher. A doctrine, however, put forward by Pierre Leroux, Renouvier, and recently advocated by M. Léon Bourgeois, a doctrine, moreover, in harmony with the most solid results of sociological investigation, namely, the doctrine of solidarity, as it is called, shows us the individual depending, in all things, on the collectivity of which he forms part. *Quid habes quod non accepisti?* said Saint Augustin. Nowadays we are shown that the individual owes to society all he possesses, even all he is. Whence do I obtain not only my knowledge and the things by which I live but also the very principles in which I take pride, the convictions and feelings that constitute my self, if not from the endless toil of so many generations that have gone before? Is it I who think, or is it a portion of mankind that thinks in me? My rôle, if I have one, is that of a drop of water in the ocean. How foolish, then, to regard the rights of society on the one hand, and those of the individual on the other, and then to declare that these respective rights are counterparts of each other, that they constitute two mutually impenetrable spheres of activity!

Finally, I will mention a third postulate, perhaps the very bed-rock of the dualistic doctrine. In the civilisation which united the Jewish-Christian religion and the Hellenic philosophy, there grew up a theory of knowledge which distinguished between belief and science, regarding them as irreducible and alike well-grounded in their principles. Science, it was held, relates to the beings of the visible external world; belief is concerned with the interior and spiritual life, the strict objects of consciousness. According to this theory, it is the province of law to regu-

late everything in human life that relates to the external world, the domain of science. But it is both absurd and impossible for the law to lay down beliefs, which are not based on any compelling reason, and exist only if they are free. This distinction between belief and science was systematised by Descartes, Locke and Leibnitz; it constituted the basis of Kant's famous system. It was very definitely manifest in Herbert Spencer's theory of the Unknowable and lo! science now regards itself as capable of abolishing it. Extending its conquests ever farther and farther, it breaks down the barrier that a simple faith had erected between the exterior and the interior, the physical and the moral, the knowable and the unknowable. Relying on the progress it has made, the conception it has formed of the universe and of the conditions of knowledge, it declares that henceforth nature has no more mysteries for it, that, in theory if not in fact, everything is dependent on science and its methods. For the present, unknowable can signify nothing else than unknown. Belief is nothing more than ignorance and prejudice. Now, is there any freedom of conscience in arithmetic, mechanics or physics? And if every class of reality is knowable in the same way as the relations between numbers and the change of bodies, where could freedom of conscience legitimately find its place? Has ignorance any right in the presence of science, or error in the presence of truth? When brought in contact with the man of science the believer, *i.e.*, the ignorant man, has but one right, or rather duty, that of acquiring knowledge. Things are divided into two categories. First, there are those which science has claimed as her own and of which she is sovereign, pure and simple; and secondly, there are those but imperfectly known so far, and the rule regarding which, in so far as practice demands immediate decisions, lies only in the inductions drawn, as scientifically as possible, from the results actually attained by science.

Thus the various postulates on which the doctrine of the mutual independence of conscience and law was based, appear involved in one common downfall. The law, as

the expression of the will of society, of its needs and spirit, of the science that is its product, and of the ends at which it aims in conformity with this science, would appear to have every right to govern not only the deeds but also the thoughts of individuals, so that it may inculcate in the latter, by education and all appropriate means, the habits, the feelings, and the form of conscience and of autonomy best calculated to realise the social goal, as determined by society. The end of this evolution would seem to be the absolute subordination of the individual conscience to the law.

II.

This tendency exists in present-day society, nor is it the only tendency influencing men's minds. As though contraries attracted each other, it finds over against it an opposing tendency. How comes it, say the representatives of this latter, that there is a reluctance to recognise the reality and the superior rights of the individual conscience? From the fact that the condition of this reality is regarded as existing in a self which is conceived as a "substance," that is permanent, fundamental, and independent of time and space. This self, indeed, is an idle fancy which must be left to the metaphysicians of another age. We, however, have nothing to do with such a self—which, in truth, is not a self at all, but is rather a transcendent, unknowable entity,—for the purpose of affirming our existence as individuals and claiming our freedom of conscience. All that is needed is to invoke the self that we feel and know and are at every moment of our conscious life. This self, indeed, is changing and transitory, shallow and without foundation, it may be, but what of that? It is real—everything that is most real, so far as we are concerned—the only thing that unquestionably is. Compared with this immediate present self, all else is but abstraction and hypothesis, a more or less artificial and unsubstantial fabric of our imagination and understanding. I live, I will, I think, I enjoy and suffer: what reality could blot

out that reality? What reality, for me, is not involved in that?

But then, it will be urged, in this very self which is immediate and irreducible reality, analysis detects two elements, one, exclusively individual: sensation, the instinct of preservation and of development proper; the other, which, in the individual himself, supplies a basis for society, namely, the aspiration to reason, to freedom, and to personality, and that can be realised only by participation in a community, by obedience to social laws. In order that the individual may be fully actualised, the lower part of his being must obey the higher part, *i.e.*, in a word, he must subordinate himself to society and to the law.

This is antiquated psychology, the individualist of whom I am speaking will answer. It is erroneous to say that there are, in the self, two distinct regions, one lower and the other higher. We have reduced this would-be higher to what you call the lower. We have shown that there is in feeling a simple mechanical development of sensation, and in reason a differentiation of instinct. The self is one, and it is its motor and sensible faculty, not its reflexive and intellectual processes, that forms the real, permanent basis of its nature.

But if we find in it elements not immediately reducible to this natural substratum,—and such, as a matter of fact, are many social or religious beliefs,—they may be explained by the part that tradition, habit, and routine play in the formation of our conscience. The commandments of Jehovah, unknown to ourselves, give us the idea of duty and obligation. From the ancient blending of religion and politics, there has remained in us the idea of a law based on justice and invested with the most sacred character. Vain survivals of a dead past! Crushing heritage from which it is time to free ourselves!

> Es erben sich Gesetz' und Rechte
> Wie eine ewige Krankheit fort.

What then, in short, is the true essence of the self? To one who is free from prejudice and observes man scientifically as plants and minerals are observed, this essence is nothing else than the need of independence and emancipation, of the possession and free disposal of oneself. All else goes against his nature and makes him unhappy, because it offers violence thereto. Not only is man incapable of understanding how he could be held bound to eternal engagements, seeing that he lives in time; but, considering that, for him, the only reality is his present self, from which his self of the next moment will perhaps differ entirely, he rejects wholesale every kind of engagement, whether for the whole of life or for a day; he feels he is in possession of his self only if this latter, at each moment, remains his in its entirety, for at each moment it is an indivisible; he is conscious of being wholly himself only when he can unfold to the full his powers of emancipation and independence.

This method of looking at things, when dealing with the laws, results in an attitude which is the opposite of that which we previously observed. The man of whom we are now speaking will not refuse in practical life to conform to the laws, but he will deliberately look upon them as means, whereas the independence and spontaneous development of his self will constitute his sole end. He will gauge the value and authority of the laws according to their fitness to bring about this result, nor will he hesitate to regard as intolerable those which he considers to have been framed in a different spirit. In any case, he will regard the system of legal constraint, as well as that of religious constraint which remains its foundation, only as a more or less provisional mechanism, which the advance of enlightenment and organization must tend to render useless and to abolish.

III.

We see from what has just been said that the minds of men nowadays are turned in very different, even in opposite, directions. Some continue to restrict more and more the independence of the individual conscience in order to

offer wider scope and influence to society, state and law. Others are all the time endeavouring to reduce the social community to an instrument for the individual's emancipation and autonomy. When, therefore, we find both these types of mind invoking science in their favour, basing their claims upon history, and maintaining them with like conviction and energy, we might almost imagine we were dealing with an insoluble antinomy, where force alone is to decide the victory.

The precision of claims, however, the frankness of opposition and the violence of conflict, are not invariably sure symptoms of the real field of dissent. How many apparently irreconcilable oppositions the past has seen, oppositions which, at the present time, we cannot understand! It has always been the custom of human beings to begin by saying: "He who is not for me is against me," and to try to discover enemies in those nearest to them. The more points of contact we have, the more occasions for friction. But time frequently tones down these would-be contrasts by raising up others, which, in turn, are at first looked upon as absolute and ultimate. See what has become of the classics and the romantics: they imagined themselves at the opposite poles of art, but at the present time the only distinction between them is the unequal expansion afforded to the divers elements of one and the same whole. It is the same with the political parties: they hurl anathemas at one another. In many instances, however, posterity will find them on the same platform, disputing about words rather than about things.

Words form the battle-fields of stern and desperate encounters; they constitute the food that keeps them alive.

Mit Worten läßt sich trefflich streiten.

Words create the standards of war, the close, serried ranks of combatants. They are symbols of logic, or rather of that syllogistic and abstract dialectic which, indeed, would not exist without them. It is words that give a syllogism those definite, close, immutable concepts, which

form the condition of its interplay of inclusion and exclusion.

Hence might it not happen that the contrast in question should be specifically determined by the somewhat logical and verbal manner in which these questions are generally treated? Consider the present conditions under which ideas are worked out in political and social life. Most of the time is spent in discussion during meetings and conversations; speeches are delivered and articles written in journals and magazines, for the purpose of producing an immediate effect. What is our criterion in these brilliant wordy tournaments? This criterion is and can be nothing else than the principle of contradiction. Logic alone is the same for all; it alone supplies immediate and decisive arguments with which to overthrow the adversary. Its victories, however, are frequently as ephemeral as they are brilliant, and many a principle which it has crushed for an indefinite period is now alive and strong. The reason is that there is another logic than the strict logic of concepts; there is the logic of life and reality, nature and reason, in the full and concrete sense of the word. Whereas dialectic demonstrates, with the easy clarity of its spatial language, the reciprocal impenetrability of the one and the many, the identical and the different, nature delights to combine them in her creations. To understand how freedom and duty can be associated, how a subject can be both his own master and obedient to a law, how a law can be, at the same time, necessary, and yet subordinate as regards its realisation to the caprices of individuals—this is a desperate problem with which logicians are confronted. But in the will of a right-thinking man, however ignorant he may be of logic, freedom and duty form only one. Pascal gloriously demonstrated how it is possible for man, with utter freedom and unyielding will, to love perfectly and freely what he is bound to love necessarily.

Now, what would happen if we applied to our subject, not abstract logic which descends from concepts to realities,

but rather concrete and living logic which proceeds from being to concept, from realities to relations?

The first thing to do, when following such a method, is to ask ourselves if we are dealing with things that live and really are, that tend to subsist, to continue in being. In duly ascertained being, there is a value that is willingly recognised by a reason free from the prejudices of abstract logic. In destroying that which is, there is always a degree of temerity. The method required by the desire to attain effective perfection is the preservation and growth of being. *Ens perfectum, ens realissimum:* such was the doctrine of Leibnitz.

Now, both of the principles we are considering strongly testify to their vitality. Law, the expression of the collective will of societies, has become endlessly diversified, adapting itself to the beliefs, the geographical, economic and historical conditions, and the ends pursued by different states or communities. It has none the less preserved its essential characteristics: universality, obligation, and sanction. Being abstract and impersonal, it is imposed on all citizens alike; and, though admitting of numberless varieties and changes, it claims, at all times, in its actual form, absolute respect and obedience.

The individual conscience did not set forth its claim to existence and inviolability as soon as did the law. The ancients, for the most part, cared little about it. And yet, in such men as Socrates, Saint Paul, and Luther, it definitely manifested its power to be and to continue in being. At the present time it constitutes one of the most vivid realities with which we are brought face to face, and the man who means to respect what is before decreeing what ought to be, will look upon freedom of conscience as one of the essential conditions of political order within our modern societies.

Individual conscience and civil law: two living realities, therefore two beings in favour of which there is a presumption of justice.

These two powers, however, as they develop, impede and embarrass each other; the pages of history are filled with

their struggles. It is not advisable to drive to extremes the horror of strife. There is something more to be dreaded than war, and that is peace purchased by the extinction of life and justice: *ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.* War is not only legitimate, it is fine and noble when waged for the sake of human dignity, justice, truth, and virtue, in order to win for them a right to existence. By their mutual struggles, the individual conscience and the law have been respectively developed and strengthened. It is as a reaction against social oppression that the individual conscience has been awakened and has become powerful; for freedom, in this world, insists on being won: its true name is enfranchisement, and when it comes to be, it continues in being only through repeated conquests. War is not an accident in nature; it results from the fact that existence implies self-assumption, self-defence; there is only one way of giving up the struggle, and that is by disappearing altogether.

Nevertheless, it is impossible for man, a reasonable being, to look upon war as a solution; war can be no more than a natural phenomenon which has its part to play in the creation and development of human energies, but which must be utilised in view of some higher purpose. This purpose or end is the ever-increasing realisation of human dignity. With this in view, reason aims at transforming adversaries into co-workers. What will be the judgment of reason as to the respective value and rôle of conscience and law, which it finds set up as facts and as powers frequently opposed to each other?

It is unnecessary to enquire which, of these two powers, should be an end and which a means. Both alike are ends in themselves.

The law, regarded as the very spring of civilisation and humanisation, was a principle in the eyes of the ancients. Throughout its many transformations, it has remained a principle. Whatever the origin and object attributed to it, it possesses one characteristic which renders it incapable of being reduced to the will of individuals as such: and that

is universality. It is the same for all, imposing on each person such conduct as is in conformity with the common good. It is the expression of a social order. A society, in any case, can never be simply the external, mechanical juxtaposition of individual atoms.

Again, the individual conscience is also an end in itself. To regard it as a means is to deny it. The greatness of a Socrates, a Luther, and a Pascal consists in having sought after truth with an absolutely free conscience, determined, as far as it could, to acknowledge no other law than the evidence imposed on it.

If conscience and law are two ends in themselves, does it follow that they must develop along parallel lines, without interfering with each other? or again, admitting that they belong to one and the same world, must they be content with a system of mutual limitations and compromises?

Such a system can be nothing else than an expedient, a last resource; for the individual conscience and the law are not only irreducible opposites; they are even inseparable from each other. Their mutual interpenetration is the condition of their respective development.

Law presupposes conscience; for, whether its aim be justice or utility—which, assuredly, differ only in appearance, as the ancients said—it has in conscience its original source, its supreme judge, its principle of life and of amelioration. Its prescriptions or commands, which nowadays appear before us as legal articles of the most abstract and precise nature, were at first individual and impermanent feelings and thoughts. And it is important that they should constantly be confronted with the living consciences of individuals, if we would not have them degenerate into scholasticism and routine. For such is the natural tendency of human institutions; they become detached, as it were, from the mind that gave them birth, and along the lines of an altogether formal logic become defined, systematised, and stereotyped, as though of themselves, into rigid, fixed forms. They then assume the imposing aspect of immutability, but as they remove farther and farther away

from man, who is ever investigating and changing, they finally lose their spiritual significance and, becoming reduced to empty formulæ, cease to serve any useful purpose. It is by incessant contact with minds that are consciences, that the law remains concrete and living, capable of modification and amelioration.

On the other hand, the individual conscience cannot do without the law. It is idle to imagine a conscience capable of developing alone. No sooner does man claim to have transcended animality, than he has to make use of words, concepts and rules, consequently, of those abstract generalities of which law is the *résumé*, the most authoritative expression. From this condition no one can free himself; if a conscience could be strictly independent and individual, it would really be no more than a thought, abandoned to the hazards of extraneous suggestions, or of autosuggestion, which differs therefrom only in appearance. And just as the conscience realises itself only by working upon ideas, traditions and laws, so it cannot develop by regarding itself as its sole end. The work that fortifies it and confers on it true originality, consists in the effort to fathom the origin, signification and value of laws, in order to resolve them into itself, to criticise and improve them. There is a remarkable affinity between the strictly human conscience and the law. By making the law its study, the conscience is awakened; its work is to create laws. We know that Kant purposed to realise within himself the autonomy of the conscience in all its fulness; he found satisfaction only by imposing on himself stricter laws than the ordinary ones. It is by relying on the law that we make ourselves capable of transcending it; it is by laying down a law that is more universal, just and moral, more worthy of the name of law, that the conscience becomes more noble and free.

Hence it follows that, on the one hand, the law cannot stifle the individual conscience without being changed into a blind, despotic force: the more it guarantees the life, expansion and unfoldment—even though it be audacious

and venturesome—of the individual conscience, the more rational, living and capable of progress will it be. On the other hand, the conscience cannot, without forswearing itself and being reduced to a state of isolation and impotence, either disdain or regard as purely external aids those laws that have supplied it with the fixed centre which its rational development needs. It is not in a spirit of transcendent disdain, but rather with the firm conviction of all there is of goodness and truth in the law, even though it sometimes expresses itself in unjust measures, that Socrates acquiesces in the death sentence pronounced against him according to the laws of his country. He hears these laws saying to him: To act as though thou wert on due equality with thy country and with the laws, to return them wrong for wrong, blow for blow, to attempt to defeat and destroy them, whereas, but for them, thou wouldst be neither a citizen nor a man, wouldst thou call that justice, thou who claimest to be enamoured of virtue?

In a word, we must abandon the convenient metaphor of the fortress, the intangible, impregnable sanctuary, closed against the law, but outside of which the law apparently holds sovereign sway. However cunningly the boundary line between the two domains be drawn, it will still be an artificial one. Man is a unity, like the world in which he lives. The conscience and the law are two creations of the mind, not two things that pre-exist and are mutually impenetrable. Look beyond metaphors, seek the real behind the abstract and the scholastic, and you will find that law and conscience blend together, that they are determined by each other. Here we have the key of history, here we have true logic, the logic of life and reason, not that of mere dialectic.

This penetration or permeation should be maintained, favoured and realised as well as possible in existing societies.

How far and in what way can and ought the law and the conscience to determine each other? This is the practical side of the question, one which cannot be entered upon in an introductory study such as the present; for the solution

of this practical problem will necessarily vary with the extremely diversified conditions presented by existing societies.

In a general way, the relation to be established between law and conscience in any given society will depend, first, on the degree of reality, growth and vitality of each of these two principles. To maintain the progress effected on both sides, to open up the path to future progress: such is the rule to be followed.

Secondly, we must consider the conditions in which individuals and societies exist. One and the same development of individual or social life would not produce equally salutary effects in the various human communities. If the cohesion of the community is threatened, we must apply our best efforts to maintain it; if it is the dignity of the conscience that is in peril, we must endeavour to restore that dignity.

Thirdly, practical solutions will depend on the degree of harmony between individuals in the pursuit of a common ideal. For, to fathom the human conscience is not to encroach upon its autonomy when its promptings are satisfied; and, on the other hand, the law, without loss to itself, can set limits on its intervention when individuals, of themselves, are working efficaciously along the lines of the general will.

Indeed, while the principle of the relation between the conscience and the law is afforded us rather by life than by theory, *a fortiori* is this the case with the applications and adaptation of this principle to the varying conditions of existing societies. In such matters as these, which concern not only the systematic unity of our knowledge but also the moral destiny of individuals and nations, all the progress of science could not prevent the aphorism of Goethe from still being true:

> Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,
> Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum.

EMILE BOUTROUX.

PARIS, FRANCE.

CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS.

A. K. ROGERS.

THE term class consciousness is not wholly unambiguous, and I shall need to define the sort of considerations with which I am to be engaged. And I certainly do not mean to raise a question about the right of men to further their own interests, and, when they have ends in common, to recognize this community, and learn to act together to secure what they desire. What I conceive to be the practical meaning of class consciousness is this, but also something more. It is the disposition to find one's common interests in connection with a well-defined and exclusive group of other men, and to allow this special connection to dominate one's whole political outlook and activity.

In modern times, the term brings first to mind the so-called lower or proletarian class, although it is just here that the thing itself has been least in evidence in the past. On the other hand, class consciousness in the upper classes has always been a highly influential fact, which was so little talked about only because it could be so thoroughly taken for granted. It has had its effect less through conscious theory, than through the natural reaction of members of an aristocratic body against such of their number as took sides against their interests and privileges. A gentleman might go to almost any length in the way of mere immorality, and find himself less frowned upon by his associates, including his womankind, by far, than if he were to ally himself effectively with some attempt to blur the distinction between gentleman and common citizen.

It is only with the rise of modern democracy that class consciousness begins to loom up vaguely as a portent. Of the numerous criticisms made upon democracy, most came back in the end to this, that as soon as the majority discovered their power, they would at once rise up and expro-

priate the helpless minority who hitherto had been running things. Now a prophecy, if dated far enough ahead, is always a pretty safe sort of argument; and this particular prophecy is still a favorite at the present day. In its earlier forms, however, it has clearly not worked out as was expected. That votes can be extended practically to everyone, and property still remain reasonably safe from the greed of the poor,—a thing which to many of the earlier critics of America was self-evidently impossible,—has been proved possible by the course of events.

Naturally this does not show that such is going to remain the fact indefinitely. All that it does prove, is that in a modern democracy the populace is not a mob, which spontaneously will flock to plunder as soon as the ballot is put in its hands. There is, as we know, a serious propaganda now on for doing what the critics held that democracy was bound to do; but the fact that it is a propaganda, and not a spontaneous movement, is significant, and is of considerable importance for an estimate of the expediency of the class ideal. It is recognized now that if the relatively expropriated class is really to be united so as to make its class interest predominant, the thing can be done only by a strenuous process of education. Men must be convinced and persuaded, and held against all the natural forces of disruption to a prolonged campaign of collective action. It is clear that this presupposes something quite different from a mob; it is the expression of a voluntary, and relatively rationalized, purpose. And when men have been drilled to common ends sufficiently for this, there is hope of bringing reason to bear upon them. They are capable of stopping to separate means from ends, and asking whether they are really on the road to the attainment of what they want; and when this question can really be put, and reflected upon, the first danger of the situation has passed. Of course if the interests of the majority, and those of a minority, are in point of fact genuinely opposed, there can only be one outcome. The majority will in the end get its way, and it ought to get it. But the assumption of the

critic always is that the majority is going to work in a manner really prejudicial to its own welfare; and if this is true, it ought not to be impossible to show that it is true. If indeed a certain ideal situation were actually present, there would be serious danger. If the great majority of men were visibly and totally expropriated, so that they had everything to gain and nothing to lose, there might well be possible a ferocious and unreasoning combination to attack all existing institutions; though it might be remarked that in such a case there really would not be much to say in defense of the rational character of the institutions in question. But as a matter of fact this is not of course the real situation. The workingman is far from being without a stake in the country. He does not have much property, but he has some. His job doesn't suit him probably, but still it is a job; and his experience has led him to feel that a job is a good thing to hold on to until he sees pretty clearly ahead in the near future a chance to better himself. Indeed, the workingman with a little money ahead, and a family, is often inclined to be even timidly conservative, and the hopes of the agitator are constantly getting a setback from this, as it seems to him, irrational temper.

The possibility of drawing class lines in political action is always present so long as men do find themselves separated off more or less into groups marked by a conflict of interest. There is indeed a philosophic faith that if we could take an outlook broad enough, we should find everyone's good identical with that of everyone else; and it is no doubt true that there is a very large measure of actual identity between the interests of different people. We are all benefited by the extension and bettering of education, the growth of the arts and sciences, the wider distribution of the amenities of social life, the prevention of useless noise and disorder. Other things being equal, it is to the advantage of everyone that prosperity should reign, and business hum. But a contemplation of these commonplaces, when steadied by a certain degree of satisfaction with one's own lot in the world, has not infrequently carried the enthusiast

too far. He has let his academic vision of the common good blind him to the actual existence of strong antagonisms on the stage where men actually play their parts. Methodists and Baptists and Presbyterians do not now constitute classes in the political sense, in spite of the fact that they represent groups of men bound together by common ends in separation from other men, because, except to the high theological mind, it is not obvious that the Baptist is any the worse off for the prosperity of the Methodist church around the corner; and accordingly we should all object if Baptists were to go into politics as Baptists. We don't expect, in art or philosophy, to see rival schools forming political combinations, because so far are such groups from limiting one another, that they are quite necessary to the highest enjoyment of each. It would be but a drab and solemn world to the philosophical realist, or the cubist, did he rule alone with nothing to do but slay dead dogs over again; to say nothing of the inroads which a cessation of literary and philosophical and artistic quarrels would make upon the gaiety of nations. But if by any chance the good at which all are aiming became a limited good, the situation would alter, and the dictum that the interest of one is the interest of all would need reconsideration.

And this fact, out of which class affiliations grow, suggests also the main point of advantage to be attributed to them. If we are going to make changes to any real purpose, the first requisite is that we should be able to render our issues definite; and definiteness at any rate is secured when we follow the lead of self interest. If we were in possession of the ideal social goal, and all that was needed was to stir up men to its attainment, then private claims might be only a hindrance. But since the goal is hidden, and we are groping our way to it without full vision, it is hard to see how we ever should be able to direct our steps without following the lead of these personally felt demands. Certainly the alternative way of leaving people to discover their neighbors' needs would not seem to carry any better

promise of success. The more strongly a man feels an interest to be his, the more definite is the thing he will go after, and the more decisive, therefore, is the test to which the desire can be subjected. Compare with this the fumbling and inconclusive character of most speculative and academic proposals,—proposals, that is, which attempt to abstract from the interests of anybody in particular, and settle the destiny of mankind on the principles of impartial reason.

It is, however, as I have remarked, sufficiently clear that not all differences between men are relevant to the growth of a class consciousness in the political sense. Indeed I see only two things that appear to have any natural tendency in this direction,—power, and money. And in these latter days, when brute physical force by itself is politically negligible, and special privileges before the law have been approximately done away with, the first of these is pretty sure to reduce itself to the second. Apart from financial inequality, there is very slight ground for fixed opposition between groups. The schools into which intellectuals are divided do not lead to this. Neither do occupational differences in themselves. Doctors do not set themselves against lawyers as such, or shoemakers against tailors; for shoemakers need tailors, and tailors shoemakers, lawyers need physicians, and physicians sometimes need lawyers, or think they do. But the same thing does not hold of the distribution of money rewards. The total amount of the industrial product may be influenced by a great variety of factors; but given the product at any particular moment, it is apparently a matter of arithmetic that interests are not identical. The more for some, the less for others. It is the financial basis, accordingly, on which contending political classes ulitmately rest.

And this calls attention, in the first place, to the fact that effective political classes are artificial. They cut across the complex interests of man's life, and isolate one from out this complex, which then is made to legislate for all the rest. Whatever the apparent tactical necessity for a hard and

fast combination here, it seems obvious that it runs the risk of sacrificing other demands. It will hardly happen that a man's best good in every direction will always coincide with his interest in increasing his income; and consequently to make this the fundamental principle for governing his political action is bound to be narrowing and artificial.

There is a second drawback, which will appeal more strongly to a man the wider and more independent his nature. Closely drawn class lines inevitably represent the spirit of militancy; and warfare always carries with it certain undesirable consequences. It necessitates a very large encroachment on personal independence of thought and action. When everything has been subordinated to one end, which end is to be attained by fighting, it is unavoidable that party discipline should be very strict. You must, to begin with, be perfectly and unqualifiedly certain of the worth of your party end, otherwise you do not belong to the party at all, and are not encouraged to stay. Both socialism and militant suffragism recognize the need, for their purposes, of such a final and definitive confession of faith. The result is that dogmatism, and a refusal to examine first principles, become a moral duty; and history does not make it clear that this is the most desirable frame of mind. It is this which has been in the past the particular vice of the religious temper; and it is worth noticing that party socialism, usually a severe critic of religion, is in a special way the movement which has inherited most of that spirit of intolerance which religion is gradually shedding. And besides having to put oneself in a not altogether desirable frame of mind at the start, class warfare makes it necessary further to subordinate the spirit of disagreement as one goes along. A man may have very positive opinions about questions of method; but he must fall in line with the ruling majority, or his company will not long be wanted. It is not difficult to understand why Socialism, again, has shown so great a tendency to split up into sects; the difficulties are very great for the persistence of a militant

minority within a class conscious organization. With a great purpose to attain under militant conditions, men, it is felt, should be willing to give up their private judgment, as actual warfare is generally not thought to be the time for airing differences of opinion. The more class solidarity is put into the foreground, the more this sense of restraint upon individual freedom is bound to assert itself; and it can hardly fail to have unfortunate results. The more energetic natures, unless they are turned into the doubtful paths of the demagog and dictator, will be repelled by the need that they submit themselves to an over-strict restraint; while in the case of others it will mean the exaggeration of mental habits to which mankind is already too prone,—partisanship, unwillingness to consider the other side, and the substitution of action for discussion. And among outsiders, the loss of good will is sure to be considerable. Any group of men with a show of justice on their side are certain of a fairly widespread sympathy beyond their own circle; but the stricter class lines are drawn, the less vigorous is this appeal. Many votes that might have been won for some measure in particular which is approved, will fail to materialize if the insistence is on an entire program or nothing. A class may not care for outside help; but at least it is evident that in proportion to the violence of the appeal to class consciousness, the unlikelihood of getting it will increase.

Now this last point reverts to a matter which needs some further consideration. Allowing that drawbacks exist, it may be said, what else is there left to do if we are to get our rights, except to combine with others who suffer the same deprivation? Of course we *must* combine; but I wish to call attention to the alternative way of combination which the theory of democracy provides.

It has been customary from the start for critics of democracy to assume that the rule of a majority is interchangeable with class rule. So Professor Barrett Wendell, for example, to take a recent instance, argues that majority rule is unjust. What it really means is legislation by a

single class,—the so-called lower class, I suppose,—since wealth, ability, and education will always be in a minority; whereas justice demands that every class alike should have its say. This obviously is using the word "class" very loosely. There is no class, in the political sense, of the average man, the man in moderate circumstances, the educated or uneducated man. That property and special capacity should have weight in determining the affairs of the nation is of course to be admitted; but most people have suspected that they already possess such influence. And as I have already noted, the fear lest majority rule may mean the rule simply of the special class of manual laborers seems more academic than real, unless indeed we call it being ruled by the laboring class to be forced to consider its interests as well as our own. Meanwhile the idea of government through a balance of classes fails of entire clearness. The claim that all classes should be represented has its most obvious historical meaning in terms of a situation where considerable elements of the population are deprived of the franchise. Such men by the very fact of their disfranchisement, though usually for more fundamental reasons also, constitute a class; and the demand that they be represented means no more therefore in the first place than that as individuals they should be allowed to vote. This, however, is quite different from Professor Wendell's claim, which is intended as a weapon *against* the democratic tendency to enlarge the franchise. Alarmed by the early encroachments of popular power, advocates of the *status quo* sometimes suggested meeting it by "class representation." Their idea apparently was that the masses would be satisfied if only they had men to represent them in the national council; meanwhile the special interests of the numerical minority were to retain a large enough number of representatives to outvote them. Of course if groups of men, not individuals, are represented, the numerical superiority of a given group might easily be rendered innocuous. This is for example the gist of Sir James Mackintosh's political theory. It has a specious appearance of justice;

but in reality it is simply the old claim that power ought to reside in the "safe" minority, which has only to be put in plain language to be certain of rejection by modern democracies. Meanwhile the theory of democracy deprecates the whole notion of classes. It holds that a man has the right to *vote*, not to elect a representative. If he wishes to combine with like-minded persons to try to put in some one who shall represent them in some special capacity, he of course has the privilege; but he has to take the chance of being able to secure a majority. What ideally he and his fellows are encouraged to do, however, is not to split up into as many factions as there are separate interests, but rather to sink minor differences by combining on a more comprehensive program, and so endeavoring to enlarge the unity of aim among citizens.

Democracy, then, or the theory of majority rule, expressly discountenances the idea of hard and fast class lines, and encourages instead a fluidity whose aim is to give rational considerations, not selfish interests, a preponderating influence in the long run. This appears clearly, in theory, in connection with the idea of popular *responsibility*. The criticism of majority rule rests very largely on the assumption that it is irresponsible. If the people were a unit, there would be no further question of responsibility; no more ultimate court of appeal exists. But in practice "the people" always means a majority of the people, to whom a minority stands opposed. Representatives can be effectively responsible to the majority which elects them, because in this majority superior force is located. But there can be no responsibility, of the same literal sort, of the majority to the whole people, and therefore no legal responsibility at all, since when it is divided into factions the people as a depository of *force* has no reality. Mathematically the whole people are stronger than any majority. But to exert this power they must be unanimous; and then the situation would be entirely changed, and the supposed majority, as an entity opposed to the whole, would have no existence. But if a majority is not responsible, how is

it ever likely to develop that political morality which is essential to good government?

The dilemma, however, is only an apparent one. Although in a legal sense there can be no authority superior to the will of the majority, in a more indirect way this can still be said to be responsible to the people, and political institutions can be arranged to make this responsibility effective. And the success of this depends on the degree in which the majority is, not a permanent, but a fluctuating thing; so that although, while it remains a majority, it can do its will, it yet is restrained by the knowledge that if it does certain things it will cease to be a majority, and become a minority. This is due to the fact that ideally in a democracy reason and discussion, rather than brute force, is the ultimate court of appeal, and the consequent need for a majority to keep its actions in some degree within the bounds of reason, under penalty of losing its strength. Democracy is not the rule of *the* majority, but of *a* shifting majority. Every instrument of publicity, and every growth in intelligence, is therefore a limit upon the actual, as opposed to the theoretical, power of any party in control. That which constitutes a majority is not a fixed personnel,—this is extremely fluctuating,—but certain purposes and opinions that hold men temporarily together; and the operation of these is under ordinary circumstances so delicate and subject to variation, that only blind prejudice can fail to see that it is suicidal to press the temporary power they give beyond a certain indefinite limit.

Now it seems to me that the advocates of a class conscious proletariat are repeating the illusory identification of majority rule with class rule, and so are overlooking a road to the attainment of their wishes which not only is in principle more rational and equitable, but which also, in view of the plain fact that no well defined and compact class constitutes an actual majority, is a safer path to the righting of injustices. The best chance is offered, pretty clearly, for genuine progress, when the freest possible play of private interest and points of view is combined with circumstances

which insure that these shall meet one another in the first instance on the field of reason and intelligent discussion. A strict class alignment may be, conceivably though not probably, favorable to the former end, but only at the expense of the other; and the only evident way to reconcile the two is by a more serious endeavor to live up to the principle of democracy. Having primarily to convince a number of people sufficient to form a permanent majority, the emphasis would have to be upon those rational considerations which constitute justice, instead of upon a foregone conclusion which does not even pretend to be careful of the supposed interests of other groups. If really the claim of the exploited is a claim of justice, it would seem undesirable not to keep this as much as possible in the foreground. The more the emphasis is placed on the class, the group of men affected, rather than on the nature of the particular right which is claimed, so that their interest appears to stand apart from the interest of others, or the more hostility is directed to the personal make-up of the opposing class instead of to the special privileges they are claiming, in short, in so far as the situation is made to approximate to the irrational standards of a state of war, the more danger there is that its larger rational aspect will be side-tracked, and a pugnacious and intolerant habit of mind developed which is prejudicial to both parties alike. To the complaint of the radical that the way of reason is too long and tedious, and that something more summary is called for, the answer is, that facts do not seem to warrant the confidence that these more summary methods will succeed. Since there appears very little likelihood under present conditions that a secure majority can be obtained for anything that approaches the revolutionary without the aid of members of other classes, to say nothing of the need of other than purely selfish appeals to enlist the full vote even of the class directly concerned, the method of persuasion might seem even from the standpoint of good tactics preferable.

My general conclusion is, therefore, that social progress is best advanced by a political system which encourages

the growth of an intelligent and convinced majority, and then puts them in a position to insure that their conviction shall be honestly and promptly carried out. And in conclusion I may refer very briefly to a proposal which is not indeed intended to promote class differences, but which looks to me very likely to have this effect. The suggestion that we should arrange to give minorities representation in our legislatures seems on the surface a fair one; and indeed it may do all that its advocates claim. But on examination its case does not appear altogether clear. Of course in terms of the party system *the* minority has representation now. If a man's own candidate is not elected, there are other districts in which the relative strength of the parties is reversed; and through this a minority representation is built up which is, or conceivably could be made, roughly correspondent to the number of voters on the two sides. It might be said that a voter's purely local interests are not adequately represented by a legislator from another district. But his local interests, in so far as they are legitimate interests of the community, are in most cases sufficiently taken care of by the local representative of either party; and the notion that legislatures should be the meeting ground of conflicting local interests, bent on making the most advantageous deals, is anyhow of dubious validity. But what the device in question looks toward is apparently something more ambitious. It would have representatives stand, indeed, not for local interests, but for large and more or less principled differences of opinion, as in theory our parties now do; but it would extend the participation of such differences in legislative action, by giving opportunity to an indefinite number of minor points of view.

Now what is the nature of the groups which it is likely would secure minority representation. Probably there would always be a few causes capable of attracting a large following by their sheer eccentricity. Not separated from these perhaps by any very sharp lines, would be one or more large moral issues, of the sort that satisfy the deep-seated human craving to do good to our fellow beings, at

a minimum of personal expense. But the greater number would almost certainly stand for selfish interests, or classes. It is not academic differences of opinion that in the main is going to determine the grouping of voters, but conflicts, real or apparent, in what they conceive to be to their personal advantage. These may be guided by familiar lines of formulated political or economic doctrine of a more or less disinterested and academic sort; but they will hardly be created by these to begin with. Accordingly we are led to inquire how the case stands on the *legislative* side for any scheme which tends to encourage class differences.

The advantages that might be claimed for such a scheme are, as I see it, mainly twofold,—that it would result in the election of an abler type of legislator, and that, with all the main conflicting interests personally represented in legislative halls, we should stand a better chance of getting really adequate laws. Now it is to be premised in the first place that minority interests are anyhow not going to be entirely neglected because they do not have a seat in Congress. A man's salvation, and the salvation of his opinions, ought after all to depend more upon himself than on a representative; and there is still left open the real business of a minority, which is not to force things through the legislature upon an unwilling public, but to grow into a majority by influencing public opinion. Meanwhile suppose that, prior to convincing the country as a whole, a few prohibitionists or single taxers could be assured election. Doubtless they might make good average legislators, and their special outlook might even now and then be of advantage to the cause of sound government; but how would the political situation as a whole be benefited? As a minority, they either would be quite powerless to effect their peculiar aims, or else they would be strong enough to force some sort of a crude compromise as a price for their support in other matters; but until the preliminary work of gaining public backing is accomplished, they could not, and it is not desirable that they should, make any real legislative progress. And the work of public education really belongs elsewhere;

to give a man the opportunity to take up the time of his colleagues by discussing an issue not practically pertinent, at the expense of the real business they are paid to carry out, neither recommends the issue, nor serves any other useful purpose. And the more you multiply the number of the interests to be listened to, the more, it would seem, are you lessening the likelihood of efficient legislation. Especially is this likely to be the case if it is differences of fundamental aim that minority members represent. It at least is an arguable thesis that we have the chance of the best results when legislation depends rather on the deliberation of men chosen to accomplish a relatively specific task set for them by the majority judgment of the nation, than when the legislature is an arena within which the nature of the goal is thrashed out by hired advocates: and so far as this is true, the policy of concentration, with the representatives of the majority in control, is better than a wide scattering of interests. With a strong opposing party responsible for defending the other side of the question, we are apt to get the one main desideratum—full discussion; and we lessen the risk not only of confusing the issue, but of encouraging the unprofitable sort of compromise to which the need of conciliating a large number of conflicting demands is almost sure to lead.

And furthermore it seems rather probable that the more specifically we set out to secure representation of minorities, the more we should be likely to find political opinions hardening into dogmas, and passing from an open-minded insistence on large matters of principle, to a partisan attachment to some pet scheme of method which the representative is chosen to advocate. But a difference of opinion about methods we are already likely to find sufficiently present in existing legislatures, in a more fluid and therefore more desirable form. Besides, the attitude here involves some inconsistency. If the voter is competent to decide about methods, it might seem that he ought to do it directly, and not elect a number of men to fight the thing out all over again; and if he is not com-

petent, neither is he fitted to elect representatives on such an issue.

But now while I think that such considerations as I have been advancing justify themselves in the long run as against the expediency of class conscious propaganda, it would be foolish not to see that there are conditions under which they are bound to be a mere waste of words. Under certain circumstances nothing will prevent the development of a narrow class consciousness. But if, as beings of superior rationality, we deplore this, it is well to determine where the main responsibility lies. The necessary fact is this: whenever any number of men feel that, in a sufficiently important manner, they are being discriminated against, and shut out from privileges which others enjoy, they will inevitably, in proportion to their intelligence and means of co-operation, find themselves developing a special class spirit. But if one is inclined to complain about it, he should direct his complaint to the right party; and the fault lies, not with the militant class itself, but with the other class, frequently the complainant in the case, which by arrogating to itself special privileges precipitates the conflict. Accordingly while one may offer good counsel here—always an easy thing to do,—he need not be surprised, or particularly resentful, if his advice is not taken. He may even feel that there are occasions where the advice tends to be impertinent. There are grievances so great, with the peaceful remedy so apparently remote, that even the philosopher may feel like throwing his judicial temper overboard, and applauding a single-minded and bitter state of revolution. And indeed, since everybody knows that men in authority are by nature slow-moving bodies, that reason and justice do not always seem to them more important than expediency, and that the willingness and ability to make trouble often stands a complainant in good stead as a discourager of apathy, it is not apparent on what grounds one can ever wholly rule out the appeal to factionalism and turbulence as a legitimate weapon. Inevitably, however, with the advance of civilization, the apparent

expediency of this grows less convincing, as temporary conditions become more endurable, the chances for a remedy through peaceful or semi-peaceful means more promising, and, in particular, as the permanent source of remedy more and more plainly lies not in the mere abandonment of special privileges, but in the reconstruction of intricate social and industrial conditions where a failure of reason is sure to injure everybody concerned. One can hardly perhaps subject a feeling of grievance to the niceties of argument; but it does seem that a bitter temper, and the inclination to set one's own ends in antagonism to those of others, lose their justification under such circumstances. The militant revolt of women, for example, in its later stages, seems rather forced and hectic as serious grievances due to a lack of the ballot become more difficult to find, and as the prospect of being able to persuade a not specially unwilling male sex grows by leaps and bounds. Certainly it is arguable that the English suffragists were making headway by keeping their temper, and making their enemies ridiculous; no one except the politicians particularly objected to a warfare carried on in so amusing a fashion. And this is not the least of the drawbacks which the insistence on a strenuous class warfare is likely to entail, that it will interfere with that sense of humor which is among the most powerful of political weapons. The too deadly earnestness of the advocate of a cause is often one of the reasons for his lack of success, as it is indeed a reason why, for the security of the rest of us, he ought not to succeed; a sensitive conscience against extremes, and a recognition that no one cause takes precedence over all other causes put together, is as a means of social advance only second to the necessity of a genuine and firm conviction that this particular cause is nevertheless really important, and worth going after.

A. K. Rogers.

Yale University.

SOCIAL FORCES AND INTERNATIONAL ETHICS.

HOWARD C. WARREN.

IN EXAMINING the attitude of thinking men toward the present war, one is struck by the prominence given to ethical considerations. A mass of books, magazine articles, pamphlets, and editorials have been written in the endeavor to fix the responsibility for beginning the war, or to establish the guilt of one side or the other in its actions during the conflict.

Among the belligerents, writers belonging to one group of Powers inveigh against their adversaries for violating a solemn treaty and invading an unoffending neutral nation, or indict them for barbarous modes of warfare. Those of the other group condemn their opponents for illegal blockades or for interference with neutral mails and commerce on the high seas. One party claims to stand for freedom and self-government, the other for discipline and organization.

Even thinkers in neutral lands are prone to measure the situation by ethical norms. There is no question but that the sympathies of millions of Americans were definitely turned in one direction at the outset by the German invasion of Belgium. It would be difficult to determine how much of this feeling was due to the broken treaty and how much to sympathy for the weaker nation.

It is obvious that citizens and subjects of the Powers actively engaged in the conflict see the situation from a sharp angle. From their viewpoint certain factors appear distorted; the bearing of some events on the general situation is unduly magnified, while the significance of others is missed completely. But the eye of the neutral observer is not at the edge of the field. His perspective need not be at fault, like that of the combatants. Nevertheless we find almost as much disagreement in discussing the ethical aspects of the war on this side of the water as abroad.

A pamphlet recently issued by a number of prominent Americans residing abroad illustrates at once the powerful influence of ethical motives in determining one's view of international relations, and the lack of historical perspective which an emotional attitude may produce. The writers urge Americans to abandon the position of moral neutrality. "Can we blame England for honoring her signature to the guarantee of Belgian neutrality?" "Can we blame France for resisting invasion?" "Can we blame Russia, a great state, for championing Servia, a small one, of kindred race?" "The present war with all its horrors is actually due to Germany. But for the two initial crimes committed against the liberty and integrity of small states, the Allied Armies would not be to-day in the field." "The President in his note of last April . . . convicts the German government not only of crimes of the most brutal inhumanity, but of the violation of its pledged word and of deliberate lying in the matter of the *Sussex*." These quotations sufficiently indicate the trend of the document.

Some months ago the present writer in an "Open Letter" to a colleague ventured to express the opinion that our own country was not interested in the victory of either side. He suggested, among other considerations, that the neutralization of Belgium was part of the European scheme for maintaining the balance of power, a policy in which this country has never participated; that the treaty was entered into by each of the several Powers for its own self-interest, and not through sympathy for the Belgians themselves.

This letter was circulated privately among the membership of the American psychological and philosophical associations. The replies elicited might be worth publishing some day as a contribution to the study of individual psychology. They range all the way from uncritical flattery to scandalized expostulation.[1] The chief point of interest in the present connection is that the men addressed were all by profession students of human nature, investigators of

[1] A Scotchman—a philosopher—to whom a copy of the letter was inadvertently sent regarded it as a personal insult.

social problems, or explorers into the underlying principles of nature itself. If these specially trained thinkers exhibit such widely different standpoints, if they are unable to agree on any basal judgment in such matters, how can a judicial decision be expected from the plain man in the street? If preconceptions and distorted perspective prevent the philosopher and the psychologist from studying dispassionately the meaning of the Great War, is there any prospect of a rational attitude on the part of the unenlightened majority who (in theory at least) govern the policy of democratic nations?

A fundamental difficulty in reaching agreement on international issues along ethical lines is the absence of any definite center of moral orientation. What is "chivalrous defense of the weak" to X, is "hypocritical self-complacency" to Y. What is "self-preservation" to Y, is "agression" to X. So long as we attempt to interpret international crises in terms of ethical values, our judgments are hopelessly at variance.

The only solution to the deadlock, in the writer's opinion, lies in a complete change of attitude toward the great social forces which manifest themselves in wars and in the governmental policies which lead to warfare. If our best thinkers cannot agree as to the "right" and the "wrong" of these social manifestations, it is at least a plausible assumption that the nations which are brought into conflict by clashing ideals *are not governed by the same ethical standards.* If the student of social phenomena concludes that the present war, for example, embodies a struggle between two conflicting ethical systems, it surely devolves upon him to measure the situation from a standpoint apart from his own traditional ethics; indeed, he may find no alternative open but to judge it from a wholly non-ethical standpoint.

As a matter of fact the ethical standpoint has been largely abandoned in our interpretation of past historic movements. The historian no longer pours invective upon William and his Norman hosts for their ruthless conquest of England. In our own land North and South are beginning to join in

doing honor to both sides in the Civil War. For the most part it is only *contemporary events* or those of our own generation which call forth the ethical judgment.

In the present case a moral interpretation is peculiarly inappropriate. Is it likely that an entire half-continent of civilized nations—either the Entente or the Central Powers—should suddenly go "plumb wrong?" Is it not a saner, more reasonable attitude for the social scientist to treat war and all such massive commotions of human groups, whether in ancient or modern times, as manifestations of potent social forces?

Perhaps the best practical cure for the ultra-ethical attitude toward contemporary history is to compare present events with similar occurrences in the past. Let the American who discourses so vehemently against the invasion of Belgium examine the history of our own treaties with the Indians. It is not altogether a question of whether one should deal differently with civilized and uncivilized races—it is rather a question of the inviolability of a solemn treaty. What civilized nation has not at one time or another broken its agreements? And do we not find instances in every generation of the invasion and forcible annexation of lesser states by greater? California, Alsace, the Transvaal are fairly recent examples as history goes. Even the strictest moralist would not expect that a complete regeneration of international ethics could be effected between 1900 and 1914.

The writer would not wish to be reckoned a disbeliever in group morality. The present outcry against national disregard for the ethical standards which hold among individuals, is indeed a sign of progress in the "right direction." Nor is he quite skeptical of the help afforded to the evolution of national morality by these vehement individual protestations and indictments. The preacher and the prophet are real factors in national life. National sentiment is molded by a few individuals who think and speak, just as military campaigns and political policies are directed by a handful of leaders.

But where international morality is in question, the average ethical teacher finds himself quite beyond his depth. His criticisms and his judgments are beside the mark, because they are based upon a single code. He is bound to the standards of his own nation or his own particular "school," while it usually happens that the several nations concerned are following very different standards.

A problem in ethics is far from being a mere question of the facts. It is largely a question of values. An old lady watching her first base-ball game declared that the home team had the best pitcher, because he hit the bat every time, while the visitors' pitcher usually missed. Her statement of fact was quite correct, but her appreciation of values was wholly at fault. Before condemning a nation for its policy towards its neighbors or for its methods of conducting war, it is of prime importance that we study that nation's *ideals*. Else we are striking at an opponent as reflected in our own mirror.

The fallacy of much of the discussion concerning the responsibility for the present war, even by those who profess to have studied the philosophy of history, lies in the fact that they confine their study to the week, month, or decade before the war started. The German invasion of Belgium, the Russian mobilization, the Austrian ultimatum, the execution of the Archduke in Bosnia were all potent factors, no doubt, in bringing about the crisis. But the effective causes of the war extend back a century—perhaps centuries—before these special occurrences.

The ideal of *conquest* has pervaded European national and tribal life since the dawn of history. This has found historic expression in both *centralization* and *subjugation*.[2] These two tendencies manifested themselves during the past century in struggles for national unity and in colonization; they are trunk roots of the present war. Since Napoleon's time, at least, a contest has gone on between forces striving to form a great United Germany and counter-forces

[2]How far these impulses also dominate American national development would form an interesting study. We cannot discuss it here.

striving to thwart it. An equally potent force has been the tendency toward building up great colonial empires. The impulse toward external expansion, checked in the Western hemisphere in 1776 and 1820, was later renewed in Asia and Africa; it has been a leading motive in international politics for at least the past thirty years. To the student of history these ideals, these modes of expressing them, and the international friction to which they have unavoidably led, made the Great War of 1914 highly probable *some time* during the present generation. It is perhaps too much to say that the war was inevitable. But the situation is not unlike that of a vehicle standing on a railroad track. It invites collision.

Tracing the path of events further and further back into the haze of time, it seems a mere waste of breath—or ink—to discuss the responsibility of individual nations for beginning the present war. When an avalanche overwhelms and demolishes a chalet, it is of little moment to determine which stone struck the roof first. The attempts to distribute praise and blame in just measure among the Powers belong to by-gone generations. They smack of the age when Xerxes lashed the contumacious waves and happy parents gave thank-offerings to Juno Lucina.

International conflicts are not so much moral events as they are the clashing of social forces. Their true significance can only be appreciated from this viewpoint. The two contending forces in the present war seem to be *organization* and *individualism*. We of the Anglo-Saxon race are historically predisposed toward individual liberty; this accounts in part for the warm personal sympathy of the average American with the cause of the Entente. On the other hand the war has brought into high relief the marvelous efficiency of German organization; we cannot but express our admiration for the industrial and economic system, and our amazement at the military system, which has made that nation well-nigh invincible. May we not be sentimentalists enough to hope that when peace finally comes the best in *both* principles will be preserved—that efficiency and

liberty will somehow be amalgamated in the social organization of nations generally?

From the sociological standpoint the present conflict shows at least one hopeful sign. If wars are manifestations of social forces, they are likely to persist only so long as one side or the other may expect to *gain some advantage* from armed warfare. What prospective gain is there for either side to compensate for the tremendous wastage of life and property?

HOWARD C. WARREN.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY,
December, 1916.

NIETZSCHE AND THE WAR.[1]

WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER.

I.

THE present European War is sometimes closely connected with Nietzsche. It is even called "Nietzsche in Action," or the "Euro-Nietzschean (or Anglo-Nietzschean) War."[2]

In speaking of it, or of anybody's connection with it, one goes on the basis of a certain view of it—and I am obliged to give briefly my own, contestable as it may be. To me the war is a not unnatural outcome of the working of a certain set of conflicting national interests. In Servia there was a Great Servia agitation, which became inevitably, in a measure, directed against Austria-Hungary, since the latter included Bosnia and Herzegovina, mainly populated by Servian stock. Austria-Hungary as inevitably looked askance at the agitation—its success would mean her partial dismemberment. If, however, she should attack Servia, Russia, as a sister Slav State, and with ambitions of her own in the direction of Constantinople, would come to Servia's assistance; she had yielded to Austria-Hungary, when the latter had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina—she would yield no more. But if Russia took sides against Austria-Hungary, Germany, as kindred to Austria-Hungary, and with desires and hopes of her own in the direction of Constantinople and the Near East, would intervene for her. With Germany aligned against Russia, France was bound to be drawn in—she was Russia's ally, and, moreover, she wished her lost provinces back,

[1] An address given to the Societies for Ethical Culture in Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Chicago, also at various colleges and universities, in November and December, 1916.

[2] So an article in *The Unpopular Review*, January, 1915, and advertisements of *Why We are at War*, by members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History, in *The Nation* (New York), September and October, 1914.

Alsace and Lorraine, and war would be a chance to get them. England's hand was freer and all her immediate interests lay in peace—she already had "control of one fifth of the earth's surface and the care of one in five of all the inhabitants of the world";[3] yet she could not contemplate with serenity the rise of an overtopping power on the continent, and Germany might prove such a power, if there were a general Continental war, and she stood quietly by.[4] She had fought Spain, Holland, and France in successive centuries from such motives; in the American Civil War she desired "the severance" of our country as "a diminution of a dangerous power";[5] and an overshadowing Germany at her very door was an intolerable thought. She would move reluctantly, but she would move, if Germany drew the sword.[6]

Unhappily, this train of possibilities anticipates the actual course of events. One situation involved the next—the peoples and their ambitions or interests being what they were. It does not appear that any people wanted war, unless perhaps Austria against Servia, and Germany and

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[3] So Lord Roberts, *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1914, p. 15.

[4] Cf. Lord Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 12. In the middle of the eighteenth century Lord Chatham had said, "The only danger that England need fear will arise on the day that sees France attain the rank of a great sea, commercial and colonial power"; it matters little that Germany now took the place of France, and Lord Palmerston once declared, "It is a narrow policy to suppose that this country or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy of England. We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." In somewhat the same spirit France had desired to prevent the rise of a powerful Germany, Thiers saying in the French Parliament in 1867, "A fundamental principle of European politics has been at all times to keep Germany in its previous condition, namely, divided into a certain number of states united only in the bonds of a confederation; to consent to German unity, even if we receive an enlargement of territory in return, is to consent to the abasement of France—hence we must oppose it, in the name of French interests and of the European equilibrium." (Schlosser's *Weltgeschichte*, Book VII, p. 344.)

[5] This was the language of Mr. Gladstone, then a member of the Government.

[6] Cf. the predictions of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in the *British White Paper*, No. 17, and Sir Edward Grey's speech, August 3, 1914.

England, if not Russia, strove to keep the conflict between Austria and Servia within its local limits;[7] so little did Germany wish to fight England, that she only hoped that England would not fight her—and yet all preferred the risks of war rather than not put their interests through. We might almost say that the war was in each case defensive, even in Austria's; it simply happens sometimes that offense may be the best defense. I do not dwell on the Archduke Ferdinand's assassination or Belgium's invasion; they were minor causes, or occasions rather than causes—we now know that a year before the assassination Austria was ready to take up arms against Servia[8] and also that even if Germany had been willing to respect Belgian neutrality, England was not willing to agree to stay her hand.[9] Delay, particularly on Germany's part in declaring war, might have changed matters, but we do not perceive the full tragedy of the case till we see that it was just the apprehension, the fear, the tension of the parties concerned that forbade delay.

If I am right in this analysis, the war is at bottom a gigantic struggle of conflicting national interests. Each nation thought of itself only, put its own interest before anything else in the world (save as self-interest begot alliances); they distrusted and feared one another; there was no common bond between them—there was no common aim from which a common bond could arise. The war proves that national sentiment is now the strongest sentiment in the world. Christian ideals go down before it—

[7] See not only the introductory statements of the German *White Book* and Annexes 13, 15, 19, 22, but also the British *White Paper*, Nos. 107, 108, 110, 111, 118, 121; and further a despatch of the German Chancellor to the German Ambassador in Vienna, July 30, 1914, in which he said that Germany must "refuse to be drawn into a world-conflagration through Austria not respecting our advice" (printed in the *Westminster Gazette*, August 1, 1914, and acknowledged by the German Chancellor in a speech before the Reichstag, August 19, 1915—see *Deutsche Reichsanzeiger*, No. 196, August 20, 1915, also the *Kölnische Zeitung* of same date).

[8] So ex-Premier Giolitti in the Italian Chamber, December 6, 1914.

[9] Cf. British *White Paper*, No. 123, also the general language of Nos. 24, 25, 59, 87, 89.

Christianity is practically reduced to a set of national religions, as in the antique world; Socialist ideals equally go down before it; nothing conquers it, and it conquers everything. Yes, such is its pressure that men of letters and men of science in the various countries turn against one another and belittle one another—all their former respect for one another undergoes a sea-change; even artists do not escape the tremendous tide. If a man does not join heart and soul in the national cause, if he has scruples and reserves, if he sees some good in the foe and thinks that other lives may be precious besides those of his own people, if like Romain Rolland he dares to call young soldiers of all the nations his brothers and to lift himself above the *mêlée* he becomes suspect to his countryman, and is cast out, or frozen out—I have heard it said of certain Englishmen now that they are "never mentioned."

Such and so grounded, appears to me the war. There have been abhorrent developments in the struggle—things that, if there had been a will to a clean and honorable war, would not have happened; but I do not enlarge on them—in their wandering mazes would one be lost; it is the essence of the phenomenon that I am trying to grasp.

II.

What now is the relation of Nietzsche to it? Or rather first, what is the real mind and spirit of Nietzsche? He was born of pious parents—essentially religious by nature. His first thought was to follow his father's calling, who was a pastor, but doubts assailed him—he was thoughtful and speculative from an early age—and by the end of his first semester at the University, he definitely renounced his first intention, and turned to philology and philosophy. He did some notable, at least creditable, work in the former branch of learning, and became professor of Classical Philology at the University of Basel when but twenty-four. His deeper cravings, however, were not satisfied by philological research and teaching, and he sought the ampler views, the broader ideals that might more or less make up for

his lost religious faith. He was deeply impressed by Schopenhauer, and gathered from him a view of life and the world as a whole, and of his own place and function in it. A goal for life seemed suggested in Schopenhauer's exaltation of the philospher, the artist and the saint as the great types of existence; he wished to see these possibilities of our human stock pushed to the highest point, to have a new human culture that would aim that way. It was not perhaps a religion, but to some extent it satisfied instincts for the great and unattained and far away, which are close to the heart of religion. Schopenhauer, indeed, had regarded the supreme types as means by which we may be led to see the vanity of existence and be weaned from it—as steps, bridges to another order of things than this suffering, struggling, contradictory, evanescent life we know, and Nietzsche at first followed him. But soon he came to regard the types as good on their own account and wholly for their significance in relation to this actual earthly life; and this life as the only life he knew he accepted, instead of turning from, as Schopenhauer had—accepted it *with* its suffering, its struggle, its contradictions, the evanescence of all its forms, was ready to take a man's part in it, to suffer himself, to struggle and fight and die. He measured life not by its pleasures and pains, but by the quality of mind and will that might come forth in it—if it gave opportunity for worthy striving, it was enough. If this very faulty order of things still left it possible to aim for those great types of human achievement, on which he set his heart, if by the wise concerted effect of mankind they might be measurably attained, he asked no more. Grant that chance (that is, no design) ruled in the world, that chaos was the natural order in the human world as well, that unregulated desires and ambitions made history a scene of unreason and caprice, might not a master-hand, a master-motive and thought bring order out of this chaos, and more or less subdue nature herself and the world-tree yet bring forth fair and consummate fruit? Oh, the waste of the possibilities of the world, the blind, near aims that shut out

the vision and attainment of far and great ones, the tragedy and comedy of the idea that the world is being guided well anyway and we may trust to Providence!—such, if not his words, was the undercurrent of his thought. It was a supreme exercise of human power, a regulating and refashioning of the stuff of which man and nature are made in the interests of the production of great specimens of humanity, men who, in comparison to the common run of us, would be supermen and half divine, and a new people and a new culture looking this way and replacing the peoples and cultures that now exist—it was this toward which his mind turned and his aspiration went out. Early we hear from him an ejaculation like this (and it is the undertone of his whole life): "I see something higher and more human above me than I myself am; help me all to attain it, as I will help everyone who feels and suffers as I do; in order that at last the man may arise who is full and measureless in knowledge and love and vision and power, and with his whole being cleaves to nature and takes his place in it as judge and valuer of things." Schopenhauer had maintained that humanity should continually labor to produce individual great men, that this and nothing else was its task; and now Nietzsche says to us, "How does thy individual life receive its highest value, its deepest significance? Surely only in that thou livest to the advantage of the rarest and most valuable specimens of thy kind, not to that of the most numerous, *i.e.*, taken singly, least valuable specimens."[10]

Accordingly he wins a graded conception of humanity—all are not equal; some are more valuable than others. Certain men—at least certain types, when they come—are ends in the highest sense of that word, since they represent the highest evolution of humanity; others take themselves best as they make themselves means to serve them, or facilitate them. The higher are not to serve the lower, but the lower are to serve the higher. The idea that all can be all things is a fancy picture—there is a difference

[10] "Schopenhauer as Educator," sect. 6.

in the capacity and fitness of men; all may serve the highest and may have the dignity of serving, but not all are the highest or can be. A true society will be aristocratically organized—and some, the many, must serve, willingly or unwillingly, rather than be served, though they need not be mistreated, and every effort should be made to have them happy, contented, efficient, to give them, indeed, pride and solid satisfaction in doing their piece of service well. On their labour the whole superstructure of society rests—they literally support not only themselves, but those above them, it is only as they produce more than is necessary for their own needs, that others can be free for those higher activities that make human life supremely worth while: without leisure, no higher culture. But they are not their own end, and to make them think that they are as much entitled to consideration as anybody, that institutions are good as they favour them and allow them to do as they please, to accumulate and spend as they please, to seek happiness in any of the myriad ways high and low that may appeal to them, is a fundamental mistake. A sense of differing values, subordination, discipline, restraint, voluntary or enforced, *not* equality, *not* freedom (and *not* brotherhood, in the sense of all being on a common footing), are fundamental features in Nietzsche's view.

I have used the term aristocratic, but I must not mislead. The higher men whom Nietzsche wished to see or anticipate were not any set of people who get on top of others and ride them, not a money aristocracy as we know it in America, distinguished chiefly by luxurious ways of living and not knowing how to use leisure when they have it, not a military aristocracy (of itself more respectable) as there have been examples of it in Europe, not even an hereditary ruling class of statesmen, princes and kings, but a kind and type beyond all these—men like Plato or Aristotle, who have a world-view and are born legislators for mankind, men like Homer, Phidias, Raphæl, who reproduce the world in art and so transfigure it, men like the saints and apostles of religion who renounce the aims that ordinarily rule the

world and transform it. To these greater types even statesmen, princes and kings may well do homage: they are superior to the state and to us all. Partial instances of them the world has known, but not the full perfection of the types. Nietzsche refers to some of the great men of history, but the greatest, like the smallest, he says, are "all-too-human"; "there has never yet been a superman."[11] Zarathustra is a picture of the higher man, philosopher and saint in one—but he is a projection of Nietzsche's imagination, and even he, as pictured, looks beyond. And the philosophical type ranks first; intellectual qualities are even the first requirement for the ruler—if he lacks them, though he wishes to do well and practice justice, he may work harm. Minds not of the highest order should obey rather than rule, and the ruler must rule according to the inspiration of the philosopher—he is his executor, his right hand, his best pupil.[12]

Strange and venturesome as it may seem, in face of the democratic tide now sweeping through the world, to throw out an anti-democratic social ideal like this, Nietzsche did so. He was critic, analyst, scholar, and yet if one looks deeply enough and has a scent for the connection of things, one discovers that almost all he writes is in one way or another related to this central thought, this deeper hope. He wanted first to lay the basis for a new culture among his countrymen. He wished, I might almost say, to create a German culture, for he felt that there was none now: a culture he defined, as a unity of style in the activities, the life-expressions of a people—and German aims were too haphazard, too criss-cross, too much a compound of irreconcilable elements, to deserve that name.[13] The philosophies, the religions and the no-religions, even the moral ideas, were a jumble—there was no clear, mastering thought

[11] *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, Book II, ch. iv.

[12] Cf. the general statement of Nietzsche's social ideal in *The Antichristian*, § 57.

[13] See "David Strauss, Confessor and Writer," sect. 7, "Schopenhauer as Educator," sect. 6.

and dominating aim. Yet he hoped. He had, he felt, Kant and Schopenhauer for path-breakers, Gœthe for a shining example, Wagner for a powerful present helper, and he sent out his message—half-veiled—in the form of critical studies of Greek Tragedy, of David Strauss, of the Use and Harm of History for Life, of Schopenhauer, of Wagner. But it was too new a voice, and the thoughts, the preoccupations of Germans (it was directly after the Franco-Prussian war) were elsewhere. Some slight excitement was produced, particularly by his attack on Strauss and the self-satisfied Philistine culture he represented—he spoke of Strauss as a "Bildungs-Philister," and the term clung—but no real following. Later on he wrote, "I have made many not unscrupulous attempts to draw men near to me to whom I could speak of such strange things; all my writings have thus far been nets cast out; I wished to catch for myself to this end men with deep, rich, venturesome [ausgelassenen] souls. . . . Shall I confess it? I found no one."[14] So zealous was he that he said he would rather have a man an enemy, than take his doctrine half and half,[15] and he ordinarily found enemies, so far as he was noticed at all (silence being his usual portion). It was not till almost his last days that he found real recognition, and that beyond the border—in Denmark from Brandes, in France from Taine, not in Germany. He attributed no purposeful ill-will—at least it was very rare, he could hardly cite one literary instance of it, or more than one—but ignorance, lack of intelligence [reine Thorheit], abounded[16]; and ignorance, we know, may make enemies as

[14] *Werke*, vol. XIV, pp. 355–6; cf. pp. 381, 193, and a letter to Peter Gast in Oehler's *Auswahl* (of Nietzsche's *Briefe*), p. 267.

[15] *Joyful Science*, § 32; cf. *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, III, iv, and viii, § 1. The opposition of the literary class and of swollen agitators concerned him little; what did grieve him was the opposition of the serious and morally-minded, who longed for superior things and felt his irony at the limited scope of their ideas (*Werke*, XIV, 357–8).

[16] *Ecce Homo*, III, § 1; I, § 4. He writes to Brandes, April 10, 1888, "Where did you get the courage to want to speak publicly of a *vir obscurissimus*? . . Do you think perhaps that I am known in the dear fatherland? Even there I am treated as if I were something absurd and bizarre, something that

well as malice. Moreover, after a few years, he lost Wagner—that is, became disillusioned about him and the aid he would give: was Wagner, he asked, really striving for a new culture, was not his wonderful art an end in itself to him, a pale, dying sort of Christianity too, glorifying asceticism as it did in "Parsifal," and without promise for higher and more virile things?

Experiences like these increased his critical bent. He came to expect little help from art and artists and felt that before all the cool, clear, critical thinker must do his work, and the fighting spirit against what ever obstructed higher ideals be aroused. He subjected the democratic humanitarian spirit of our time to pitiless analysis—the impatience of rule, the lack of discipline, the softness, the identification of goodness with sympathy and pity, the herd-instincts that make men unwilling to stand alone and be themselves, the ruling morality then as well as the ruling religion; and particularly did he direct his shafts against the new spirit in Germany after the Franco-Prussian war. "The luxury, the contempt of the French, the nationalism (das Nationale) displeased me. How far back had we gone compared with Goethe! Disgusting sensualism!" so he wrote afterwards.[17] People were saying, "We have been too poor and modest hitherto, let us become rich and self-conscious, and then we too [*i.e.*, as well as the French] shall have a culture"—but Nietzsche could only answer that it would be a very different culture from that for which he was looking.[18] The Germans were capable of great things, but the real German spirit was yet to be born—in the past they had been lamed, dulled, by the two great European narcotics, alcohol and Christianity,[19] and

meanwhile nobody need *take seriously*" (*Briefe*, vol. III, p. 297). He had written to Hans von Bülow in 1882 from Italy (after having made a visit to Germany), "I found the whole dear German animal (Bestie) ready to spring at me—I was, you know, absolutely no longer 'moral' enough" (*ibid.*, III, 365–6).

[17] *Werke*, XI, 119, § 369.

[18] "Schopenhauer as Educator," sect. 6.

[19] *Werke* (pock. ed.), III, 435, §4; "Twilight of the Idols," VII, §2.

now their ambition to form another petty state in the European system was laming, dulling them, spoiling their finer, higher possibilities, again. The new so-called "great politics" was swallowing all earnestness for really great things.[20] One pays dear for coming to power, he ironically remarks: power makes stupid—the era of Bismarck was the era of German *Verdummung*.[21] Whatever intellectual leadership Germany had had was going—no significant men were coming from her any more; Wagner was from 1813, Bismarck himself from 1815.[22] "*Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles*"—he fears that was the end of German philosophy[23] Since Germany had become a so-called "great power," France won a new importance as *a power in the realm of culture* (als Culturmacht), and he wished that his *Will to Power* were written in French so as to avoid the appearance of strengthening German imperial aspirations.[24] "Quousque tandem, Crispi—Triple *alliance*," he remarks in an aside to the Italians in 1888: "with the 'Reich' an intelligent people makes only a *mèsalliance*."[25] This is severe language for a man to use against his own people, and one might think he did not love it. The fact is, he loved it too deeply, expected too much of it—he thought it capable of great things, and it was content, yes going mad, with lesser things. To him the day was past for petty states and petty state-ambitions and politics, such as were dividing and embroiling Europe. Crude patriotism such as the Romans had, *patria* and *honor*, watchwords of the antique world, were good enough in their time, necessary stages no doubt in the evolution of man from primitive savagery and individualism to civilization, but now, with

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[20] *Werke*, XIII, 339-340.

[21] "Twilight of the Idols," viii, § 1, *Werke*, XIII, 350.

[22] *Werke*, XIII, 350.

[23] "Twilight of the Idols," viii, § 1. I need not say that Nietzsche uses "Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles" as a synonym for the new national enthusiasm—not as it is popularly construed (misconstrued) in England and America.

[24] *Ibid.*, viii, § 4, *Werke*, XIV, 420.

[25] Preface to "Nietzsche *contra* Wagner."

higher aims and greater tasks before mankind, they were either dishonesty or a sign of arrested development.[36] Why this fresh crude patriotism, why Germany in general, he asked, unless it wills, stands for, represents something of more value than any previous power stood for? "Of itself only a great state the more, an absurdity the more in the world."[37] "Where is the new thought? . . . To rule and help the highest thought to victory—that is the only thing that could interest me in Germany. What concern of mine is it whether Hohenzollern are there or no"?[38] Instead of leading in a great, brave, new, enterprise for the world, the Germans were thinking of *themselves*, exaggerating themselves, building a state for themselves, exalting their *race*, and so far as there was any idea of ruling the world, ruling in *their* interest, impressing *their* mongrel culture or no culture upon it, getting places of investment for *their* capital and building up *their* commerce and trade. And the thinkers and scholars of the country were more or less going this way, too,—history was being rewritten, written now from the German standpoint, the Imperial, and even Prussian-court standpoint: there were the Sybels and Treitschkes[39]—Nietzsche did not live long enough to pour his satire on Houston Stewart Chamberlain.

The fact is, he had an idea of the organization of mankind, and the greater enthusiasm swallowed up the lesser, such as the Germans about him were carried away with. He thought that the first necessary step in this direction was for the European peoples to overcome their national egoisms and join in a common undertaking—and he saw with no pleasure the Germans adding a new egoism to the already over-supplied stock. To be a good German in his eyes was to un-Germanize oneself—it was what the strong in Germany had ever done, for instance Gœthe, who was far

[36] *Human, All-too-Human*, § 442.

[37] *Werke*, XIII, 350.

[38] *Ibid.*, XIII, 352.

[39] There are four references to H. von Treitschke in Nietzsche's sixteen volumes, viz. *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 251, *Ecce Homo*, III, ii, § 2; x, § 2 and § 3—all of them satirical.

more a European event than a German one.[30] He went so far in this direction that he had little sympathy with the German Liberation-Wars against Napoleon—the Germans thereby frustrated the possibilities of a united Europe which Napoleon was holding out; he berated Fichte—the philosopher *par excellence* of the Liberation movement—saying that one had to come down to Wagner and his last epoch [when he condescended to the Empire] and the "Bayreuther Blättern" to find a marsh of presumption, [intellectual] uncleanness and Deutschthümelei (Teutomania) equal to Fichte's "Reden an die deutsche Nation."[31] In their purely national ambitions, the Germans had thrown Europe back and were responsible for the sickness and unreason that had ailed Europe ever since, this *névrose nationale*, as he called it, nationalism—he pronounced it the worst enemy of culture that exists—this eternalization of Europe's system of small states and small politics; they had brought Europe into the *impasse* (Sackgasse) where it was to-day. For Nietzsche knew the tense state of Europe in his time, and significantly remarks that with the founding of the German Empire, this "pitiful European system and nervosity passed into a critical state" (the nearest to a prognostication of the present crisis that I know of in his writings.[32]

Nietzsche would have welcomed a victory of Napoleon, and yet there was another way and this was what he worked for. The peoples might of themselves bring about a united Europe, and be the nucleus for a better world. At first, he thought, somewhat after the manner of Mazzini, that the democratic movement might have such a result, the interests not of the many, but of princely dynasties, and of certain commercial and social classes, pushing in the nationalist direction.[33] Later, seeing that the peoples must

[30] *Mixed Opinions and Sayings*, § 323, *Werke*, XIII, 337, "Twilight of the Idols," ix, § 49.

[31] *Werke*, XIII, 340.

[32] *Ecce Homo*, XII, x, § 2, "Twilight of the Idols," ix, § 39; cf. *The Antichristian*, § 61.

[33] Cf. *The Wanderer and his Shadow*, § 292, *Human, All-too-Human*, § 475.

have leadership and that in any case an aim such as he conceived must be defined and thought out by thinkers, he looked for the rise of a new aristocratic class, self-chosen, philosophers and men of action at the same time who should point the way. The new aristocracy, however, would be different in principle and character from anything now existing—it would be international not national, interracial not racial from the start. While not holding that all the races of men are on an equality and have equal rights—he was far from sentimental humanitarianism and what is often called cosmopolitanism—he knew of no innate superiority of European races as against each other. The original Aryan races, indeed, were superior to the European aborigines whom they came down upon and conquered, but they mixed with the aborigines, and there are no pure races any longer. "How much mendacity and swamp-land," he says, "are necessary to raise race-questions in to-day's mishmash Europe (supposing that one does not come from Borneo or Horneo)." It became his maxim "to have nothing to do with a man who takes part in the mendacious race-swindle."[34] We hear instead of "international marital unions" (with the task of raising up a master-race, future "lords of the earth"), and in particular of a mixing of German with the dreaded Slav blood (Bismarck, he says, was an instance of this)—yes, Jewish blood was desirable, too, and just for the financial abilities of that race (Nietzsche was always superior to the narrowness of anti-Semitism).[35]

Nietzsche looked for aggressive movement along the lines he projected. He expected opposition, and was prepared for it—and sought to prepare his followers, too. Something of the warrior was in his nature, something of that same will to power which, as a matter of psychology

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[34] *Werke*, XIV, 356.

[35] *Will to Power*, § 960, *Werke*, XIII, 347, 352, 356–7—cf. *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 251. On freedom of travel enabling groups of like-minded men to come together and found fellowships (Gemeinwesen), see *Werke*, XIII, 359, § 883; "as many international powers (Mächte) as possible—to give practice in world-perspectives" (*ibid.*, XIII, 362, § 891).

and general philosophy, he found the basic thing in all the world, the basic thing, that is, in all that lives and advances and grows, and is not dead or dying. He would conquer, yes, he would have his aims prevail and overtop and rout all other aims, the democratic and Christian included. "War," he said, "though without powder! between different thoughts and between their hosts!"[36] The ordinary physical wars of our time interested him little—they were chiefly for commercial and national ends. "Beyond all these national wars, new 'empires,' and whatever else is in the foreground, I look away," he said. "What I am concerned about,—for I see it slowly and hesitatingly prepare itself—is a united Europe (das eine Europa)."[37] He found the military system, as it now exists in European nations, a living anachronism, the sign of a barbarous society—he uttered an extraordinary expectation that a strong victorious people might some day disarm![38] And yet he was no pacifist, and knew that his own idea might sometime have to fight—he has a special word of recognition for religious wars in the past, inasmuch as they turned on points of doctrine and had an intellectual significance.[39] Idealistic as his aim was, it involved a transcendence and disappearance of the present European state system; and powers in possession do not always readily yield the field. It went counter, too, to the supremacy of the masses in modern communities, of the wealth-seekers, of the money-lords—and these classes might not all willingly yield. What an idealistic aim lay behind those watchwords of the eighteenth century in France, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity! Yet the powers that were opposed the powers that were to be, and France and all Europe were thrown into a turmoil.

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[36] *Werke*, XIV, 226, § 456; XII, 368.

[37] *Werke*, XIII, 357.

[38] *The Wanderer and his Shadow*, §§ 297, 284.

[39] *Joyful Science*, § 144. Dr. A. Wolf's *The Philosophy of Nietzsche* (London, 1915), the best extant English monograph on Nietzsche and a welcome proof that English scholars *can* be objective at the present moment, somewhat overdoes, it appears to me, Nietzsche's pacifist tendencies (in the opening chapter, p. 17).

Nietzsche's idea was aristocratic rather than democratic, but its fortunes might not be dissimilar.[40] In a way ideas—pure ideas, abstract ideas—are the most dangerous things in the world, if they strike brutal obstruction, and though Nietzsche would like to have had all war on a spiritual plane and counted it his happy fortune that he lived a preparatory existence and could leave to future men the conduct of actual conflicts,[41] he knew that conflicts might come and he wished a martial spirit in those who followed him. Turning away from war on principle—whether on the intellectual or physical plane—was contrary to his whole nature. "Let little maidens say, good is what is pretty and affecting; to be good is to be brave." He had his own opinion of scholars who are content to sit in cool shadows; it is not enough to prove a thing, we must win men over to it—our thoughts must go forth to conquer and possess.[42] He even saw some incidental good in the national animosities and national wars, which in principle he reprobated, since they kept up the fighting spirit and maintained the military tradition in the world[43]—he was thus able to turn evil into good, as God is said to make even the wrath of men to praise him. Yet ever are great ends in mind in his praise of war. "Your war ye shall wage for your thoughts," Zarathustra charges his disciples; their love of life was not to be a mere brutish, instinctive thing, but love of their highest hope, and their highest hope was to be their highest thought of life.[44]

Nietzsche had his dark hours as the strongest have, and as to the methods by which his aim was to be accomplished he had no fixed assurance; yet his main mood was one of hope. Zarathustra (but another name for Nietzsche) scarcely knew how to live, save as a seer of things to come—so did the past oppress him; but "atonement would be made

[40] Cf. what seems like a wild prediction, *Ecce Homo*, IV, § 1.

[41] *Werke*, XII, 209; cf. XIII, 175–6, § 401.

[42] *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, I, x; II, xvi, *Dawn of Day*, § 330, *Joyful Science*, § 283.

[43] Cf. *Will to Power*, §§ 729, 126, 127, *Werke*, XIII, 358, § 882.

[44] *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, I, x.

for the past and the great Hazar be finally ushered in."[45] "Have ye heard nothing of my children," he says to men who come to visit him, "and whether they are on the way to me? Speak to me of my garden, my Happy Isles, my new beautiful race. . . . For them I am rich, for their sake I became poor; what have I not given, what would I not give to have one thing—these children, this living plantation, these life-trees of my will and my highest hope!"[46] One feels the full longing of a man's soul (a woman's, too, in the great, divine sense of that term) in words like these. Yet it is not mere longing. He speaks of the "unexhausted possibilities" of mankind. He believes that in the long course of history the fundamental law will break through, and the best come to victory—supposing ever that man wills and seeks their supremacy.[47] "From you, the self-chosen," Zarathustra says to his disciples, "shall a chosen people grow; and from it the superman."[48] Indeed, Nietzsche thought that the conditions for a change in the general attitude existed now—only the great persuasive men were lacking.[49]

IV.

What is the relation of a current of ideas like these to the European War? Only "reine Thorheit," complete lack of any real understanding of Nietzsche, could bring him into any special contributory connection with it. The basis for the common view is, first, that he was a German (almost everybody and everything German being now suspect in England and America), and then that he said certain strange things and used certain strange phrases, which the people do not understand and our scholars have given them little help in understanding. There is, for instance, the

[45] *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, II, xx; cf. IV, i, and *Werke*, XIV, 306, 136.

[46] *Ibid.*, IV, xi.

[47] *Beyond Good and Evil*, §§ 45, 203, *Werke*, XIV, 71, § 567.

[48] *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, I, xxii, § 2.

[49] *Werke*, XI, 372, § 567. In the above paragraph I borrow (in part) from my article "Nietzsche's Superman," in *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, August 5, 1915.

saying, "a good war sanctifies any cause"; there are expressions like "will to power," "blond beast," "beyond good and evil," "superman." His countrymen are supposed to have imbibed corresponding ideas— "greedily swallowed" them, an Oxford professor says[50]—and so to have been braced, if not inspired, for their present aggressive war.

Really, however, the influence of Nietzsche on his countrymen is a very debatable quantity. It was almost *nil* during his life-time (I count his life to the apoplectic stroke that ended his *intellectual* career, 1889, his body lasting some years longer), and though he was widely read afterward, and for a time might be almost said to have been the vogue, particularly among university students, artists and the literary class, real influence is another matter. One need not say that the "powers that be," whether in church or state, did not listen gladly to him; professors who took him up, because their students were reading him, were of divided mind and mostly critical toward him—one boasting that though the members of his *Seminar* on Nietzsche were all Nietzscheans at the start, when they finished, none were Nietzscheans any longer;[51] and sometimes he was as roundly, though never as unintelligently, attacked as in England and America—the last book on him before the war being a running fire on him, with the title *Nietzsche der falsche Prophet*.[52] What his influence is since the war, it is hard to say. I was in Germany for several months after its outbreak and I rarely saw or heard a reference to him—once, I remember, by his sister who knew of young soldiers at the front inspired by him, and believed that now that lessons in courage and heroism were supremely needed by the Germans, Nietzsche would come or was coming by his own.[53] The popular idea is, of course, that

[50] Selwyn Image, *Art, Morals and the War*, p. 13.

[51] Theobald Ziegler (of Strassburg) in *Der Turnhahn*, June, 1914, p. 643.

[52] By Otto Ernst.

[53] See her article in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, September 5, 1915 (cf. an earlier one in the *Hamburgischer Correspondent*, September 15, 1914). Frau Förster-Nietzsche naturally emphasizes Nietzsche's instinctive loyalty to his father-

he helped to make the Germans aggressors in the war—unscrupulous aggressors too, as witness their invasion of Belgium. But that the Germans were aggressive in any essentially different sense from that in which the Russians or the English were, remains to be proved; and as for the wrong to Belgium—most unquestionably a wrong—Nietzsche never speaks in greater contempt than of the man who breaks his word,[54] and I think he would have said the same of a nation. That he stimulated the egoism of the Germans—made them think themselves supermen, as the Oxford professor quoted asserts—is absurd to one who knows anything about him. He praised war, but not a war like this, without an idea or principle behind it—save, indeed, as it might prove a training-ground for men who would fight to great uses in the future.

And these striking phrases, that are in everybody's mouth, what do they really mean? We might fancy from current discussion that "will to power" was some odd German invention, at least a German idiosyncrasy practically, something that other peoples, the good moral English particularly, know nothing of; but, in truth, the doctrine is Nietzsche's fundamental analysis of human nature and the world at large—he conceives will to power to be the root thing in individuals as in peoples, in women as in men, in animals and even in insensate things: Schopenhauer saw everywhere will to life, Nietzsche will to power. The

land, and leaves in the background his attitude to German nationalism. Probably the most reasoned treatment of the subject is by Julius Bab, *Die Hilfe*, December 31, 1914. Professor H. L. Stewart thinks that so long as Nietzsche emphasized the German failings he was ignored, but that when he enforced the same lesson in more impersonal terms he was acclaimed (*Nietzsche and the Ideals of Modern Germany*, p. 174); but this is a misstatement (unwitting) of fact: so far as one can speak of recognition in Germany during his life-time at all, he had more of it earlier than later, and his most violent and least impersonal attacks on the Germans are in his latest books, "Twilight of the Idols" and *Ecce Homo*. Bernhardi quotes a general passage from Nietzsche about war on his title page—nothing anywhere else in his book (*Deutschland und der nächste Krieg*).

[54] In *Genealogy of Morals*, II § 2; cf. the comments on the shamelessness of (ancient) Greek nobles in breaking their word (*Dawn of Day*, § 199), and a personal reference (*Werke*, XII, 224, § 486).

English and the Russians have this will as truly as the Germans—everybody and everything has it that is really alive. "Blond beast" is Nietzsche's picturesque way of describing our fair-skinned, fair-haired Aryan ancestors who came down on the dark-skinned European aborigines ages ago and conquered them, using all manner of violence in doing so and with perfect good conscience—ancestors then of Scotchmen and Englishmen and Scandinavians, even of Frenchmen and Russians, as well as Germans now, unquestionably he felt that they were a superior race—but need I explain that in his view force, strength, superiority *can* be shown in other ways than killing, burning and ravishing? "Beyond good and evil" means transcending, not morality, but a certain type of morality, the herd or social type, with its main emphasis on mutual help and sympathy and pity, the type that dominates in our Christian, democratic world to-day—even so the type is not to be transcended by the mass of men, but only by those rarer privileged individuals who exist for ends beyond society, and are to be half like gods on the earth. "Superman" is a poetic term for these great self-complete individuals, the consummate outcome of the species' evolution, yet to be. Nietzsche is charged with travestying Darwinism, making it mean death to the small and weak; but the unhindered, uncontrolled struggle for existence leads, in his judgment, rather to the destruction of the great and strong, owing to the matter-of-fact preponderance of group-standards in the world—and this, not the submergence of the small and weak, is the real human tragedy in his eyes.[55] He does not deny a place to sympathy and pity, but will not give them the supreme place,[56] as our altruists and sentimentalists and pessimists (they naturally run into one another) do. "Not your pity, but your bravery has hitherto saved the unhappy." Not the love of neighbors, those near us, but of those furthest off, the possible divine specimens of our kind, is

[55] Cf. a passage like *Will to Power*, § 685.

[56] See my article, "Nietzsche on Love and Pity," in *The Hibbert Journal*, Oct., 1914.

the highest, yes, the most *human* thing. Have thoughts like these had any particular influence on the present war? True, Nietzsche says, "a good war sanctifies any cause," and it is a hard saying; but when I look it up[57] and observe that it comes right after declaring that we must war for our *thoughts*, and reflect that after all our thoughts may be mistaken, and that each of us has only to fight for the best and truest he knows, I feel that perhaps for us poor mortals, human, all-too-human, a good fight is the highest thing and that it may even lend a kind of sacredness to *whatever* concrete thing we do. Yes, I will dare say, that for these soldiers now giving up their lives on the battle-fields of Europe—all of them, English, French, Russian, Servian, Austrian, German, if so be they fight for the highest they know—a good fight may be the supreme thing, and that it may sanctify their cause, yes, possibly give it a greater sanctity than it ever had of itself.

But enough of these small explanations and corrections of misapprehension! There are stumbling blocks in Nietzsche; and yet one who penetrates to the heart and thought of the man, knows that his aim and hope belong to another atmosphere than that of this war, and that the war is in fact—if I read it aright—an outcome of the very tendencies and instincts he deplored and opposed. How will it end—and what will come after it? He would be bold who would prophesy. One side may crush the other—so many on each side hope; but France was crushed in 1870!—crushing will not end the war, but plant seeds of a new war. There may be a draw, but neither will that end it. The conflicting interests remaining, the nations, after rest and recuperation, will be liable, at a new unhappy juncture of affairs, to break forth again. Thoughts are abroad for quelling them in such an event, for a league to enforce peace, and Dr. Felix Adler, going more deeply still, argues for a new conception of nations and their relations, according to which each would respect the others and leave them free to develop their own national genius

[57] It is in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, I, x.

and type.[58] Even such proposals, however, contemplate a continuance in essentials of the *status quo*, a perpetuation, I mean, of the existing European state-system, each people having its separate interests and living its separate life. Nietzsche's is the one scheme I know for binding these peoples together. Does anyone aside from me, he says in a passage from which I have already quoted, know a way out of the *impasse* in which Europe is to-day—*a task great enough to bind the peoples together again*?[59] The bond he had in mind is the common aim already described—an aim in just this specific form unknown before, though Dante had in mind something like it, and the Catholic Church in its great days, when it stood superior to peoples and states and made them seem small in comparison, attempted to realise certain features of it[60]—the aim of a world-wide organization of humanity for the attainment of the highest types of humanity. Nietzsche thought that a new interest like this, a new faith, a new great passion, might transcend the nationalist interests, overtop and drown the nationalist faiths and passions that now rule and misrule the world. Not peace, not letting alone, but a new positive uniting aim was his proposition. One might almost speak of a new religion; he spoke of a new culture—a new *conscious ordering and disciplining of this crude, chaotic human life of ours*, so that it might attain some great end, blossom in some perfect fruit, before it passed away. Is such a thing possible? *Can* men rise above their country to the thought of something greater? Can the Englishman become more than English, the German more than German, yes, can our swirling democratic masses, mad for the lesser goods of life, comfort, wealth, luxury, ease—can they rise above themselves? Can they, can we all, care supremely for this *species* of ours and some culmination of its possibilities? I dare think so; still I do not know,

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[58] *The World-Crisis and its Meaning.*

[59] *Ecce Homo*, III, x, § 2.

[60] Cf. Nietzsche's reference to the Catholic Church, in *Human, All-too-Human*, § 476.

and for all I know the whole thought may be preposterous and Utopian, one more mirage of this old race of ours that can dream so much better than it can do—the only thing I *know* in the connection is that it is one of the ironies of fate, one of the comedies in the history of culture in England and America, that the man who proposes this far-reaching, supernational, I might say superhuman faith, is charged with complicity with the present European war.

WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER.

SILVER LAKE, NEW HAMPSHIRE.

BOOK REVIEWS.

EGOTISM IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY. By Professor G. Santayana. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1916. Pp. 171. Price, 5s. net.

No philosophical writer has happier *aperçus*—or expresses them more incisively—than the author of this brilliant book. Once heard, his phrases—and they are found on every page—are not forgotten: but he has arrived *ex errore per veritatem ad errorem;* the epigram is as true of him as it is of Sohm. For few writers are so inconclusive and so unsystematic; his is a critical, not a constructive, mind. Latin thought is fundamentally sceptical; seldom does it get beyond the question, *Chi lo sa?* Whereas German thought is dogmatic. It replaces systems by systems: "an Amurath an Amurath succeeds." Professor Santayana represents the Latin genius; and this has now a unique opportunity. In its lower forms, it connects the present world-war with the Reformation—this is the contention of the clerical press; in its higher, with that German philosophy which, in pre-Tractarian Oxford, a University preacher is said to have wished at the bottom of the German Ocean. Professor Santayana, it seems, echoes the wish.

"I am not going to lay hands on my father Parmenides." In the province of ideas we owe too much to Germany to dismiss her speculative constructions so summarily. "The whole transcendental philosophy, if made ultimate, is false, and nothing but a private perspective." But what if there is no such thing as an ultimate in speculation, and no finality in thought? In this case the "transcendental" philosophy may be a milestone, momentous and inevitable, on the path of mind. For of thought, as of life, it may be said "Here we have no abiding city." Our shelters, serviceable as they are, are temporary; we "seek one to come." Philosophers and pietists alike, while they deny this in words, recognize it in fact; indeed without such recognition neither philosophy nor piety could subsist among men. Each system, as it comes, "thinks itself true, and final; but, in spite of itself, it suggests some next thing."

Protestantism is uncongenial to the Latin temperament. Professor Santayana has more understanding of, than sympathy

with, it; like Balaam he blesses, even while he comes to curse.

"Protestantism was not a reformation by accident, because it happened to find the Church corrupt; it is a reformation essentially, in that every individual must reinterpret the Bible and the practices of the Church in his own spirit. If he accepted them without renewing them in the light of his personal religious experience, he could never have what Protestantism thinks living religion. German Philosophy has inherited this characteristic; it is not accumulative science that can be transmitted ready made."

This is to say that the one is religion and the other thought. Neither can be vicarious; we must live and think "on our own." And when we are told that, "favourable as Protestantism is to investigation and learning, it is almost incompatible with clearness of thought and fundamental freedom of attitude," we can only reconcile the two statements by remembering that to the classic thought of Greece Reason was a Limit; and that "they see not clearliest who see all things clear." But this is not the Professor's meaning, though it is perhaps the lesson of his very suggestive but somewhat irritating book.

A. Fawkes.

Ashby St. Ledgers, England.

As a thinker of the present moment, no man could be so well employed in focusing the popular hatred of either party of the belligerents as in enlightening it that we might make the best use of what has happened. One of the crudest causes of this war is no doubt the lack of knowledge between peoples of what they one another are. The author would have been wiser, if he had depicted the supposed English or French characteristics discoverable in German Philosophy as well as the supposed German characteristics discoverable in English or French Philosophy, as it is really possible to do. Or he might have reduced or synthesized all the German characteristics to a more fundamental form—a fundamental form in which both German and non-German peculiarities share, and tend to share still more as they grow. In spite of the fact that the author seems to be fond of the inductive method in dealing with problems, it often happens that he speaks as if he had a "categorical imperative" in his mind which obliges him to interpret, in the light of egotism, any

characteristic whatever that he finds in German Philosophy. Sometimes he is virtually passing judgment on non-German Philosophy no less or even more severely than on German Philosophy. For the qualities responsible for the condemnation are common to both, or are outweighing in non-German Philosophy. For instance, what he meant by "The Breach of Christianity" (Ch. X) or, by "Heathenism" (Ch. XIV), if it were ascertainable in German Philosophy, should be so no less or even more in non-German Philosophy. We have simply to recall to our mind the whole history of thought since the Renaissance. It is rather trivial to point to any particular epitomes such as French Positivism, English Empiricism and Utilitarianism, or American Pragmatism. Apart from the appreciation of the author, directed to his own observation, this observation itself is not always accurate enough. "Platonic idealism spurns the earth and believes in heaven, a form of religion most odious to the Germans. They think this sort of idealism not only visionary but somewhat impious; for their own religion takes the form of piety and affection towards everything homely, imperfect, unstable, and progressive" (p. 16). Does this apply to Kant whom the author takes for one of the most important exponents of German Philosophers? For the fatal weakness of Kant was just in his ascetic and dualistic idealism as well as in his *a priorism* which was the best friend of moral and logical categories and the worst enemy of an empirical improvement. Will it not apply very well to John Stuart Mill or William James or John Dewey, whose primary assets consist just in what Kant and so many German Philosophers are devoid of? Must not the following sentence that "the Germans yearn to pursue the unattainable and encounter the unforeseen" be taken to be the description of Platonic Idealism itself? The author says, "Yet German idealism is a religion of the actual. It rejects nothing in the daily experience of life, and looks to nothing essentially different beyond" (p. 16). Can this be justified in the case of Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy? I quite agree with the author that "One of the chief characteristics of German Philosophy, without which it would melt away, is ambiguity" (p. 17). But the reason why it is so lies, indeed, in the fact that German Idealism is a religion of the *non-actual;* that it rejects *everything* in the daily experience of life, and looks to *something* essentially different beyond. I wish German Idealism could realise a trifle more of the meaning

of the *actual* which was left to English, French, and American genius. What the author in these quotations says may hold true of Goethe. But in that case it means that Goethe was not merely a German but rather a *human* and modern poet-thinker. "To despise the world and withdraw into the realm of mind, as into a subtler and more congenial sphere, is quite contrary to the Idealism of a German transcendentalist. . . . He hates as he would death what another kind of Idealists have called salvation" (pp. 70, 71). This is, however, a message universal to modern thinkers, though different in its more or less accidental attributes. "German Philosophy has a religious spirit, but its alliance with Christianity has always been equivocal and external" (p. 104). If this is so, we are only assured that non-German Philosophy has been even more advanced in that same direction than German Philosophy—a tendency coincident with the stronger originality and insight in the former than in the latter.

On the whole, the limitation of German Philosophy is that it is not based upon the "ego," as a philosophy ought to be. It is rather based on a chimerical whole. Hegel and even Fichte were guilty of this folly. On the other hand, the merit of English, French, and American philosophies is that they are based upon the ego. Their limitation is just the limitation of their ego so that it cannot successfully absorb the whole by means of a proper metaphysics. A philosophy based upon the whole which is not the result of the reflection or of the perfection of the ego will necessarily produce many an evil. It may impose upon us *duty* even at the expense of *end*, or *order* even at the expense of *liberty*. Besides all this, I have been left at least in an agnostic state as to the political insight of the author. I wonder what would be the criticism of the author on *Justice in War-Time* by Bertrand Russell, in which he is bound to be interested. The Germans may be particularly guilty of the drawbacks of nationalism, as the author is keenly aware. The fact remains none the less that other nations also are in urgent need of a drastic reconstruction of their own present conception of nationalism. We had hoped that the author would have given us at least something more suggestive as a universal remedy as well as a universal diagnosis of the world's disease by the way of criticising an aggravated point of the disease. Be that as it may, this volume has not at all failed to show the admirable qualities which we naturally expected of the author. He has shown himself once again as a

singularly delightful philosophic writer. Amazing lines and passages both in thought and expression abound. Perhaps it is no mere accident that men like Nietzsche and Goethe are treated more brilliantly than some rather technical philosophers. The author himself is undoubtedly one of the poet-thinkers for whose product, especially when and where it is sincere and unbiased, we have several reasons to be thankful. One reason among others is that he is so keenly critical and occasionally even prophetic.

KOJORO SUGIMORI.

Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan.

PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION. By Bertrand Russell. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1916. Pp. 250. Price, 6s. net.

Mr. Russell has written a great book, and its effect will probably be felt long after the political controversies which the War has aroused have been forgotten. He has set himself, as it seems from the choice of subjects dealt with, to express in unacademic language the most fundamental of the new conclusions which those have been driven to make who care to examine the assumptions upon which social belief and practice now rest. The study of principles naturally leads him first to discover what are the beliefs and passions which support the present social system. His book is therefore in part a psychological analysis of the common social attitude of to-day. And by contrast there appears another attitude not common or powerful at present but obvious and important to any eyes which care to see. This other attitude is perhaps expressed as creativeness: it is at least activity rather than acquiescence and it is that activity upon which Mr. Russell lays most emphasis in his suggestions for reconstruction.

Naturally such a book must be very far-reaching in its criticism and very indefinite in its suggested programmes. We cannot have all wisdom in one volume, and it is fundamental to the understanding of Mr. Russell's argument that we should not seek it there. So that if anyone desires to find "difficulties" against new suggestions or "arguments" for old abuses, he may do so without finding himself hampered by Mr. Russell's reasoning. There is much to be said in favour of the state or of property which Mr. Russell has not said; and his form of Syndicalism or his educational programme needs further explanation. There will be many, who, for reasons perhaps unconnected with the intelli-

gent study of political and social facts, may fear to let themselves be persuaded by writing that is so obviously a departure from the careful commentaries upon Aristotle and the British or American Constitution, which have hitherto done duty as political philosophy. Most clearly one seems to perceive the ghostly form of the Hegelians gathering themselves for flight from this unholy vigour, like a wind dispersing their "higher unities."

The book begins by contrasting the power and importance of calculation with that of "impulse" in social life. Earlier political and social theory is said to have emphasized too much the part played by rational calculation or desire or purpose. The principle of growth is to be recognized as the fundamentally important fact, by reference to which all custom and institutions must be tested. But this "impulse" appears to have two distinguishable forms: it may be creative or productive and it may be possessive. This, it will be remembered, is Plato's theory in the *Sophist* where he distinguishes productiveness from acquisitiveness,—the activity of the artist from that of the "general" or the "vermin-catcher": and Plato recognises that social forms are the results of these two forms of impulse. But Mr. Russell has carried farther and made more applicable to modern circumstances the half-humorous suggestion of Plato. He sees in established institutions too little place for creative impulse. The state, for example, seems to embody the have-and-hold tendency in human life: and the only hope for the survival of individuality Mr. Russell finds in the increase in number and in power of voluntary associations for specific purposes. Such associations would be formed definitely for contest, and not for lamb-like submission. And the impulse which now finds its relief in warfare might then grow to a legitimate and quite vigorous development (p. 97). The analysis of our established property customs follows next, and all the sacred shibboleths of economics and legalism are disturbed by Mr. Russell's criticism. There seems no hope at present for any fundamental change to be adopted calmly before it is compelled by the rising anger of the dispossessed: but Mr. Russell argues well that even Socialists, who are supposed to desire a complete reconstruction of society, "still retain the view that what is of most political importance to a man is his income, and that the principal aim of a democratic politician ought to be to increase the wages of labour" (p. 130). This is probably a mistaken policy. Control of the conditions of life and labour

and an abolition of the whole wage-system seems to be a more excellent purpose for action.

In discussing education, from the political point of view only, Mr. Russell finds himself opposed by the tradition which had its first great exponent in Aristotle, that education should secure the present structure of society. We have clearly come to a time in which education should be a source for changing that structure by giving the delight in mental adventure and freedom from the oppressiveness of authority. Marriage also needs reconsideration, since the free play of personality is not possible within the present economic-political marriage system, which is based upon the authority of one over another. The same is true of the organisation of religion by official priesthoods in churches. "Very little of what is valuable in morals and religion comes nowadays from the men who are eminent in the religious world" (p. 202). The life of the spirit and the life of the mind seem to need a new form of expression, not based upon the exclusiveness and conventionalities of the past: for we can already feel the beginnings of a social insight which will transform the relations between groups of men. The principles which Mr. Russell suggests as basis for immediate action are these: "I. The growth and vitality of individuals is to be promoted as far as possible. II. The growth of one individual or one community is to be as little as possible at the expense of another." Liberty and reverence are the two words for inspiring the new world.

There are a few minor criticisms which may be made. For example, in the theory of marriage no new constructive idea is suggested; but in a book on social reconstruction the emphasis should not be laid on negative criticism. It may be that no new idea is needed; and yet if that is so, it should be stated. Is it simply that we need a modification of the present system? For the treatment of the marriage system in that case should not be put upon the same level as the treatment of property. The marriage system as it stands at present is indeed based upon domination and authority: the husband claims authority over the wife and both claim authority over the children, without any due allowance for growing intelligence. But there seems to be no new conception, which is more than a modification of the existing system, which would revolutionise the relations within the family, and perhaps Mr. Russell means to imply that modifications of the system are enough. The property system on the other hand stands upon a different level: for here the system itself is perverse

and no mere modification of it will give that free play to creative activity which Mr. Russell desires. But if there is a real distinction between the values of these two systems, it should be stated; for one needs only remodelling and the other abolition.

Again with regard to education, Mr. Russell does not seem sufficiently to value the conception of "occupations" (not "trades" as the basis for an educational system. And yet he should recognise that "The education of a gentleman" has been the greatest curse to civilisation. Our other criticisms may be on the mere interpretation of words, but perhaps the difficulty we feel as to the use of certain words by Mr. Russell may be due to a real difference of opinion. He is unfair to "reason," for he seems to identify it with mere calculation; and he is too complimentary to impulse, for he intends by it "creative activity." The mistake of the Utilitarians was not, as Mr. Russell implies, that they valued reasoning too highly, but that they did not understand what reasoning was. They had not read Plato to any purpose. And as for "impulse," the word appears to imply evanescent, transitory, fitful excitability: it is the wrong word to use for a basic conception of social philosophy, unless indeed Mr. Russell can give it new associations. "Energy," with its Aristotelian connections, or even "activity" seems to be safer, if less emotionally coloured. Then again justice appears to be misconceived. Properly used the appeal to "justice" implies by contrast the appeal to "benevolence," and in its revolutionary history it means the emotional appreciation of other men's rights as compared with other men's wrongs. It is a better word even than liberty to overturn the obsolete conception of "charity" and "being kind to the poor" as a reason for social activity.

These are, however, unessential objections to Mr. Russell's thesis. His book remains a turning point in constructive social theory and as such may very well be followed by a more detailed and more extended treatment of the basis upon which a better social world can be built. The trivial and half-hearted tinkering with present evils, which passes usually for "reconstruction," make one impatient for some bold generalisations. Every little gospeller of compromise is now preparing cheap schemes for rearranging suburban life. But Mr. Russell's mind inhabits a freer air than is common in the suburbs of social and political philosophy.

C. Delisle Burns.

London, England.

PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH. By Richard T. Ely. New York: Macmillan Company, 1914. 2v., pp. xlvii, 995.

It would be difficult to mention any two sciences that are as intimately interconnected as are law and economics. Yet so disparate are the professional associations of the teachers of these subjects that seldom can we find any adequate recognition of this fact either in books on law or in books on economics. In France the study of political economy has now been made an integral part of the law-school curriculum, and since the publication of Adolph Wagner's great text-book German economists have been paying more attention to the economics of the fundamental legal institutions of property, inheritance, etc. But in the United States lawyers think of themselves as "practical" men and will have nothing to do with "theoretical" economics; and economists, while ready to criticise the antiquated economic theories embodied in the law, seldom take the trouble to understand the basic mechanism or social significance of the fundamental legal institutions. The publication of a two-volumed work on Property and Contract by a leading economist is, therefore, a significant event even though the work be devoid of any striking or original contribution to the subject.

Professor Ely belongs to a school of writers who interpret the obligations of scientific exposition in a liberal, if not latitudinarian, manner, so that lovers of scientific rigor and definiteness will be often irritated by an exposition which, like the wind, bloweth where it listeth. Instead of restricting himself, as the title indicates, to a definite problem in the economics of distribution, the author has given us such a miscellany of information, observations, and reflections on law, ethics, politics and economics interspersed with diverse delectable bits of autobiographic information, that it is difficult to see the thread of the argument. In a general way, however, it is clear that he has tried to defend the "social" theory of property and contract, viz., that they are not absolute rights of an abstract or isolated individual but social arrangements to be justified because they serve definite social-economic ends. Private property is the stimulus to economic productivity and we must be careful in its regulation not to break down the feeling of security, of possession, without which economic enterprise would be paralyzed. Similarly with regard to liberty of contract. Restrictions on the freedom of contract are justified

because they tend to bring about conditions of opportunity and real freedom in a society where all are bound by ties of mutual dependence. "The pressure of mutual dependence is like the pressure of the atmosphere which is not felt because of the uniform balance of forces. Remove this balance and the pressure is crushing. Remove mutuality and dependence may degenerate into bondage. Therefore the prime problem of modern economic freedom is the maintenance of mutality in relationships."

As the leaders of American legal opinion are still dominated by individualistic conceptions of abstract rights, Professor Ely's thesis, though commonplace among students of ethics and social science, might have been of great usefulness had not his handling of legal material been of such a slip-shod character. No student of law can be blamed for refusing to be impressed by a writer who fails to note that the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution does not apply to the states (p. 694). It is not merely that Professor Ely falls down on legal details. His whole conception of the Bills of Rights and the function of courts is hazy and innocent of any grasp of the real difficulties. On the fundamental question of the relation of property to contract he is content with the bare dogmatic statement that "our idea of property carries with it the right of contract" (p. 555). But this is far from being a general truth. As Dean Pound has shown, in a famous article in the *Yale Law Review*, it is but a late invention of the American courts.

Morris R. Cohen.

College of the City of New York.

The Social Problem: A Constructive Analysis. By Charles A. Ellwood. New York: Macmillan, 1916. Pp. 258.

Professor Ellwood proposes "to furnish a brief analysis of the social problem in Western civilization and to outline a scientific social philosophy which shall serve as a basis for a well-balanced progress."

Successive chapters rehearse the following aspects of the undertaking: historical elements in the modern social problem; physical and biological elements; economic elements; spiritual and ideal elements; and a final chapter dealing with the solution of the social problem. The standpoint and conclusions are not new, for they embody a trend of academic sociology in the United

States. More than some other sociologists, however, Professor Ellwood stands for the view that ideas, "spiritual factors," are the prime agents of social development. He is moved to attack the position of the biologists who claim that eugenics is a final word, to assail the determinism of the economist and the selfishness and materialism of the capitalist, to hold that modern science has partly been directed to ends which prevent the community from realizing an harmonious life; and finally to urge the need of a revaluation of family, government, morality, and religion.

So strong is the conviction of the writer that religion is a prime necessity in a progressive civilization that he may fairly be classified among the advocates of a religious sociology. For western civilization he identifies religion with Christianity. Whether it is possible to formulate and to make appealing to the multitude a religion which is both sociologically proper and Christian is an item lending itself to more extended discussion than is given. The hortatory tone, the appeal to individual benevolence (as when the author urges the capitalist to change his heart and his methods) and the partiality for the terms "unselfish" and "altruism" are almost ecclesiastical. The seeming acceptance of a dualism of egoism and altruism caused by a loose use of terms adapted to popular reading is unfortunate in the light of recent ethical criticism and insight into human nature.

What is said about the primacy of individual character, the insufficiency of external machinery and negative theories of life and society is undoubtedly true. Nevertheless, the reader wonders whether Dr. Ellwood advances beyond an already familiar first act in the drama: an outline of the complexities and interrelations of the problem, with the repeated sociological reminder to see all the factors together, to reform the family, humanize industry, reprove the revolutionist, warn the conservative, remodel education, and train wise leaders. After the plot has been told as Professor Ellwood narrates it, only a formal beginning has been made. To observe and think in terms of the Great Society, to psychologize and revise methods of communal organization so that they may become fit vehicles of human nature, to induce a general willingness to experiment and to abide by possible losses as well as to enjoy gains which follow from trying social hypotheses,—most of these things are still to do. They demand comprehensive programs applied to specific issues. Their general necessity has been stated in one way or another by various social

philosophies, including that of Professor Ellwood; but the real test of a sociology is in invention and action. This means selecting crucial problems, throwing a white light on their ramifications, surveying each aspect exactly, giving the interests involved their relative and just valuation, and formulating means and end in a workable plan. An extension of the "social survey" is the enterprise which the present international tension calls for.

Professor Ellwood aptly concludes by saying that upon the university of the future rests a sacred reponsibility to train youth to think and act in terms of social causation. "Social leaders" must be available. Just what, in the coming years, is to be the mutual relation between the social expert and the community to be guided? The question, still unpursued in a comprehensive manner, seems particularly congenial to the method of sociology, and well adapted, if successfully worked out, to free it from the burden of exhortation and apology under which the church and conventional doctrines of ethics now labor. Will this synthesis also be left to Mr. Wells?

E. L. Talbert.

University of Cincinnati.

What Is Living and What Is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel. By Bendetto Croce. Translation from the Italian by Douglas Ainalie, B. A. London: Macmillan & Co., 1915. Pp. xviii, 217.

English readers of Croce's works already know him as a thinker who philosophises from a fundamentally Hegelian point of view. They will not be required, therefore, to find him maintaining in this book that the element of permanency in the philosophy of Hegel is the synthesis of opposites in the concrete universal. Only the concrete universal, it is held, and consequently only the Hegelian philosophy, can give an adequate conception of reality, for the reason that a reality is neither simply the one side of any pair of opposites, nor the other, nor yet again the mere opposites of the two, but their synthesis. Croce conceives Hegel to have made the attempt to render thought, which naturally tends to assume a rigid expression, as fluid as is the real. For he had no doubt that the real is fluid, and hence it was that Heracleitus appealed to him; and he felt at the same time that all previous philosophies had been unfaithful to this

aspect of reality. He was thus lead to the theory that the synthesis of opposites in the concrete universal is the ground of fluidity and development in reality.

But now Croce introduces a more important speculation, and this concerns that part of Hegelism which is dead. Opponents of Hegel have often ridiculed Hegel's essays into natural philosophy; and even those who adopt his principles usually consider that in such enterprises he was not happy. But they offer no explanation of the statements which give rise to their ridicule or silence. Opponents of Hegel tend to consider it a proof of the unsoundness of his philosophy that it could issue in such absurdities; while advocates of Hegel tend to regard the so-called absurdities as hard sayings or mere lapses. The one side says it was nonsense, the other it was rash to deduce dialectically the total number of the planets; but neither side offers any explanation of the fact that Hegel attempted the deduction. Such an explanation is proposed by Croce. He maintains that there is a radical error in Hegel's thought, that his many hard sayings are not mere lapses but the direct consequence of this error. He maintains, in fact, that Hegel did not distinguish between *opposites* and *distincts;* that he often believed distincts to be opposites and in consequence fallaciously applied the dialectic of opposites to them; and that in general he often treated distincts as opposites and opposites as distincts.

Thus, good and evil are true opposites and each is essential for development, hence, they must be synthesised in the concrete universal. But elsewhere art is regarded as thesis, religion as antithesis, and philosophy as synthesis, and this Croce maintains to be utterly mistaken. For art, says Croce, has a reality of its own, and is not in relation to religion what good is in relation to evil,—an abstraction. In short, art and religion are distincts, not opposites, and to them the *notion of degrees* applies, but not the principle of dialectic synthesis. Croce illustrates the theory from different sides of Hegel's work.

The whole book is highly interesting. As to the main position, there appears to remain some difficulty in deciding what is a pair of opposites and what a pair of distincts. The decision is usually reached by Croce by means of a criterion of unthinkability, opposites being unthinkable apart from each other, while distincts are not; but one is at an entire loss with regard to the meaning of unthinkability.

The style of the author is delightful, and is characterized by apt phraseology and pertinent illustration.

BERNARD MUSCIO.

Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, England.

PRACTICAL MYSTICISM. By Evelyn Underhill. London: J. M. Dent, 1914. Pp. xiii, 163.

The conviction that the world has a significance greater than appears on the surface of it, far greater than we can fully understand, is present at times to almost all of us, and lies at the root of the appeal that mysticism makes. The power and sincerity in the writings of the great mystics reinforce that appeal. But their writings are not only undeniably difficult, to most of us there is also something repellent in them. The ordinary student has, therefore, much reason to be grateful to Miss Underhill, whose gifts of exposition are very remarkable and whose sympathy makes light of stumbling blocks. Chief of these to the ordinary reader is the insistence recurrent in many mystical writings on the need for strange states of meditation, remote withdrawals into a region where there is no distinct thought and no definite image whatever.

The plain man would sweep the whole thing aside as morbid, if it were not for a lingering sense that reality is so strange it may be rash to exclude any method of approaching it. But to Miss Underhill the method of the mystics has an indispensable value. According to her summary, if I may put it into my own words, the world has two aspects: one, that of appearance (or "becoming" or "time" or "change"), and the other, that of something beyond all appearances and distinct from them, something which cannot be named unless we chose to name it pure Being or Eternity. In the end, however, these two aspects are realized as fundamentally united so that the complete mystic can return at will from his immersion into the world of eternity to a joyous union with the world of time. But as a necessary stage he must become aware of this "eternal" side, this something over and above all its manifestations, realize that it exists and desire a union with it. *"Non voglio quello che esce da te, ma sol voglio te, o dolce amore"* (quoted from St. Catherine, though not in the little book, but in the larger Mysticism, p. 298).

This would seem to imply conceiving the universe after the way some thinkers and some poets, and those of no mean order, have conceived persons, namely, as beings that are more than all their qualities, past, present, or to come.

"These are her gifts, as tongues may tell them o'er:
Speak low her name, my soul, for that says more."

Perhaps this really is the right conception of the universe, and if so, it is very important, alike for philosophy, religion, art, and ethics, there is certainly much that points in that direction besides the whole body of mystical experience. And such quasi-mystical poems as Shelley's,

"To the deep, to the deep, down, down!"

All theories of evolution, for example, seem to posit something out of which qualities emerge, itself not qualified, and most theories of creation in art suggest that the standard at which the artist aims, although it is a standard, does not contain the particular lovelinesses as such before they are expressed. Therefore it seems quite possible that, at least for certain natures, the best way of approach to reality may include this peculiar stage in which all definite appearances are as it were blotted out. We are the less prepared to deny this when we remember that Wordsworth, certainly one of the sanest as he was one of the greatest among nature mystics, counted among his highest moments those when the world of ordinary union and ordinary thought fell right away from him. But essentially the same attitude can be and is adopted by others without anything of this experience. Meredith, for example, made Earth say of her peculiar chosen that they must "love more than things of my lap, love me," and yet Meredith always kept himself "planted in good gross earth," never out of touch with the pageant of experience. Indeed, if the world of appearance is an essential part of the ultimate reality, there seems no reason why some natures need lose touch with it at all on their way up. Certainly the "blank" stage has peculiar dangers, if also peculiar advantages, and perhaps it is one of the experiences such as those of personal affection that are only valuable when unforced.

The subject of course bristles with difficulties. Not the least of them lies in the supersession of Reason. Miss Underhill does not, perhaps in the limited space at her disposal she could not,

discuss the questions fully, but it calls for such a discussion. Without it an uneasy feeling is left that the abdication of reason is meant to be both blind and complete. "By love he may be gotten and holden, but by thought never" is quoted without comment or modification. It is possible to be told that reason might come to see that for its own completion it needed something that was not strictly speaking reason at all. It is possible to be told that at present we can somehow be aware of realities which we cannot bring fully into our range, but may we not hope that one day we shall? Unless there is some goal of this kind before us it would seem that our Spirit must always be divided against itself.

The thought of the present war gives a deep and poignant interest to the discussion of the "Night of the Soul," that desolation of complete self-sacrifice through which all the mystics pass. In these days when so many are willingly giving up their lives with no hope of immortality we can feel as perhaps never before the greatness in a surrender that asks nothing at all in return, not even an enduring spiritual satisfaction. We are reminded of Sidgwick's feeling that the ignorance of what is to come after death may be the best soil for heroism. Because of that he was prepared to say that, though he believed immortality to be true and necessary to the justice of the universe, he could be content not yet to know its truth. In one of his letters—(to Roden Noel Memoirs, p. 338) he writes that while he "could not endure an unjust universe in which Good Absolute was not also good for each," on the other hand he felt "that the *certain knowledge* that justice ruled the universe would preclude the unselfish choice of Good as Good. From this point of view "hope rather than *certainty* is fit for us in this earthly existence. For if we had certainty there would be no room for the sublimest effort of our mental life—self-sacrifice and the moral choice of Good as Good, though not perhaps good for us here and now."

In the little book before us, Miss Underhill shows that the mystics do make just that effort at its hardest and go through a death at least as terrible as the death faced on the battlefield by one who has no thought of "rising again." But with the mystics, as with Sidgwick's hope, the final view does not imply an unjust universe where the brave and noble are annihilated but one where he "who has died with his own attributes wholly into God is sure of eternal life" (p. 128, quoted from Ruysbroeck).

F. Melian Stawell.

London, England.

THE BELIEF IN GOD AND IMMORTALITY. By James H. Leuba. Boston: Sherman French and Company, 1916. Pp. xvii, 340.

This volume offers (1) a brief discussion of the origin and nature of the belief in immortality; (2) the results of a statistical study concerning beliefs in immortality and in a personal God; (3) thoughts as to the utility of such beliefs.

Professor Leuba points out a distinction between primitive and modern beliefs in immortality. The primitive belief is the result of various experiences which the author calls perceptual. Among these are exteriorized memory images, "sense of presence," dreams, visions, the natural endlessness of man, vegetation and insect metamorphoses, reflections, and echoes. The modern belief arose as a result of the "breaking down of the national hope and pride, the appearance of the individualistic spirit and of personal relations with the gods, taken in connection with the prolongation of the spiritual greatness of man" (p. 113). "The modern belief in immortality is conceived of a fulfillment of a man's most precious ideals." Professor Leuba thinks of the primitive belief as an unavoidable interpretation of facts directly perceived which have no moral significance (p. 123). The modern belief is the creation of desire. The one ends in a repulsive condition which is to be avoided, while the other works toward a condition of blessed perfection.

This work of Professor Leuba is especially instructive in that it overcomes the objectionable tendency discernible in recent literature, of making too close an association between the modern and the primitive man. In such a phenomenon as a belief in immortality it is very easy to confuse entirely different beliefs because the idea of continuity is common to them. It is very easy to forget that very diverse conditions bring about diverse attitudes in people.

Professor Leuba concludes that so far there are no sufficient metaphysical or scientific grounds for the belief in immortality.

The statistical part of the book consists of the presentations of results obtained from a study of the prevalence of the belief by the questionnaire method. A sample statement which was to be affirmed or denied is "I believe in personal immortality for all men." The questionnaire was answered by (a) college students (9 colleges), (b) students in a single institution, and (c) scientists, historians, sociologists, and psychologists (about 750 in all). A summarizing chart "shows that in any class of persons investi-

gated the number of believers in God is less than the number of non-believers, and that the number of believers in immortality is somewhat larger than in a personal God." The charts show that among the more distinguished scientists and other distinguished men, unbelief is much more frequent than among the less distinguished. The author accepts these results at their face value, disregarding the fact that there is no attempt to define the terms used. Under the circumstances one might expect a great variation in the meanings attached to these terms. It is clear that these results show merely that the general tendency seems to be toward a decrease in the belief in God and immortality whatever they may be. There are no indications as to precisely what is believed concerning the matters in question. Some might believe fervently in the things which others do not believe in, and yet all might report no belief. The difficulty in finding out what is believed is brought out in the fact that Professor Leuba was unable to obtain usable material from the philosophers. They seemed to insist too much upon knowing the meanings attached to the terms used.

The author accounts for the results on the basis of greater moral and intellectual freedom in the unbelievers. This would be a suitable explanation did the facts indicate a rejection of such beliefs because of a critical examination of them, but, unfortunately, such facts are lacking.

Respecting the ethical situation, Professor Leuba believes that a science of ethics which requires immortality would be quite unsafely supported. The final implication is that the belief in immortality serves no useful purpose in our present civilization.

The reader of this study can but be impressed with the fact that in this book is discussed with the fair spirit of critical inquiry a subject that in recent literature has been even unscrupulously handled.

J. R. Kantor.

The Spiritual Ascent of Man. By W. Tudor Jones, D. Phil., with an Introduction by A. L. Smith, M.A., Master of Balliol College, Oxford. London: University of London Press; Published for the Press Company by Hodder & Stoughton, 1916. Pp. xii, 241. Price, 5s. net.

One of our greatest English thinkers said some few years ago that as long as English writers on religion declined to be in earnest

with philosophy they would speak on some topics, if not ignorantly, at least without proper knowledge and understanding. Whatever truth there may be in this statement the reproach it implies cannot fairly be levelled against the author of *The Spiritual Ascent of Man*. For this book is clearly the fruit both of wide philosophical reading and of hard philosophical thought. Its central idea, moreover, has been worked out in conformity with a philosophical plan which is itself an integral part of its purpose. It is certainly a book which all who have the cause of religion at heart would do well to read and ponder. The book appears at an opportune time. The Master of Balliol, who has written a very genial and kindly Introduction to it, remarked in the hearing of the writer of this review that the conflict in which the nations of Europe are now plunged would leave a more profound mark on the history of the world than any event since the birth of Christianity. With that we agree. And it will be true, we are convinced, in no respect more than in respect of religion. In spite of, or rather perhaps, by reason of its untold evil and sorrow and suffering the war has tremendously quickened our sense of religion, tremendously deepened our need for its consolation and support. But, recognising this, we cannot also be blind to the fact that this quickened sense, this deepened need, owe much to our present emergencies and will require to be sustained when, in God's good time, those emergencies are safely passed. The feeling which is aroused in the moment of storm and tumult is all too prone to fade away when the storm and tumult have ceased. Our belief in the reality of religion must then be grounded in something more permanent than emergency. And what that ground is and what is its justification, is, we may say, the purpose of *The Spiritual Ascent of Man*. There are two main avenues of approach to the consideration of religion. The one, starting from actual historical religious systems, seeks, as it were, to distil from them their common spiritual essence. The other starts from human reason, where by reason we mean that restless and yet calm, clear faculty whose source is the unity within man's nature and whose goal is the unity of the nature within and the nature without. Probing the conditions of human reason itself, analysing the complexes such as science and morality and art in which, to use a phrase of the author, that reason has become incarnate, it endeavours to show how, in these things, the true foundations of religion are laid. It is the second method that

the author of this book has mainly followed. With it as a clue, he steadily pursues his way towards the summit of his theme. He shows us that if we follow out faithfully the implications of the activities of reason in science, morality and so forth, none of these separate spheres is self-contained and self-subsistent. Each of them comes for the solution of its final problems to something above and beyond itself. And as we rise from the level of the lower to the level of the higher we are brought at last to the completion of them all in religion. Religion and God, these are the profound realities, the ultimate issues, to which *The Spiritual Ascent of Man* leads us. But this is not the end of the matter. For, as the author insists, religion is not merely *knowing;* it is also *being*. And since *being* for us men consists in activity, *being* necessarily means *doing*. To be sure, *knowing* is likewise *doing*. But the *doing* that is here in question is the doing that embraces the whole of our activities. For every side of our being a place must be found in religion; and any religion that refuses to recognise this is doomed to end in barrenness and failure. Some parts of the book are distinctly hard. We do not complain of this. Religion is worth all the pains we may take to understand and appreciate it.

We whole-heartedly commend the book. It is throughout a pleading for those inner realities which because we can experience them are our greatest joy; and yet because our experience of them must be partial and fragmentary are, at the same time, not the least of our distresses.

J. T. Walley.

Bristol, England.

The Christian Ethic of War. By P. T. Forsyth, M.A., D.D. London: Longmans, Green & Company, 1916. Pp. x, 196. Price, 6s. net.

This is a sincere and earnest rather than a clear or a convincing book. As an *argumentum ad hominem* addressed to the Conscientious Objector, whose influence in the Free Churches is far from being a negligible quantity, it is often telling; "to pay taxes . . . is to be as much a partner in the war as fighting would be—with the added enormity of paying others to do an immoral thing which the protestor evades by buying himself off": and it is refreshing to come upon the admission that "Casuistry

every one has to practice; the question is whether we should use amateur or skilled." But the writer is hampered by a theory of the Atonement without which, he admits, "all I have just been saying falls to the ground as a speculative fantasy," but which few theologians would now discuss seriously. This leaves him open to criticism from more than one side. There are, it seems, three separate Dr. Forsyths: the first as he is, a Puritan of the Cromwellian type, soaked in the Old Testament; the second as he sees himself, an Evangelical Christian nurtured on the New—though on Paul, not on Jesus; the third as he would have others see him, a moral philosopher in revolt against modern ethical conceptions, which (he thinks) lead to what he denounces as an "anthropomorphic religion. That is, its prime interest is man with God to help him. (Ps: xxiii)"—surely a respectable ancestry?—but "it ends in subjective humanism, with God squeezed out." Unlike the Athanasian Trinity, these three are not one. It would be unfair to compare *The Christian Ethic of War* to Monsignor Benson's *Dawn of All*. But a certain purple patch in the latter work will not unfrequently occur to the reader of the former: "The Christ you appeal to is nothing. . . . . Have you never heard of the Wrath of the Lamb?"

The points which Dr. Forsyth wishes to make would have been brought out more clearly had he avoided the obscure theology of the Atonement, and taken them on general rather than on distinctively religious ground. "Whoever expects to find in Scripture a specific direction for every moral doubt that arises, looks for more than he will meet with," says Paley. And, while in a historical sense we may speak of "Christian Ethics" with propriety—what is meant being the development of Ethics in Christian Europe—to do so in the sense of a distinct kind, or species, of Ethics, standing over against other kinds, or species, is open to misconception. For the science of conduct is rational, rather than either Christian or non-Christian; and it is one. The distinction between rational and Christian exists for thought rather than in things. There is, no doubt, a difference of accent and emphasis, to miss which is to land oneself in a rather arid intellectualism. But, in substance, Christianity is a republication, re-statement, and reinforcement of the dictates of reason. Hence its power of development; it grows as reason grows. So that an interpretation, whether of Scripture or of Christianity, which is in conflict with reason and with the institutions in which

reason embodies itself—Society, Law, the State—is self-refuted. Such positions are better argued not on the ground of religion—this would be endless—but on that of reason. They are unreasonable, *i.e.*, intellectually foolish, and *therefore* (we may insist upon the consequence), morally wrong. It follows that they are not, and cannot be, Christian: the great text of the Cambridge Platonists was "The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord." Where the argument is conducted on other lines, it is difficult to avoid the shoals of religious controversy. To the non-theological reader it will probably seem that in the present work the author's interest is rather theological than ethical; to the theological reader it will seem that the particular theology in whose interest the book has been written is one which has no future and which has had a more than doubtful past.

ALFRED FAWKES.

Ashby St. Ledgers, England.

DIVORCE AS IT MIGHT BE. By E. S. P. Haynes. Cambridge, England: Heffer & Sons. Pp. 81.

Like all Mr. E. S. P. Haynes' work, these fine essays combine a remarkable range of knowledge with a distinctly individual outlook and style. There is something eighteenth century about their close-grained brevity and precision, the grace and felicity of the dedication to H. G. Wells and the memorable irony of the first three pages, the telling passages on pp. 55–56 and p. 60. But no one who has followed Mr. Haynes' strenuous fight against stupidity and cruelty in their most jealously guarded preserves, need to be told that the book is modern and vital in the highest degree. The two main essays, which appeared as articles in the *Fortnightly Review*, present a valuable analysis of the Report of the Divorce Law Commission (which endorses in nearly every particular Mr. Haynes' own suggestions less than six years before), and a bold, comprehensive, constructive defence of divorce by consent, subject to certain time limits and financial provisions. He does not anticipate any legal recognition of divorce by consent in England, for perhaps another century; and here it may be noted that though divorce by consent could be made perfectly compatible with due care for the children, and is the only solution tolerable to human dignity and freedom, yet, if it is not to involve great hardships, injustice to women, it should be post-

poned until motherhood is *adequately* protected by insurance or endowment, until all women have the knowledge of birth control and all young people a responsible and decent sex education. It may be that, in the words of Mr. Walter Lippmann: The family has survived all manner of stupidity. It will survive the application of intelligence, but as Mr. Haynes points out, the family is being subjected to immense strain by present conditions. Quite apart from feminism, an increasing number of men are finding the only legally recognized form of sex-relationship quite beyond their means; and in Europe the shortage of young adult men after the war will be a further disintegrating factor. Yet in England the forces of apathy and reaction continue to oppose all attempts to alter laws which resemble nothing but a revoltingly indecent and cruel practical joke and are as indefensible from the standpoint of Catholicism as from that of rational humanity; just as they annually waste thousands of infant lives, and maunder over the declining birth-rate. Probably any change for the better depends on a far greater amount of conscious "direct action" than English people at present contemplates. I believe the society of the future will recognize the extreme variety of emotional ideals and proclivities in human beings; and I hope Mr. Haynes will find time to expand the ideas presented in this book still further, to turn his very vigorous, versatile, original mind and knowledge of books and men, on the *whole* fabric of superstitious humbug and commercialized waste. His firm clear sense of vital values is much more characteristic of the French than the English mind.

F. W. Stella Browne.

London, England.

SHORTER NOTICES.

New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. By Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz. Translated by A. G. Langley. Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1916. Pp. xix, 861.

This translation of Leibnitz's important book, the *Nouveaux Essais*, and other pieces, is appropriately republished under date 1916, which year marks the two hundredth since the great philosopher's death. The new publisher is the Open Court Publishing Company whose efforts in making philosophical classics available to many readers merit the highest commendation. The present volume, though printed from the same plates, is nevertheless an improved book. The paper used is thinner and the large bulk of the first edition is considerably reduced. There is an addition in the way of a portrait of the philosopher from the well known series which the Open Court Company published some years ago. One is espe-

cially moved to note any improvement in the external makeup of the book because of the unfortunate failure to make any change in the serious defects of the translation as first issued.

J. K.

HYGIENE IN MEXICO, A STUDY OF SANITARY AND EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS. By Alberto J. Pani. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1917. Pp. xi, 206.

The ethical problems presented by conditions in Mexico are many in number, and deep rooted in their implications. Knowing that morality is a function of actual life conditions, one is not surprised at the intolerable and disgraceful disrespect for life and property in Mexico. Being an engineer, Mr. Pani attacks his problem from the hygienic standpoint. He finds that the City of Mexico taken as an example is the most unhealthful city in the whole world. The coefficient of mortality is three times that of American cities. The general problem of education is a pressing one, and the terribly unsanitary conditions may be attributed to ignorance. This problem is closely related to the fact of the extreme poverty of the people. Mr. Pani recommends the intellectual and economic improvement of the people in order to bring about healthful living conditions in the Republic.

J. K.

NICHIREN, THE BUDDHIST PROPHET. By M. Anesaki. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916. Pp. xi, 160.

This is the very interesting biography of a Buddhist prophet of the thirteenth century. Nichiren is a man of extreme human sympathy who devotes his life to the purification of Buddhism in Japan, and the spreading of the gospel of the Lotus of Truth. This little volume will prove instructive to those who wish to know something of the life of Japan in the thirteenth century.

J. K.

PSYCHIC PHENOMENA, SCIENCE AND IMMORTALITY. By Henry Frank. Boston: Sherman French and Company, 1916. Pp. 543.

This book is offered as a scientific solution of the problem of immortality; the author claims to establish the truth of immortality on a physical foundation. He attempts to account for "extra-normal" phenomena (psychic) as the work of an agency which is a refined substance. The substance is the secret seat of the psychic energies, and may survive the body. Mr. Frank believes the recent discoveries in radio-activity may be interpreted to support such a view as he holds. This book may be taken to be typical of a literature which by an uncritical web of intellectual dross spun about a core of fact does serious harm to the progress of knowledge. Many persons are misguided by the apparently scientific nature of the material, and are led into absurd beliefs.

J. K.

THE OLD TESTAMENT IN THE LIGHT OF TO-DAY. By William Frederic Bade. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915. Pp. xxii, 318. Price, $1.75 net.

This very readable account of the development of the Old Testament religion and ethics is not designed primarily as a scientific contribution but

is rather addressed to those who are somewhat perplexed by the ethical crudity of many parts of the Old Testament.

The aim is to show such readers that the Old Testament is not all one piece but represents a religious and moral growth of several hundred years. The general point of view, and much of the detail, is familiar to scholars, but it is extraordinary that so little attempt has ever been made to present the actual morals of the people of Israel in genetic fashion for the general reader.

Considerable attention is given by the author to the general nature of tribal morality, to the interaction between the nomad and agricultural situations, and to the influence of the political organisation. The account closes with the Exile and does not take up the remarkable reconstruction that took place in consequence of that crisis.

THE SOCIAL LEGISLATION OF THE PRIMITIVE SEMITES. By Henry Schaeffer, Ph.D. New Haven: Yale University Press. London: Humphrey Milford; Oxford University Press, 1915. Pp. xiv, 245. Price, $2.35 net.

This work, growing out of a thesis at the University of Pennsylvania, brings together the social legislation of the Early Semites from the Old Testament and comes chiefly from Mohammedan sources.

Some of the chief topics are Patriarchy, Agnation, Next of Kin, Slavery, Interest, Pledges, Poor Laws, The Year of Jubilee, Ezekiel's Plan of Allotment, Taxation and Tribute. Among the early Semites there was, of course, no such distinction between law and ethics as has come to pass in modern times and the student of ethics will find here much material in convenient form.

J. H. T.

FAITH OR FEAR? An appeal to the Church of England. London: Macmillan & Company, Ltd., 1916. Pp. xii, 264. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

The outbreak of war produced a certain revival of interest in religion; but it has been evident to many people that the Church has not been able to use this opportunity. What is the reason for her failure? The answer given by this little book is that the Church is hampered by formalism and tradition, and corrupted by worldliness. It consists of papers written from a personal point of view by five churchmen, and is both courageous and interesting. It is true that the reader will not find a careful exposition of underlying causes of decay, but rather an enthusiastic attempt to revive the spiritual mission of the Church and a far-reaching denunciation of those evils within which have rendered her ineffective. Thus Mr. Hankey attacks the narrow interpretations imposed by sections of the Church on the doctrine of the Virgin Birth and the Incarnation; Mr. Palmer pleads for more enthusiasm and for the abolition of formulæ, and believes in a progressive and evolutionary theology. Mr. Anson and the Reverend Lewis Donaldson criticise the timid aloofness of the Church from social and political problems—especially from the Labour question, and the latter sees in the ideal Church a democratic institution, uncorrupted by Erastianism. Finally in a paper called the "Test of Living Experience," the Editor, the Reverend C. H. S. Matthews appeals to the Church to give up her perpetual divisions, to purge herself of hypocricy, and to realise an essential comprehensiveness and freedom.

The whole book suffers from the usual defects of latitudinarian thought: the tone of each paper is so individualistic that the message lacks in part not

only cohesion but sanction and authority. Some of the authors recognise that their interpretations of doctrine are unusual; at the same time Mr. Matthews admits that there is authority in interpretation. The difficulty in the Church of England has always been to discover where the seat of this authority is. We confess to the belief that until there is evolved some intelligible power in the Church that will demand the assent of the majority of her members, the spirit of freedom will not approach that ideal which sincere and liberal-minded men like the authors of this book regard as the hope of the future. What the spirit is, which should inform that authority, is another matter; and here we share the point of view of our authors. They write "In the Hour of Self-Criticism and Repentance," and their message is intended especially for churchmen. They insist rightly on the spiritual need of the Church rather than on her ethical teaching. For the moral force of a religious institution is derived from that spiritual exaltation which sets it before men's eyes as a "*beseelte Gesellschaft*" and exhibits (in the words of Mr. Hankey) "not controversy, but demonstration, not logic but power."

A. E. F.

London, England

THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY. A Critical and Constructive Study in the Light of Recent Thought. By Ernest Northcroft Merrington, M.A., Ph.D. London: Macmillan & Company, Ltd., 1916. Pp. x, 229. Price, 5s.

There was probably never a time when philosophy, in the technical sense of the word, appealed to so small an audience as to-day. The mind does not "bite upon it": psychology, criticism, history flourish; speculation declines. There is more than one reason for this. The old Ontology is waterlogged; the great German System Schools, while they vastly extended the outlook of the human mind, fell more and more (it seemed) out of touch with the actual; and what may be called the "stopgap" substitutes for Philosophy—Associationalism, Pragmatism, Vitalism, etc.—leave the impression of being temporary expedients, and of evading the real issues. *Mox illos sua fata manent majore sub hoste:* the stubborn core of reality outlasts both systems and expedients. Whether we call reality a shadow thrown by mind, or mind a shadow thrown by reality, both are "ever with us"; neither can be got rid of by being ignored.

The author states his main thesis succinctly: "The present work represents an effort to state the problem of Personality in relation to some of the fundamental truths of philosophy and theology."

The first part of this book is occupied with an examination of certain views of the Self held by recent philosophers in Britain and America—James, Bradley, Royce, Howison, Schiller, H. Rashdall and Pringle-Pattison; the second is a thesis, published with the authority of the Division of Philosophy of Harvard University, by which it was accepted as part of the author's work for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The former is solid, ingenious, and suggestive; the latter is an important contribution to modern speculative thought.

"The part of your thesis which hits me hardest," wrote William James to the author, "is the remarks on Experience." For "like a great snowstorm this vague concept has buried beneath a colourless and uniform surface the various grades of reality and the chief problems of philosophy." The unanimity of widely differing schools in adopting it as a starting point "is not really an evidence of the value of the concept as used; it is rather an

incentive to the critic to point out the vagueness and ambiguity of the term, and to see in it one cause of the present-day confusion in metaphysics." The Self—"ever the most difficult concept for metaphysics and the most recalcitrant fact for science"—has been the chief sufferer. For the notion of Experience is, and will remain, ambiguous till its implication of Selfhood is recognised: what experience signifies is "the content of consciousness—the stream of objects as present to the Subject, or Subjects, whose experience it is."

From this analysis of Experience the meaning of Personality and its related concepts is derived. The position that Self is real and the true basis of reality follows: and the discussion of the Metaphysic first of Existence and then of Values leads to an exposition of the Metaphysic of Reality, the whole pointing to the conclusion that, while existing criticisms of Monism are themselves open to criticism, Monism, at least as it has been presented to us, is no solution of the problem of speculation. Dualism is, we may believe, not final: but, so far, the element of duality has not been overcome.

A. F.

Ashby St. Ledgers, England.

ESSAYS IN WAR-TIME. Havelock Ellis. London: Constable & Company, Ltd., 1916. Pp. xvii, 256. Price, 5s. net.

The sanity and integrity of Dr. Ellis' vision and his accurate analysis of some of the shibboleths of "biology" and politics (as expounded by the pulpit, the halfpenny press, and other stupefying and corrupting agencies) will, of course, be much resented. But the immediate urgency, as well as the profound intrinsic importance of the subjects of these *Essays* should ensure them attention and discussion; and the writing is delightful in its subtlety and distinction, its wealth of suggestion and implication, and deep quiet humour. The three concluding articles on Birth-Control and the close-packed little Essay on "Marriage and Divorce" are particularly fine, in their characteristically unflinching and beautiful treatment of sexual subjects. "Masculinism versus Feminism" stresses a point which many feminists are apt to forget, that a real civilisation should give scope for the mental and physical strength, initiative and invention of men, as well as for the special qualities of women. "Eugenics and Genius" and "The Production of Ability" are penetrating exposures of current generalisations and dogmatism, and show the need for careful and *individualised* biological research. The Essays dealing with the War, though admirable in tone, are less clear and sure in touch than the rest.

F. W. STELLA BROWNE.

London, England.

TOWARDS A SANE FEMINISM. By Wilma Meikle. London: Grant Richards, Ltd., 1916. Pp. 168. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

An insistent argument that for women the way to enfranchisement lies through efficient organisation in trade unions, and entry into commerce and business on a large scale. It is a pity this theme is not worked out in more detail on the affirmative side. The criticisms of the Pankhurst psychology, and the snobbish, pretentious fraud of the Higher Education for Women at the older universities, are admirable and much to the point. The style is clear and terse, with a graphic pictorial quality, but Wilma Meikle should beware of facile antitheses and off-hand dogmatism. She

often sacrifices accuracy to effect in the later Wells manner. She might have illustrated official suffragism's bondage to humbug, by the manner in which various leaders hastened to denounce and repudiate the *Free Woman*, at the challenge of Mrs. Humphry Ward. She brings out the immense variety of temperaments and theories among suffragists, as regards sex, but is quite priggishly pessimistic about the Hetaira type.

F. W. STELLA BROWNE.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELAXATION. By George Thomas White Patrick, Ph.D. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916. Pp. 280.

In this book important matters are treated from a scientific point of view but in a very readable style and delightful manner. Play, sport, laughter, profanity, alcohol, and war are considered. All these illustrate in the author's view one fundamental law, that of relief from the stress and tension which characterizes our modern life. Such a treatment is far more fundamental than the ordinary attitude of the reformer on the one hand or the unthinking and optimistic promoters of efficiency and intensity on the other. The book is a well-timed reminder that the human machine has certain inherent limits and that we need to consider our whole system of life and education from the point of view of these limits.

J. H. T.

PHILOSOPHY: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL FRAGMENT. By Henrie Waste. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1917. Pp. 274. Price, $1.25.

In this book an American girl tells the story of her search for a unifying and integrating of her own personality and of her conception of the world through the study of philosophy. In Freiburg she comes to love a fellow student with whom she works and talks. And though she attributes to her love no more than a quickening of her philosophical processes, one finishes the book with a strong sense of the truth of Bradley's aphorism: "To love unsatisfied the world is a mystery which love satisfied seems to comprehend. The latter is wrong only because it cannot be content without thinking itself right."

A. B. A.

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